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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reviews Panamanian-U.S. relations in an 
attempt to understand the possibilities in the relationship 
both now and beyond 2000.  This subject is important because 
of the strategic interest of the United States in Panama and 
the Panama Canal.  As currently planned, the United States 
will turn over control of the Canal and the last U.S. 
military forces will depart by noon on 31 December 1999. 
This, however, may not be necessary or desirable.  After 
viewing three levels of analysis—the international system, 
domestic politics, and leadership—this thesis has 
determined that there are possibilities in Panama other than 
a total withdrawal by the United States.  In the current 
environment (of an international system moving towards 
regional integration; of a domestic political reality in 
Panama dominated by commercial interests; and an urban, 
upper-class, seemingly pro-U.S. president in the leadership 
position), it seems that the United States could 
successfully pursue some involvement in post-1999 management 
of the Panama Canal and the renegotiation of U.S. basing 
rights in Panama beyond 2 000. 
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If the American Century is ending, as some suggest, 
then future historians will no doubt closely link the United 
States' military presence on the Isthmus of Panama (1904- 
1999) and construction (1904-1914) and control (1914-1999) 
of the Panama Canal with U.S. large power status in the 
world.  Even should the United States continue to play a 
major role in the world, the U.S. exit from Panama on 
December 31, 1999 will be a seminal event in regional 
relations. 
This thesis is a study of the strategic options facing 
the United States in Panama and focuses on Panamanian 
foreign policy development.  The basic questions are:  What 
can be done by Panamanian foreign policy makers that can 
meet the strategic interests of the United States?  If the 
strategic interest of the United States was to maintain some 
degree of involvement in the management of the Panama Canal 
or continued basing of U.S. forces on the isthmus after 
1999, would this be possible? 
Three levels of analysis are used to frame foreign 
policy options for Panama: the international system, 
domestic politics, and leadership.  The international system 
level of analysis, while providing useful insight into world 
politics during the Cold War, provides less clear 
indications of a state's foreign policy orientation in the 
1990 's.  In Latin America, a pattern of "regionalization" 
xv 
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was formalized at the December 1994 Summit of the Americas. 
For Panama, the goal in this new world of trading blocs is 
clearly to join the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  In order to join NAFTA directly while avoiding the 
Central American integration process, good relations with 
the United States are important for Panama. 
The domestic political level of analysis is important 
in understanding Panama's foreign policy options.  The 
thesis presents Panamanian domestic politics as a series of 
political landmines through which presidents and other 
politicians must negotiate.  The term bailar la vara (dance 
the stick) best describes the process.  The current regime 
of domestic politics in Panama, which can be labeled the 
"New Oligarchy," is similar to past periods of oligarchical 
rule.  During these past periods of rule, relations between 
Panama and the United States were good but still suffered 
from the polarization of partisan politics and occasional 
negative sentiment on the part of the Panamanian masses. 
The current regime of domestic politics facilitates the job 
of the national leader because (1) the military is not in 
any position to challenge the government; and (2) the United 
States and Canal Zone leadership are least involved in 
Panamanian politics since 1903. 
Utilizing the leadership level of analysis, this thesis 
views the historical record of five past Panamanian leaders- 
-Arnulfo Arias, Jose Remön, Omar Torrijos, Manuel Noriega, 
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and Guillermo Endara—and attempts to compare their 
characteristics and foreign policy behavior.  If the past is 
any indication,  Panamanian-U.S. relations are best when a 
member of the urban, upper-class in power in Panama.  It 
might be added that a leader without a charismatic source of 
legitimacy is best for such relations.  Other factors such 
as location of education and whether or not the leader was a 
military officer or civilian did not affect foreign policy 
disposition.  President Perez Balladares seems to provide 
the ideal leader for good Panamanian-U.S. relations: elected 
(i.e. rational, not charismatic legitimacy) and from 
Panama's urban, upper-class.  His U.S. education, while not 
guaranteeing a favorable disposition, does ensure a degree 
of good communications. 
All three levels of analysis—the international system, 
domestic politics, and leadership—point to a window of 
opportunity in Panamanian-U.S. relations.  Should U.S. 
strategic planners decide that it is in the interest of the 
United States after 1999 to continue to be involved in 
managing the Panama Canal or that U.S. forces should remain 
on the isthmus, then the possibility exists that an 
agreement with Panama can be reached. The ingredients for 
success are at hand;  the rest is up to the skills and tact 
of negotiators. 
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If the American Century is ending, as some suggest, then future historians will 
no doubt closely link the United States' military presence on the Isthmus of Panama 
(1904-1999) and construction (1904-1914) and control (1914-1999) of the Panama 
Canal with U.S. hegemony in Latin America and large power status on the world 
stage.  Even should the United States continue to play a major role in the world, the 
U.S. exit from Panama will be a seminal event in regional relations.  This thesis is a 
study of the strategic options facing the United States in Panama. 
While much of the literature regarding the U.S.-Panamanian relationship 
focuses on the strategic value of the Canal and military presence, the negotiation 
process leading to the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Treaties, or past tragedies such as the 1964 
Flag Riots or Operation Just Cause (1989), the subject of this thesis is the 
development of Panamanian foreign policy.  By studying the development of 
Panamanian foreign policy, it is hoped that a better understanding can be reached of 
what is possible in relations between the United States and Panama.  Knowledge of 
diplomatic possibilities could be helpful to policy-makers as U.S. strategic concerns 
with Panama and the region are considered. 
A. OVERVIEW 
From the United States Senate ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties in 
1979 and the subsequent Panama Canal Act, there have been no major alterations to 
the Carter-Torrijos agreements.  The Panama Canal Zone and its government have 






complete Panamanian control at noon on 31 December 1999, and the U.S. military 
departure, which has already begun, is on track to be completed at the same time. 
Although the entire process seems to be on an unstoppable trajectory, major questions 
which are of strategic interest to the United States remain unanswered only five years 
before the turnover. 
Broadly these strategic concerns can be divided into two categories: (1) Canal 
management and (2) post-1999 U.S. military status in Panama.  For the United States, 
Panama, and other nations that use the Canal heavily, these questions are of economic 
and military significance. 
1. Canal Management 
While the Panama Canal Commission (PCC), a United States government 
corporation, now manages the Canal under the auspices of the United States 
Department of Defense, this arrangement will end with this century.  The U.S. 
personnel regulations, federal law, and pay scales that are now used for all PCC 
employees will no longer apply.  Panama is challenged to develop appropriate 
regulations to allow for a smooth transition in administering the Canal.  While the 
current PCC Board of Directors in made up of five United States citizens and four 
Panamanians, the post-1999 organization is developing as a Panamanian organization 
with no international participation.  The United States management of the waterway as 
a public service entity providing a cheap and convenient shortcut across the isthmus of 
Panama contrasts sharply with the Panamanian view that the Canal can be operated at 
a great profit and that toll increases are feasible. 
Most important for both commercial and U.S. military shipping is that the 
operation of the Canal continues.  While many dedicated Panamanians are preparing to 
operate the Canal efficiently, an objective observer cannot help but note the condition 
of previously reverted areas—especially the Panama Rail Road—which were 
mismanaged and quickly fell into inoperable states.  If the Panama Canal were to 
suffer the same fate, it would be a disaster for the shipping industry and a new 
challenge for U.S. strategic planners.  Political Scientist Margaret Scranton sums up 
the situation best: 
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Panama must rise to the occasion.  If they botch this, they will 
never forgive themselves, and the world will never forgive them.  The 
Panama Canal will become an interesting historical artifact, like the 
pyramids, like the dinosaurs.1 
2. Post-1999 U.S. Military Status 
Under the Panama Canal Treaties there will be no U.S. military presence in 
Panama after 1999.  However, the United States will continue to have the right and 
obligation to protect the Canal should the neutrality or operation be threatened.  In the 
current global environment there appears to be no external threat to the Canal and it 
was decided long ago that the best way to protect the facility against internal 
Panamanian sabotage was to placate Panamanian demands by turning over control.  To 
show concern over protecting the Canal from an external threat reflects a long-view of 
the development of power-projection capabilities by global actors.  Concern over this 
future and yet undeveloped threat is allusive for most policy-makers who are generally 
content with an ad hoc approach to international affairs, military planning, and the 
Panama Canal in particular.2 
The U.S. military presence in Panama has significance beyond serving as 
protection for the waterway.  As the United States' largest deployment to the region, 
1Tracy Wilkinson, "An Uneasy Passage in Panama," Los Angeles 
Times, June 6, 1994, Information Service on Latin America, Vol. 
48, No. 6, pp. 76-78. 
2A cyclic view of history, such as that provided by William 
Straus and Neil Howe in Generations; The History of America's 
Future, 1584-2069 (New York: William Morrow, 1991), provides a 
longer view of historical development and suggests realistically 
that other global challenges will appear.  Another helpful 
approach is presented in Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long 
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the force has been a significant factor in representing U.S. interests, showing support 
for democracies, and moderating the international behavior of regional states.3  United 
States Southern Command located at Quarry Heights, with its four-star Commander-In- 
Chief and staff, has been the United States military's representative for all of Central 
and South America.  This unique in-region presence has allowed high-level 
relationships between the CINC and top military and civilian leaders throughout the 
region.  After 1999, this staff will most likely be located in Miami, Florida despite 
arguments that it is more effective when located within Latin America. 
More practical considerations are logistical in nature.  For the Air Force, how 
will the reversion of Howard Air Force Base affect U.S. power projection in the 
region?  How will AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) counter-narcotics 
Detection and Monitoring be accomplished without Howard?  Will the resupply of 
embassies and other U.S. missions in Latin America be supported by flights directly 
from the United States?  For the U.S. Navy, will the reversion of Rodman Naval Base 
limit the operation of ships in the Western Caribbean and off the western coast of 
Central and South America?  Do other resupply and maintenance agreements have to 
be sought?  For strategic planners, what would closure of the waterway mean for 
regional, extraregional, and global contingencies? 
This thesis will not answer these potential logistical problems nor will it argue 
the strategic importance of the Panama Canal.  These tasks are left to the staffs of 
3The ten bases in Panama are, other than the small Soto Cano 
Air Force facility in Honduras, the only U.S. bases in Central 
and South America. 
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policy-makers.  However, while this thesis is a study of Panamanian foreign policy, 
some basic assumptions about the importance of the canal are necessary.  This thesis 
assumes that (1) while use of the Panama Canal by U.S. Navy warships is not vital to 
national defense, future inability to use the Canal could be costly for U.S. military and 
naval forces in lives, equipment, and national prestige; (2) closure of the Canal would 
result in limited and nearly world-wide economic decline, especially in nations that are 
most dependent on the Canal; (3) closure of the Canal would result in the realization 
by U.S. naval leaders that ship-building has been inadequate to protect U.S. interests 
in the absence of the Canal; and (4) Panamanian policy-makers have a vested interest 
in the continuing operation of the Canal. 
It is hoped that by dissecting the factors present in the development of 
Panamanian foreign policy, an understanding of what is possible and what is not 
possible within Panama's political context can be reached.  While many~especially 
those within the U.S. State Department who were involved in the Carter-Torrijos 
Treaty negotiations—view the turnover of the Canal and the U.S. military departure in 
1999 as a fait accompli, the matter appears unsettled. The classic anti-reconsideration 
stand is that held by Robert A. Pastor who writes in Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy 
Toward Latin America and the Caribbean: 
In March and June 1991, public opinion polls in Panama 
indicated that a majority of the people want U.S. troops to remain in 
Panama after the year 2000 to defend the Canal.  This situation would 
reopen a sore best left closed.4 
4Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), p. 280. 
u s
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In the 1964-1975 bureaucratic arguments over the Canal, the U.S. military held 
a conservative view that contrasted sharply with the "giveaway" approach followed by 
many at the State Department.5  The military, particularly the Navy, viewed control of 
the Panama Canal as a cornerstone of strategy.  Patrolling and controlling sea lanes in 
the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico had been a principal mission of the U.S. Navy 
since the early 19th century.   Some of the Navy's thinking on the Canal was based on 
the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.  In considering the geographical position of the 
United States, Admiral Mahan compared it to that of France.6 He viewed having two 
separate coasts negatively: 
The geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a 
concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces.   Here 
again the British Isles have an advantage over France.   The position of 
the latter, touching the Mediterranean as well as the ocean, while is has 
its advantages, is on the whole a source of military weakness at sea.7 
The Pentagon's view until 1975 was a remnant of the "Large Policy" of 
President Theodore Roosevelt (1899-1908), Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Acimiral 
5The term "giveaway" is not mine, but rather an example of 
the contemptuous view that many on the right held of the State 
Department and subsequently President Carter's approach to the 
Canal issue»  For discussion see Denison Kitchel, The Truth About 
the Panama Canal (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1978), 
pp. 90-98 
6See Alfred T. Mahan, "The Panama Canal and the Distribution 
of the Fleet," The Panama Canal; Readings on its History, Paul J. 
Schieps, ed. (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc, 1979). 
7Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 
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Mahan and reflected a traditional geopolitical view of the Hemisphere.8  The Canal 
was viewed, and continues to be viewed by some, as a vital life-line between the 
Atlantic and Pacific fleets.  The journey of the Oregon, during the Spanish American 
War (1898) is still related to the necessity for the Canal.  The Battleship Oregon was 
in San Francisco when the Maine blew up in Havana harbor.  While the nation waited 
in suspense, the Oregon made the dangerous 12,000 mile journey around Cape Horn to 
Cuba.  Strategists were quick to point out that the journey could have been only 4,000 
miles had there been a Central American Canal.9 
This traditional Pentagon view of the Canal and open challenge to the U.S. 
State Department ended during the administration of Gerald Ford (1974-77).  In 
August 1975, President Ford directed that the military end its in-fighting with the State 
Department and publicly support the administration's efforts vis-ä-vis a new agreement 
with Panama.10 This presidential order ended active duty grumbling over the issue, 
but among the retired ranks several prominent admirals came out publicly against 
surrendering the waterway.  These Admirals included former Chiefs of Naval 
Operations Robert B. Carney, George Anderson, Arleigh A. Burke, and Thomas H. 
8This view is well developed in Samuel Flagg Bemis's The 
Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1943), Julius W. Pratt's Expansionists of 
1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), and Donald A. Yerxa's 
Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 
1898-1945 (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991). 
9David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1977), p. 254. 
10Paul B. Ryan, The Panama Canal Controversy (Stanford: 
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7 
Moorer.  Their letter to President Jimmy Carter (1977-81), dated 8 June 1977, 
reflected the traditional naval view of the problem: 
...the truth is that this inter-oceanic waterway is as important, if 
not more so, to the United States than ever.  The Panama Canal enables 
the United States to transfer its naval forces and commercial units from 
ocean to ocean as the need arises.  This capability is increasingly 
important now in the view of the reduced size of the U.S. Atlantic and 
Pacific Fleets. 
Our experience has been that as each crisis developed during our 
active duty service-World War JJ, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cuban 
Missile crisis—the value of the Canal was forcefully emphasized by 
emergency transits of our naval units and massive logistical support for 
the Armed Forces.  The Canal provided operational flexibility and rapid 
mobility. 
As long as most of the world's combatant and commercial 
tonnage can transit through the Canal, it offers inestimable strategic 
advantages to the United States, giving us maximum strength at 
minimum cost.  Moreover, sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Canal 
Zone and Canal offer the opportunity to use the waterway or to deny its 
use to others in wartime.  This authority was especially helpful during 
World War JJ and also Vietnam.11 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will study the formation of Panamanian foreign policy concerning 
the Canal and U.S. military presence.  Three levels of analysis will be considered: (1) 
the international systems level, and (2) the domestic politics level, and (3) the policy- 
maker (or leadership) level.  After determining how these levels of analysis explain 
Panama's historical diplomatic record, the thesis will examine current and future 
possibilities for Panamanian foreign policy.  This analysis may be of use to military 
11Conaressional Record, 30 June 1977, p. S11345, cited in 
Denison Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal (New Rochelle, 
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strategists and diplomats in their attempts to match United States strategic needs with 
possible solutions. 
The level of analysis question is the key to making any meaningful estimate of 
future Panamanian foreign policy.  If the international system is the more important 
level of analysis, then the change from bipolarity to multipolarity (or unipolarity as 
some propose) should be followed by a change in Panamanian foreign policy.  Also, 
the decline in U.S. hegemony in the Americas noted by many observers should foster 
changes in Panama's foreign policy.  However, the domestic politics level of analysis 
is also important in the formation of Panamanian foreign policy.  Recognizing the 
importance of domestic politics in the formation of foreign policy makes the task of 
analyzing possibilities difficult as the influence of the various actors is considered. 
The traditional interests of the various domestic elites, the public, and political parties 
will continue to influence the formation of foreign policy unaltered by the international 
system's exit from bipolarity.  The policy-maker is also important as an individual, 
rational actor.  In reality pressures in each level of analysis provide boundaries for 
policy-makers.  Past boundaries may provide evidence of what boundaries continue to 
exist for Panamanian policy-makers-systemically, domestically, and mentally. 
C THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
1. International Sources of Foreign Policy 
The systemic theories of Morton Kaplan and subsequent work by others such 





state's foreign policy.12 The essential points of the structural realist approach are that 
the international system is anarchic in nature, that military force is important, and that 
states balance against threat.13  This view is shared by some conservative 
Panamanians.  Dr. Julio Linares, who served as Foreign Minister during the Endara 
Administration (1989-1994), believed that the structure of the international system was 
the dominant factor in determining Panamanian foreign policy.14 This level of analysis 
if the subject of chapter HI: Life in an American Lake: International Sources of 
Foreign Policy. 
One factor that has decreased the utility of the structural realist approach in 
studying the developing world is the school's Euro-centric concentration on great 
power relations and neglect of small powers.  A few writers have considered the status 
of small states in the international system.  An important work is Robert L. Rothstein's 
Alliances and Small Powers.  In the work Rothstein proposes that "Small Powers and 
Great Powers are very different kinds of entities."15 The fact that small powers have 
been able to reach diplomatic objectives despite a lack of capabilities, seems to point 
out that traditional realist rules for state behavior do not always apply.  Some 
12Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New Yorks Wiley, 1957). 
13Robert 0. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 1986) 
14Reymundo Gurdiän Guerra, "Modelos Y Teorias en la Politica 
Exterior Panamena," Tareas 83 (January-April 1993) (Panama: 
Universidad de Panama, 1993), p. 28. 
15Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: 
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interesting propositions put forth by Rothstein are: 
(1) small states often concentrate on the short-run;16 
(2) foreign policy issues often consume their whole political process;17 
(3) in the face of an eminent threat, small states may ally with or appease the 
enemy (i.e. bandwagoning);18 
(4) while great powers ally to balance the global system, small powers often 
ally "in terms of a threat to its local balance;"19 
(5) neutrality and non-alignment, often couched in very idealistic terms, 
ultimately allow small states to take advantage of great power rivalries; as great power 
rivalry decreases, non-alignment is less of a challenge to the great powers.20 
2. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 
The domestic politics level of analysis provides another potentially valuable 
approach.  In the Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy edited by Richard Rosecrance and 
Arthur A. Stein, the natures of domestic systems are considered and noted to have 
"determined key decisions and national policies toward the outside world."21  Domestic 
constraints on foreign policy-makers were considered important by Rosecrance and 
16Ibid.# p. 25. 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid., p. 26. 
"ibid., p. 62. 
20Ibid., p. 28  and p.   254. 
21Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A.   Stein,   The Domestic Bases 
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Stein and they expressed this in two tables. 
Table 1, "Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Domestic Conditions" from 
Rosecrance and Stein, provides an interesting way to view (1) status quo states and (2) 
revisionist states.  Whether domestic conditions are (1) constrained or (2) permissive 
or stimulative, will encourage or cause a resultant occurrence.  As an example of how 
this table could be applied:  If we were to view Panama as a revisionist power during 
the period 1964-1979 with a stimulative domestic condition and match this against the 
United States during the same period as a status quo state, then according to Table 1 a 
constrained domestic condition could have lead to war or deterrence failure.  This 
chart indicates that two countries in opposing positions on an issue are more likely to 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































of Status Quo State 
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Domestic Conditions 
Domestic Condition of Revisionist Power 
Constrained Permissive or Stimulative 
Constrained Peace from Mutual Restraint Wa /Deterrence Failure 
Permissive or Stimulative Peace 1 terrence/ Realist World Balance of 
Unn rrence Power 
Table 1: From Rosecrance and Stein, 1993, p. 19. 
Domestic Constraints on Commitments and Capabilities 
Capabilities Commitments 
Constrained Unconstrained 
Constrained Unresponsiveness to 
international events 
Overextension 
Unconstrained Underextension Realism Extended 
Deterrence 
Table 2: From Ref. Rosecrance and Stein, p. 100. 
Table 2, "Domestic Constraints on Commitments and Capabilities" from 
Rosecrance and Stein, provides a way of matching national capabilities and the 
domestic will of commitment with likely resultant outcomes.  According to the table, 
if a country has constrained capabilities (i.e. limited human and natural resources) and 
the willingness of the public to commit is unconstrained, the overextension is likely 
the result.  Could Panama's acceptance of the responsibility for managing the Canal be 
a case of overextension. 
Torrijos-era Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack viewed domestic 
politics as very important in the formation of foreign policy.  In fact, he viewed the 
foreign policy of the Torrijos government as an extension of revolutionary domestic 
14 
licy_
politics.22 Arnold Wolfers has argued that as international constraints lessen (such as a 
movement away from hegemony or from bipolarity to multipolarity) differences in 
state behavior must be explained at the decision-maker level.23  Should Wolfers' 
approach to the puzzle be correct, then the domestic level of analysis should be 
increasingly important. 
This thesis will closely study Panamanian domestic politics in chapter 4: 
"Dancing the Stick:  The Significance of Domestic Politics in Foreign Policy 
Development."  The chapter will compare the foreign policy of Panama with the 
domestic political construct during six different political regimes:   (1) the Old 
Oligarchy, 1903-31; Elite Populism, 1931-41;  Elite Militarism, 1941-55; the Middle 
Oligarchy, 1955-68; Military Populism, 1968-89, and the New Oligarchy, 1989- 
present.  During each regime, the relative positions of various interests will be 
considered: (1) the military, (2) the masses, (3) political parties, (4) commercial 
interests, (5) the elite and (6) United States Canal Zone leadership.  The term "dancing 
the stick" (bailar la vara) is borrowed from Panamanian political humor and is used to 
describe the gesticulations of political leaders as they maneuver through the domestic 
political landscape. 
3. The Importance of Leadership 
While a systemic approach, as Morton Kaplan suggests, can provide the 
22Gurdian,   p.   28, 
23Arnold Wolfers,    "The Actors   in  International  Politics,"   in 
Discord and Collaboration   (Baltimore,   Md.:   Johns  Hopkins  Press, 
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essential rules of a system "which describe general relationships between actors of a 
system or which assign definite systemic functions to actors...", and a domestic politics 
approach can provide an understanding of the constraints and stimulation faced by 
national leaders, another level of analysis is needed.  A leadership approach to the 
problem allows us to express a seemingly obvious fact, that national leaders do matter 
and often profoundly influence foreign policy development.   Such a view in the case 
of Panama is very important because of the traditional strength of the presidency and 
the weakness of the bureaucracy.  In addition to current President Ernesto Perez 
Balladares, five other leaders will be studied: Arnulfo Arias Madrid, Jose Antonio 
Remön Cantera, Omar Torrijos Herrera, Manuel Antonio Noriega, and Guillermo 
Endara Galimany.  These men together represent the history of Panama since 1931. 
Their individual backgrounds, political stands, and foreign policy positions will be 
considered.  Chapter V: Leadership in Panama: Can one man make a difference? uses 
the theoretical approaches of Stephen D. Krasnefs "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or 
Allison Wonderland), of Lewis J. Edinger's "Political Science and Political 
Biography," of Otto Klienberg's The Human Dimension in International Relations, and 
of Max Weber's On Charisma and Institution Building. 
Chapter JJ will provide a chronological discussion of Panamanian foreign 
policy from the 19th century to the present.   Chapters JH, IV, and V each consider a 
different level of analysis and so relate back to chapter II.  The conclusions of 
comparison of theory and historical record will be used in Chapter VI to project future 
Panamanian foreign policy behavior. 
16 
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Panamanian policy-makers, driven by their own characters and policy stands, 
have been in the past and will be in the future limited by domestic constraints and 
international systemic factors.  In the case of Panama, domestic political considerations 
have been important in past foreign policy development, sometimes decisive.  The 
major argument of this thesis is that domestic politics are more useful that 
international systemic changes in explaining Panamanian foreign policy and must be 
considered by U.S. policy-makers dealing successfully with Panamanian leaders.  By 
recognizing  domestic constraints on policy-makers, U.S. officials will be able to 
better understand the realm of possibilities in protecting U.S. security interests.  This 
study of international systemic factors, domestic determinants of Panamanian foreign 
policy, and the character of President Ernesto Perez Balladares will demonstrate that 
partial renegotiation of the Carter-Torrijos treaties is possible and that U.S. strategic 
interests in the Canal and the military bases in Panama can be successfully re- 




H. PANAMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES 
A. IN FORMATION, 1830-1903 
This chapter will examine Panama's foreign policy towards the United States. 
The root of most disagreements between Panama and the United States since 1903 is 
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.  This treaty provided for U.S. President Theodore 
Roosevelt and other proponents of the "Large Policy" the right to construct an 
isthmian canal, to exercise powers in a 10-mile wide zone from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific—"as if sovereign," and to intervene in Panama.  All of these rights were 
granted to the United States in exchange for a guarantee of independence from 
Colombia and 10 million U.S. dollars in gold and were in "perpetuity."  This treaty 
was negotiated by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay and Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, 
Panama's accredited representative to the United States.  Following the agreement, 
U.S. warships soon appeared at Colon on the Atlantic and Panama City on the Pacific 
thus guaranteeing Panama's independence from Colombia.1 
Panamanians, however, are quick to call the document a treaty that "no 
Panamanian ever signed."  Understanding the role of Phillipe Bunau-Varilla, a 
Frenchman, is key to understanding the Panamanian point of view.  Bunau-Varilla was 
a representative of the French Canal Company—Compagnie Universelle du Canal 
fciteroceanique.  For him, agreement with the United States meant selling the French 
holdings in Panama from the failed canal-building effort of Fernand de Lesseps in the 
1Good coverage of this episode is provided by David 
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1880's.  Why the leaders of the Panamanian Revolution decided to trust Bunau-Varilla 
to represent them in the United States is not known.  As the representative of both 
interests Bunau-Varilla was able to make Panama's offer to the United States so 
inviting that it would guarantee the U.S. purchase of the French Canal Company and 
provide him a great personal profit. 
B. DURING THE OLD OLIGARCHY, 1903-31 
The diplomatic disaster (the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty) was left in the hands of 
President Amador.  Amador and a delegation of leading Panamanians arrived in 
Washington only two hours after the treaty had been signed.2 In fact, Bunau-Varilla 
knew the Panamanian leader was on the way from New York and so rushed the 
agreement through.  Amador was left with a simple choice: accept the treaty or reject 
it and face losing the U.S. guarantee of protection.  Amador and the other 
revolutionary leaders accepted the treaty and in fact included parts of it in the 1904 
Constitution.  Article 136 is referred to as the Panamanian Platt Amendment: 
"The Government of the United States of America will be able 
to intervene in whatever point of the Republic of Panama, to reestablish 
public peace and constitutional order if it has been disturbed, because 
by virtue of a public treaty that nation assumes or has assumed the 
obligation of guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of the 
Republic."3 
Early Panama-U.S. relations were close with a high degree of cooperation 
2William J. Jorden, Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1984), p. 24. 
3Ramon E. Fäbrega and Mario Boyd Galindo, Constituciones de 
La Repüblica de Panama (Panama: Talleres Gräficos de Irapresiön 
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during the building of the Canal (1904-1914).  The closest ties were between Panama's 
traditional oligarchy and the senior leadership in the Canal Zone.  There was some 
resentment by Panamanians of how the Americans wanted to change the country, to 
make it reflect American ideals of sanitation, cleanliness, and morality.  This was 
expressed in a folk song of the era (translated to English): 
The Gringos invade our houses 
And tell us just what we must do. 
The Gringos are the bosses; 
Panameiios, you are on the spot. 
They make us learn to walk the chalk, 
Like fence posts in a row, 
They dig and pave and scrub the streets; 
They're even cleaning up the jail. 
You might suppose that they are mad, 
But all Americanos act like that.4 
In addition to being concerned about public health matters in Panama, the 
United States was also interested in ensuring that no unrest interrupted work on the 
Canal.  The United States reasoned that the best way to ensure peace was to have the 
most popular man in Panama as national leader.  Following this reasoning, free and 
fair national elections in Panama were vital for completion and smooth functioning of 
the Canal.  This led to United States intervention into Panamanian electoral affairs in 
1908, 1914, and 1918.  It should be noted that these interventions were unopposed, 
invited, and always sought by the party that was out of power and fearful that electoral 
fraud would deny them victory. 
4
 John E. Minter, The Chaqres: River of Westward Passage (New 
York: Rinehart & Co., 1948) p. 346 cited in Herbert and Mary 
Knapp, Red, White and Blue Paradise: The American Canal Zone in 
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These early interventions were generally uneventful and simply involved the 
election being overseen or conducted by U.S. Army troops and officials of the Panama 
Canal Company.  Nationalists who lost a particular election due to not being able to 
use fraud, would condemn the U.S. presence, but return four years later to ask for 
American intervention to guarantee a fair election.  Belisario Porras's actions are a 
good example.  When he asked U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg for American 
intervention to conduct the elections of 1932, Taft refused and sternly reminded the 
nationalist former-President of his previous opposition to U.S. involvement.5 Despite 
later requests from the opposition, the 1918 intervention was the last in electoral 
matters until 1989.  This change in policy on interventions partially stemmed from the 
negative experience of the 5th Infantry Regiment in Chiriquf province.  The regiment 
was tangled in a local conflict involving an American citizen's property and was 
unable to extricate itself for two years.  From 1920 to 1989, Panama ran its own 
elections with or without fraud and without U.S. involvement. 
During the first two decades of the Republic, Panama rarely opposed the 
United States on issues of international significance.  Panamanian leaders often basked 
along with the Canal Zone leadership in the success of building the Canal and 
cleaning up the port cities.  At the 1910 International Conference of American States, 
Belisario Porras gave a "well-received recital" of the successes in Panama in the areas 
5Julio E. Linares, Enrique Linares En La Historia Politica 
de Panama (San Jose: Litografia e Imprenta LIL, 1989), p. 267-8 
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of controlling disease and sanitation.6 The fact that the U.S. was in charge of water 
and sanitation in Panama City and Colon and that Dr. William Gorgas of the Army 
Medical Corps led the effort to make Panama medically safe did not lessen the pride 
that Panama took in these achievements.7 
During this period, Panama was supportive of U.S. diplomatic efforts.  During 
the discussions of the Drago Doctrine (1906 and 1907), which was a theory of 
absolute non-intervention, Panama supported the United States in attempting to weaken 
the proposed treaty.  Panama supported the U.S.-proposed Porter Proposition, which 
made a debtor nation's refusal to submit to arbitration a valid exception to the non- 
intervention standard.8 
During World War I, Panama and the United States worked together to ensure 
that the Central Powers were not allowed to use the Canal.  Because the Canal was 
declared "neutral in perpetuity" by the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, agreement 
between Panama and the United States was necessary in order to ensure that the Canal 
was legally used to favor the Allies and that the agreement between Panama and the 
U.S. on neutrality could not be extended to a third party such as Germany.  When 
coaxed by Argentina and Mexico to join an alliance of American neutrals, Panama 
"snubbed the proposal and made clear her solidarity with the United States."9 
6Lawrence 0. Ealy, The Republic of Panama in World Affairs, 
1903-1950 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951), p. 32. 
7Ibid., p. 32. 
8Ibid., p. 30. 
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Following World War I there was an increase in anti-U.S. sentiment in 
Panama.  The fact that the United States had seemingly sided with Costa Rica in the 
1921 border conflict was viewed negatively by the general populace.10  Panama's 
participation in the League of Nations during this period encouraged Panamanian 
diplomats and scholars to discuss the "juridical equality of states."  However, over and 
over the extreme asymmetry of the Panama-U.S. treaty relationship and the American's 
treaty rights made this concept meaningless for Panama.  In 1925, when General 
Pershing and his forces stopped for liberty in Balboa on their way to Tacna-Arica, 
large anti-U.S. demonstrations occurred.  This was the first of many low points of 
public opinion of the U.S. in Panama.11 
In 1926 an attempt was made to replace the 1903 treaty;  however, the effort 
was unsuccessful.  The stillborn treaty was referred to as the Kellogg-Alfaro Treaty. 
Under the proposed treaty, the U.S. agreed to forbid commercial establishments in the 
Canal Zone (except those operated by the U.S. Government), to restrict commissary 
sales to government employees, and to give Panamanian merchants facilities for 
supplying ships in the Canal Zone.  The document would have obligated Panama to 
participate in any war that the U.S. was involved in, to construct roads, and to allow 
U.S. military exercises throughout Panamanian territory.  The populace was opposed to 
the treaty and members of the Assembly were threatened with death if they favored it. 
On 26 January 1927, the Assembly suspended all consideration of the ratification in 
10Ibid.,   p.   61. 
11
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order to avert further unrest.12 Behind the scenes, this unacceptable treaty proposal 
gave the secret, bourgeois, political group Action Comunal a new nationalist, anti-U.S. 
cause.13 
C. DURING ELITE POPULISM, 1931-41 
During Elite Populism, Panamanian diplomats continued to stress the concept 
of absolute non-intervention.  The anti-U.S. hostility that climaxed in 1926 declined 
and, by 1933 and the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt, a sense of benevolence had 
returned to the relationship.  While welcoming the American acceptance of non- 
intervention, Panamanians still felt that they had to announce that they would resist 
future land grabs by the U.S.14 
In 1936 with the Hull-Alfaro Treaty, Panama accomplished a major goal of its 
foreign policy—the abrogation of the U.S. right to intervene in Panama.  This was a 
full expression of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.15 In 
addition to loosing the right to intervene, the U.S. also gave up the right to unilaterally 
seize properties in Panama.16 
In 1940, Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid was elected President.  Dr. Arias had 
sympathies for fascism and the German cause.  As a diplomat in Europe in the 1930's, 
12Ibid.,   p.   63-4. 
13Linares,   p.   257. 
14Ealy,   p.   79. 
15The  ideas  of  non-intervention and the  equality of  nation- 
states  were  cornerstones   of  the Good Neighbor  Policy. 
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during the administration of his brother, Harmodio Arias (1936-40), Arnulfo met with 
Hitler and Mussolini.17  It was during this time that he developed his own racist and 
nationalistic doctrine, called La Doctrina Panamenista (the Panamanian Doctrine). His 
rhetoric went beyond disdain for minorities and placed the blame for nearly all of 
Panama's problems on the United States.  Needless to say, Arnulfo Arias was a thorn 
in the side of the United States.  The United States encouraged Arias to allow U.S.- 
owned, Panamanian-registered ships to be armed in mid-1941, but Arias resisted.18 
While the United States did not directly participate in the October 1941 coup to 
remove Arias, the U.S. at least implicitly approved of the action.    Many supporters of 
Arnulfo Arias identified the U.S.-Panamanian disagreement over arming merchant 
vessels as the clear reason for the coup and charged that the United States played a 
large role in the action.19 
D. DURING ELITE MILITARISM, 1941-55 
Alias's overthrow brought intensified Panamanian support of U.S. efforts to 
prepare for war.  In the period immediately leading up to the U.S. entry into World 
War n, the U.S. defense establishment in Panama grew significantly.  Troop numbers 
grew to over 69,000 by 1943, some 130 new defense sites were manned, and 14 new 
airbases were established outside of the Canal Zone to protect the approaches to the 
17The  Arias  brothers  were  often,   but  not  always   in 
agreement. 
18Ealy,   p.   110. 
19For a review of the Panamenista history on the subject, 
see Demostenes Vega Mendez, El Panamenismo y Su Doctrina (Panama: 
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Canal.  Beyond allowing the United States additional bases in Panama, Panamanian 
flagged ships were armed (in October of 1941) and played a large role in the cross 
Atlantic convoys to Great Britain and the Soviet Union.  As author Lawrence Ealy 
writes: 
"One of the immediate results of Panama's predominately pro-Allied 
sentiment was seen in the use of her flag to circumvent restrictions of 
the United States Neutrality law, which in 1939 excluded U.S. ships 
from war zones...it may truthfully be said that the Panamanian colors 
were the first of any Pan American nation to fly over major operations 
designed to bring about the defeat of the Axis."20 
On the Panamanian homefront, domestic actions also took on a pro-U.S., pro- 
United Nations fervor.  The government ran a patriotic radio station, La Boca de 
Democracia, which constantly stressed the importance of the United Nation's cause to 
Panama.21  The populace took pride in the fact that Panamanian merchant vessels with 
Panamanian captains and crewmen were involved in the dangerous resupply missions 
to Murmansk. The National Police, under the leadership of Lt.Col. Jose Remön, also 
contributed to the effort by organizing youth and civil defense groups.  In areas of 
importance, like protection of the Canal and Counter-intelligence, the Panamanian 
Police and the Canal Zone Authorities worked together like a well-oiled machine. 
U.S. liaison officers served in key billets throughout the Panamanian government.  A 
joint effort was made to censure mail, telephone, and telegraph services.22 
20Ealy,   pp.   107-8. 
21
 Ibid.,   p.   114. 












The post World War II era was difficult for Panama as economic depression 
from the U.S. reduction in forces took effect.  Nationalism, social tension, and 
economic depression led to a worsening in Panamanian-U.S. relations.  Merchants 
were especially jealous of the U.S. commissary system which seem to de drawing 
away their customers.  The original agreement on the World War II-era bases called 
for their return to Panama within one year after peace.  Panamanians assumed this 
meant no latter than 1 September 1946-one year after the surrender of Japan. 
However on 29 August 1946, the American Embassy sent a note to Panamanian 
President Enrique A. Jimenez (1945-48) asking to initiate negotiations on extending 
the U.S. presence at the sights.   The Panamanian response was negative.  The United 
States opted to continue to occupy the facilities and to seek a diplomatic agreement. 
Panama did not agree to talks until May 1947.23  Agreement was reached in December 
of 1947 in the Filös-Hines Treaty. 
The National Assembly however did not ratify the agreement.  Panamanian 
students were especially vocal in calling for the treaty to be rejected.24  As the police 
used violence against the students, protests only grew angrier and began to include 
populist voices like Arnulfo Arias, a candidate in the 1948 Presidential Election.25  As 
soon as the National Assembly's vote not to ratify became known, the United States 
23Larry L. Pippin, The Remön Era: An Analysis of a Decade of 
Events in Panama, 1947-1957 (Palo Alto: Stanford, 1964), pp. 9- 
10. 
24Ibid., p. 16. 
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ordered immediate withdrawal from the facilities.  This action, however, did not 
restore Panama's faith in the U.S. keeping its word.  Author Larry Pippin refers to this 
incident as the United States' "worst diplomatic blunder."26 
In the 1950's Panama tried and succeeded to get the United States to deal with 
matters of concern, especially commercial relations and the matter of sovereignty. 
Remön wanted agreement that the treaties governing the Panama Canal could be 
modified by mutual consent, "equal employment opportunities" in the CZ for 
Panamanians, agreement on a date after which Panamanians would assume 
responsibility for resupply of ships in transit, and more economic opportunities for 
Panamanian businessmen in the Canal Zone.27  The Eisenhower Administration (1952- 
60) agreed to give Panamanians equal opportunity and to allow Panamanians to 
resupply ships after 31 December 1956.  During the discussions, Panama granted the 
United States use of the Rio Hato Air Base rent-free for 15 years.28 
E. DURING THE MIDDLE OLIGARCHY, 1955-68 
The year 1964 was a turning point in Panamanian foreign policy.  After the 
effort by Panamanian high school students from the Instituto Nacional to raise a flag 
at Balboa High School got out of control and resulted in a pitched battle between U.S. 
troops and Panamanian civilians, the government of Panama led by Rodolfo Chiari— 
recognizing that they could not control the situation-opted to join the nationalist 
26Ibid.,   p.   9. 
27Ibid.,   p.   117. 
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struggle.  By removing Panamanian forces from the border along the Canal Zone, 
Chiari forced the United States Southern Command into the no-win task of bringing 
the situation under control.  Five Americans and 21 Panamanians died. "Cuatro de 
Julio" (Fourth of July) Avenue that separated the Canal Zone from Panama was 
renamed "Avenida de los Märtires" (Avenue of the Martyrs). 
While diplomatic relations were reestablished on 16 March 1964, relations 
never returned to the pre-1964 condition.29  Panamanian leaders recognized that they 
had to lead and not be victims of the nationalist struggle to recover the Canal Zone. 
U.S. leaders realized that they had to satisfy the Panamanians or face urban guerrilla 
warfare or sabotage against the Canal.  It was this thinking that led U.S. leaders to 
believe the best way to insure protection of the Canal was to turn it over to Panama. 
Some authors see this as a clear case of capitulation to blackmail.30 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson (1963-1969) immediately recognized the 
gravity of the situation in Panama and in late 1964 negotiations over a new set of 
treaties began.  These treaties were concluded in 1967, but were unacceptable to the 
Legislative branches in both the United States and Panama.  When news leaked on the 
treaties' details, the Panamanian National Assemble voted to impeach President Marco 
Robles (1964-68).  However, Robles remained in office with support of the National 
29Jorden, p. 81. 
30Whetfier the 19 64 Flag Riots were a spontaneous or an 
orchestrated event is a good subject for debate.  Some authors, 
to include Jules Dubois in Trouble Over Panama (Indianapolis: 
Dobbs-Merrill, 1964), have argued convincingly that the riots 
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Guard.31  Robles and Johnson agreed to shelve the project for their mutual political 
benefits.32 
F. DURING MILITARY POPULISM, 1968-89 
The coup in 1968 was not marked by an immediate change in Panamanian 
foreign policy.  Initially, there was no indication that the new government would take 
a leftist, populist stand.  However, the populist aspects of the regime developed more 
distinctly after the attempted coup against Torrijos in 1969.  After this failed coup 
attempt by Col. Amado Sanjur, Torrijos was recognized expo facto as the real leader 
of the 1968 Revolution.  Torrijos believed that the CIA was behind the coup plot and 
this belief tempered his view of Americans.33  Torrijos was more suspicious than ever. 
From 1968 until 1971, the issue of the Canal Zone was rarely mentioned in 
Washington.  In Panama, General Torrijos felt pressured to revive the 1967 treaties 
and approve them, but he viewed the documents as flawed.34  He wanted to start over 
and negotiate a treaty for all Panamanians;  he closely connected the 1967 treaties 
with the oligarchy.  Discussions began very quietly in mid-1971.  From that point until 
the treaties were ratified, the Torrijos government demanded an end to the Canal Zone, 
31U.S. Senators viewed the treaty as a give-away plan. 
Panamanian Assemblymen viewed the treaty as yet another affront 
to Panamanian sovereignty. 
32Michael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States: The 
Forced Alliance (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992),  p. 
124 
33Seymour M. Hersh, "The Creation of a Thug: Our Man in 
Panama," Life, January 1990, p. 84. 





31U.S. at r e  -aw l .
ani s l e t t r t
ani er i t .
32 l . o ni f, nit t t s:
r ll t s: niversit eorgi r ss, 2), . 
33Sey our . ers , r at  ug: ur a
a, i , 0, . .
~ . .
a date for U.S. military withdrawal, and a date for the complete turn over of Canal 
operations.  They used the threat of mass assault on the Canal as an encouragement 
for the Americans to accede to Panama's demands.  Ultimately, the demands were met. 
General Torrijos chose the United Nations as his main venue of attack on the 
United States.  In 1973, the majority of the Security Council agreed to meet in 
Panama.  The meeting was an embarrassment for the United States.   Torrijos spoke to 
the council on the need for revision of the U.S.-Panama relationship and a resolution 
calling for major changes was voted upon.  In order to stop the resolution, the United 
States exercised its veto power for only the third time in history.35 Panama's Foreign 
Minister Juan Antonio Tack, announced that "The United States has vetoed Panama, 
but the world has vetoed the United States!"  This was a key victory for Panama and 
within two months the U.S. National Security Council reported to Congress that it was 
time to renegotiate treaties with Panama.36 
The first agreement on how to negotiate new treaties was the Kissinger-Tack 
Agreement, which was approved by both sides in January 1974.  Ambassador William 
Jorden provides an excellent summary of the agreement: 
"The main features of the new agreement were the decision to 
write a new treaty to replace that of 1903 and to give it a fixed 
termination date; ending the U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal Zone 
"promptly"; recognition of the U.S. right to use the lands, waters, and 
airspace required to operate and protect the canal; recognition of 
Panama's right to 'a just and equitable share' of canal profits; agreement 
350ne reason that the United States was alone on this issue 
was the fact that the U.S. had not supported Britain and France 
during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. 
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that Panama would participate in both the administration of the Canal 
and its defense; an understanding that the two countries would work out 
an agreement on expanding canal capacity."37 
Negotiations over the Canal issue continued intermittently throughout the 
Nixon and Ford years.  The Panamanian position remained basically unbending, while 
the American negotiators occasionally gave in on various issues and carefully watched 
domestic politics in the United States.  Within Panama, demonstrations occurred with 
some degree of regularity and more than a few were aimed at the U.S. Embassy. 
Statements made by negotiators or Mgh-ranking U.S. officials were often met in 
Panama with anti-Americanism.  While Torrijos was not directly controlling these 
demonstrations—at least not always—his anti-Canal zone rhetoric was guiding the 
general anti-American fervor.   He stated, "I do not want to go into history.  I want to 
go into the Canal Zone."  The 1976 U.S. Presidential Campaign put the effort on hold, 
as President Gerald Ford (1974-77) ducked questions relating to the Canal, because 
candidate Ronald Reagan was using the Canal issue against Ford in the Republican 
primaries.  Candidate Jimmy Carter gave little indication before inauguration of how 
he would approach the issue, but stated that he would "never give up complete 
control" of the Canal Zone.38  Panamanians, especially Torrijos, grew weary of the 
campaign.  After inauguration, gears were changed and Carter made Panama his top 
priority. 
The Carter-Torrijos Treaties were completed in 1977.  President Carter and 
37Jorden,   p.   216. 
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Chief of State Tomjos signed the documents in Washington, D.C. at a gathering of 
regional heads of state.  Torrijos came to trust Carter personally and felt that the 
President wanted to do the right thing.  The ratification fight, however, was another 
story.  While Torrijos was successful in Panama in getting the treaties approved in a 
national referendum, the U.S. Senate ratification was not so easy for President Carter. 
As the vote neared, Torrijos's threat of taking the Canal Zone by force was very much 
on the minds of many in Washington and Panama. 
Just how close Torrijos came to taking military action was hinted at in a 
speech that Torrijos gave on radio and television in Panama on the evening that the 
treaties were passed.  "Today, the Canal came within two votes of being 
destroyed...tomorrow we would have started our struggle for liberation, and possibly 
tomorrow the Canal would not be operating any more."39 A year later, Torrijos 
reassured Ambassador Jorden that his threat had been real.  According to Torrijos, 
small special forces units were trained to incapacitate the Canal and were in the field 
as the Senate voted.  The troops were recalled by Torrijos, using a special code.40 
From the Senate ratification of the Canal Treaties until 1986, Panama-U.S. 
relations were good.  While Panama reserved the right to act alone in some instances, 
the United States enjoyed good relations with the military leaders, including General 
Manuel Noriega.  Treaty implementation was on track, although many in the U.S. 
were critical of Panama's dismal effort to maintain reverted properties, especially the 
39Ibido,   p.   623. 









Panama Rail Road.  The next major change in Panama's foreign policy towards the 
United States was in 1987.  As allegations of drug trafficking by Noriega and the PDF 
were made and interest in Panama's record on Human Rights grew, the Bush 
Administration slowly distanced itself from Noriega.  Author John Dinges believes 
that the final break occurred after June 1987 when "clear opposition to Noriega 
emerged in the Reagan administration.''  The administration opposition developed 
because of mass protest in Panama, the impending indictment of Noriega, and 
Congressional pressure.41  On 5 January 1988 U.S. Attorney Robert Merkle in Tampa 
announced the indictment of General Noriega on twelve counts of broad conspiracy 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.42 This U.S. 
action embittered the Noriega government and put the United States and Panama on 
the way to 20 December 1989.  The anti-Americanism of the post-June 1987 Noriega 
regime encouraged a hostile attitude towards American citizens in Panama and 
provided President Bush with another reason to launch the invasion, to protect U.S. 
lives. 
G. DURING THE NEW OLIGARCHY, 1989- 
Panamanian foreign policy towards the United States during the Endara 
Administration is difficult to judge.  Even though U.S. forces were clearly responsible 
for placing Endara in power, he was reluctant to indicate any support for the invasion. 
Others in his administration, especially members of MOLIRENA, clearly supported the 
41
 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (New York: Random House, 
1990), pp. 313 and 331. 
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U.S. action.  Regardless of Endara's personal disposition, he did work closely with the 
United States to re-establish democratic government in Panama.  However, beyond this 
Endara was not in a position to address larger issues.  He made it clear that he would 
not negotiate any new agreement concerning the Canal or U.S. bases.  Late in his 
administration, Endara became hostile towards the United States over allegations that 
his government was not participating in the regional counter-narcotics effort.43  On all 
of these issues, Endara's political weakness and nature as a U.S.-installed president 
was a major factor. 
The inauguration of Ernesto Perez Balladares marked a change in Panamanian 
foreign policy.  Legitimized by free and fair elections and inaugurated without external 
support, Perez Balladares was strong enough to do some things that Endara could not 
accomplish.  He immediately carried out his promise to allow Cubans to be 
temporarily housed on U.S. installations in Panama.  This gained him friends in 
Washington and took pressure off of President Bill Clinton (1993-     ).  During the 
Haiti crisis, Perez once again came to the rescue by providing asylum to exiled-Haitian 
military leader General Raul Cedras. 
President Perez Balladares has indicated a willingness to discuss U.S. bases in 
Panama after the year 2000, but says that the United States will have to come to him 
with a viable reason—such as counter-narcotics—for keeping the forces there.  Perez 
appears to have more maneuver room than did Endara and has been more helpful to 
43Tod Robberson, "U.S. Sounds Alarm on Drug-Linked 
Corruption in Panama—Again" Washington Post, 31 January 19 93, p. 
A-20. 
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the United States.  However, his domestic support and legitimacy suggest that he has 
greater latitude to move against U.S. interests, if he chooses to do so. 
So far, it seems that President Perez Balladares will use his powers as a 
political leader to positively affect the Panamanian-U.S. relationship.  His foreign 
policy priorities are in line with U.S. priorities and the concept of regional integration 
that was verbalized at the 1994 Miami Summit.  The aclrninistration's foreign policy in 
general does require good Panamanian-U.S. relations at every level.  As set out by 
Foreign Minister Gabriel Lewis Galindo, the Panamanian Foreign Ministry's tasks are: 
(A) Preparing a harmonious transition from a U.S. administration 
to a totally Panamanian administration of the Panama Canal. 
(B) Promoting foreign investment in Panama. 
(C) Working closely with Mexico, the United States, and Canada 
to achieve Panama's acceptance into NAFTA, following our acceptance 
into GATT. 
(D) Fostering and ensuring close relations with the United States 
in fulfilling the Torrijos-Carter treaties and in all areas of mutual 
interest (the fight against drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal 
immigration, and trade and cultural exchanges). 
(E) Achieve Panama's entry into APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation.44 
Clearly the general sentiment of the Perez Balladares administration towards 
relations with the United States is positive and filled with more possibilities for 
cooperation than any Panamanian administration since World War n. 
^La Estrella de Panama, "Ministry Outlines President's 
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m. LIFE IN AN AMERICAN LAKE: INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Because the design of the international system is believed by many political 
scientists to be the determining factor in a state's foreign policy, it is appropriate that 
this study compare the structure of the international system over time with the 
development of Panamanian foreign policy. 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
1. Theoretical Approach of This Chapter 
In the case of Panama, there are two systemic considerations that must be 
studied if the international determinants of foreign policy behavior are to be seriously 
considered: (1) the design of the world system and (2) the design of the friteramerican 
system. 
a. International system sources of foreign policy 
Dr. Julio Linares, who served as Foreign Minister during the Endara 
Administration (1989-1994), believed that the structure of the international system was 
the dominant factor in detemiining Panama's foreign policy.1  Dr. Linares and other 
Panamanians who have studied the subject have drawn on international sources and 
have applied the theories, but have developed no new theories. 
In considering the international system, Morton Kaplan's System and Process in 
International Politics (1957) is useful.  Kaplan relates the power divisions and alliance 
1Reymundo Gurdiän Guerra, "Modelos Y Teorias en la Polltica 
Exterior Panamena, " Tareas 83 (January-April 1993) (Panama: 





1Rey und  ur ia ue ra, odel s  eori olit
xteri r efia," ar pril ) a:
nivers a, 3), . .
structure with the behavior of states.  He is careful, however, to point out that this "is 
not a law in the sense of physical laws; it merely specifies characteristic behavior."2 
While Kaplan was optimistic that understanding the nature of the international system 
could be helpful in explaining the behavior of individual states, he was realistic and 
compared predicting the behavior of a single nation-state to a phenomenon in the 
physical world:   "The scientist cannot predict the path of a single molecule in a tank 
of gas."3 
Kaplan's work is, however, somewhat limited in that small states are only a 
minor consideration.  One work that helps to bridge this gap between systemic theories 
and the small nation-states is Robert Rothstein's Alliances and Small Powers (1968). 
Rothstein put forth some interesting propositions on the behavior of small states: 
(1) Small states often concentrate on the short-run.4 
(2) Foreign policy issues often consume the whole political process.5 
(3) In the face of eminent threat, small states may ally with or appease the 
enemy (i.e. band wagoning).6 
(4) While great powers ally to balance the global system, small powers often 
2Morton A.   Kaplan,   System and Process  in  International 
Politics   (New York:   Wiley,   1957),   p.   9. 
3Ibich ,   p.   xvii. 
4Robert  Rothstein,   Alliances   and  Small  Powers   (New York; 
Columbia University Press,   1968),   p,   25 „ 
5Ibid. 
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ally "in terms of local balance."7 
(5) Neutrality or non-alignment, often couched in very idealistic terms, 
ultimately allow small states to take advantage of great power rivalries;  as great 
power rivalry decreases, non-alignment is less of a challenge to great powers.8 
b. As a small state in an "American Lake" 
Even a combination of Kaplan's systemic work and Rothstein's work on 
small states does not sufficiently explain the positions of small states within Latin 
America.  Panama's uniqueness is also problematic in understanding its relative 
position within the international or Interamerican system.  It has resisted being 
grouped with Central America and has basically avoided regional integration with 
Central America.  At the same time, although historical ties with South America are 
strong, the geographical reality of mountains and the Darien jungle makes overland 
travel into Colombia nearly impossible and more worthy of adventurers than 
merchants. 
The significance of Central America and the Caribbean as being within an 
"American Lake," i.e. geographically close to the regional hegemon-to the United 
States—cannot be overstated.  This hegemonic interest in the region will be included in 
this chapter's discussion of the Interamerican system.  Panama's unique importance to 
the United States, as the geographical cornerstone of turn of the century "Large 
Policy," is implicit within this discussion. 
7Ibid.,   p.   62. 











2. Are Systemic Factors Worth Studying? 
Systemic factors represent only one of the three levels of analysis being studied 
for this thesis.  While it is not the most explanatory level of analysis, it is a necessary 
consideration.  It is the environment within which states behave and is a predecessor 
to the second level of analysis to be considered—domestic politics.  The systemic level 
of analysis is important in explaining Panama's foreign policy behavior during periods 
of intense international struggle, such as World Wars I and II. 
B. THE WORLD SYSTEM 
In order to describe all possible international systems, Kaplan devised six 
models: "(1) the "balance of powef system, (2) the loose bipolar system, (3) the tight 
bipolar system, (4) the universal system, (5) the hierarchical system in its directive and 
non-directive forms, and (6) the unit veto system."9 
1. "Balance of Power" System 
Kaplan believes that the "Balance of Power" model best describes the 
international system during the 18th and 19th centuries and up to World War H10 He 
proposes six essential rules of behavior for states in such a system: 
(1) Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather that fight. 
(2) Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase 
capabilities. 
(3) Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor. 
(4) Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to 
assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the 
system. 
(5) Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational 
9Ibid.,   p.   21. 
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organizing principles. 
(6) Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re- 
enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some 
previously inessential actor with the essential actor classification. Treat 
all essential actors as acceptable role partners.11 
In Kaplan's view the "Balance of power" system ended in the late 1930's as 
British Prime Minister Chamberlain opted to compromise with Germany instead of 
opting to ally with the Soviets to balance against the German threat. This violated 
rules one, two, four, five, and six.12 
2. Loose Bipolar System 
The system that developed in the wake of World War II is categorized by 
Kaplan as a "Loose Bipolar System."  The leading actors of the blocs were the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  Kaplan believed that the U.S.-led bloc was non- 
hierarchical in nature.  The essential rules of the loose bipolar system are: 
1. All blocs subscribing to directive hierarchical or mixed 
hierarchical integrating principles for the international system are to 
eliminate the rival bloc. 
2. All blocs subscribing to directive hierarchical or mixed 
hierarchical integrating principles for the international system...are to 
negotiate rather than fight, to fight minor wars rather than major wars, 
and to fight major wars...rather than to fail to eliminate the rival bloc. 
3. All bloc actors are to increase their capabilities in relation to 
those of the opposing bloc. 
4. All bloc actors subscribing to non-hierarchical or non-directive 
hierarchical organizational principles for the international system are to 
negotiate rather than fight to increase capabilities, to fight minor wars 
rather than to fail to increase capabilities, but to refrain from initiating 
major wars for this purpose. 
5. All block actors are to engage in major wars rather than 
11Ibid.,   p.   23. 








permit the rival bloc to attain a position of preponderant strength. 
6. All bloc members are to subordinate objectives of universal 
actors to the objectives of their bloc but to subordinate the objectives of 
the rival bloc to those of the universal actor. 
7. All non-bloc member national actors are to coordinate their 
national objectives with those of the universal actor and to subordinate 
the objectives of the bloc actors to those of the universal actor. 
8. Bloc actors are to attempt to extend the membership of their 
bloc but to tolerate the non-member position of a given national actor if 
non-tolerance would force that national actor to support the objectives 
of the rival bloc of to join the rival bloc. 
9. Non-bloc member national actors are to act to reduce danger 
of war between the bloc actors. 
10. Non-bloc members are to refuse to support the policies of 
one bloc actors against the other except in this capacity as a member of 
a universal actor. 
11. Universal actors are to reduce the incompatibility between 
the blocs. 
12. Universal actors are to mobilize non-bloc national actors 
against cases of gross deviancy, for example, resort to force, by a bloc 
actor.  This rule, unless counteracted by other rules, would enable the 
universal actor to become the prototype of an international political 
system.13 
3. Post-Cold War Era 
While Kaplan's work is dated, it seems clear that the end of the Cold War 
marked the end of loose bipolarity.  Which of the other models best describe the 
current international system is subject to debate.14 While some suggest that the 
international system is returning to its pre-World War II design, it is clear that 
technology has made many of the lessons of the pre-nuclear age obsolete.  In the post- 
13Ibid., pp. 38-39 
14After careful consideration of each of Kaplan's 
theoretical models, it seems that we are either (1) in transition 
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Cold War world, describing power and counting the number of political poles in the 
world is not such an easy task. 
Considering the traditional realist conception of "power"--of a military nature, 
many have argued that we are at a unipolar moment.15  However, others believe that 
military capability (the traditional realist measure) is less relevant now than in the past 
and that other areas of relative strength must be considered, such as economic and 
political power. 
If we look to economic power as a measure of national strength, then the world 
is not in a unipolar moment.  In fact John Lewis Gaddis points out that "Bipolarity 
never did exist in the economic realm:  there power shifted from a unipolar to a 
largely tripolar configuration dominated by the United States, the European 
Community, and Japan, with the Soviet Union an isolated bystander."16  Others have 
referred to this as the trilateral system—where economic power is shared between 
Europe, the United States, and Japan. 
It is in the area of ideological power that the end of the Cold War means the 
most—especially to Latin America.  Communism as a political philosophy had lost the 
fight to capitalism and democracy.  Gaddis believes that Communism had lost the 
fight long ago "when people [had] the right to choose between them."17 However, 
15One example of such literature is Charles Krauthammer, 
"The Unipolar Moment," Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, 
eds., Rethinking America's Security; Beyond Cold War to New World 
Order (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992) 
16John Lewis Gaddis, The United States at the End of the 
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within Latin America the attraction of this alternative political doctrine was attractive 
to the political left and provided impetus for revolutionary struggle well into the 
1980's. 
Political Power is closely related to ideological power, but different.   Political 
power and influence has been diversified in the world with modern communications 
and increased contact.  For Latin America this multipolarity of political power means 
increased political contact with Europe and Asia.  This could be viewed as largely 
symbolic.  Examples might include the European involvement in the 1980's Central 
American peace process.18  In estimating the trajectory of political power divisions in 
the world, Author Paul Kennedy suggested in 1987 that there seemed to be a 
"pentarchy" developing with five political poles: the United States, the USSR, China, 
Japan, and the EEC.   Whether Russia will take its place within the "pentarchy" is 
uncertain.19 
18Alberto Van Klaveren, "Europe and Latin America in the 
1990s," Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., 
Latin America in a New World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp, 
81-104. 
19Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: 
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Post- Cold War Polarity Along Five Dimensions 
Nuclear Bipolar 
Conventional Armaments Unipolar or Multipolar 
Economic Multipolarity or Tripolarity 
Political Multipolarity 
Ideological Unipolarity20 
Table 3: Author 
C. THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM 
The Western Hemisphere, and especially Central America and the Caribbean, 
has long been referred to as the United States' "sphere of influence."  The 
Interamerican System has developed from United States interests and policies.  This is 
not to insinuate that other nations have not contributed to the development of the 
Interamerican System, but the United States as the first independent state in the 
Americas and the dominant force militarily has played the leading role.  This leading 
role has been demonstrated historically by the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine 
in 1823, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, and by the Rio 
Treaty in 1947.  To measure the effectiveness of Interamerican cooperation is to 
measure the level of U.S. hegemony in the region. 
1. The United States' Isolationist Phase, 1823-98 
Even before the independence of Panama and the United States' imperialist 
phase, U.S. interest in Panama was demonstrated by the number of U.S. military 
20Ideological unipolarity refers to the victory of 
democratic and neo-liberal ideals in the world. 
47 
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interventions on the isthmus. 
J           Incidents of U.S. Intervention in Panama During the U.S. Isolationist Phase 
Year Motive Max. No. of 
Troops 
Duration 
1856 Watermelon War 160 4 days 
1860 Local Disturbance 100 11 
1861 Political Disturbance — — 
1865 Political Disturbance — — 
1868 Riots 14 1 
1873 Civil War 200 15 
1873 Civil War 190 13 
1885 Local Disturbance 12 1 
1885 Preston Aizpuru Revolt 1,200 57 
1895 Bocas del Toro One company 7 
Table 4: From Conniff, p. 34. 
2. The United States' Protective Imperialism Phase, 1898-33 
Panama's 1903 national independence was concurrent with the apex of U.S. 
imperial expansion.  The Spanish-American War, the occupation of the Philippines and 
Cuba, and the withdrawal of the British West Indian Squadron, all in 1898 were each 
signs of the new power of the United States.  The independence of Panama on 3 
November 1903 and the signing of the Isthmian Canal Convention two weeks later on 
18 November 1903, were the finishing touches on the geopolitical dreams of Alfred 
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"Expansionists of 1898." 
While U.S. behavior was never again, after the administration of Theodore 
Roosevelt, so bold and audacious, the United States did continue its basic policies.  It 
was during these years of protective imperialism (1898-1933) that it was not 
uncommon for the U.S. military to supervise or conduct national and local elections 
within Central America and the Caribbean.  U.S. forces were also used to solve 
financial crises, to end disorder, and to protect American property. 
Along with interventions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and 
Nicaragua, U.S. forces also intervened in Panama on various occasions. The 
Panamanian Constitution of 1904 granted the United States carte blanc to intervene in 
Panamanian internal affairs, the right to "intervene, in any part of Panama, to 
reestablish public peace and constitutional order if it has been disturbed."  In Panama, 
this is referred to as the Panamanian Platt Amendment.21  The early victories of U.S. 
diplomacy are in reality the root of U.S.-Panamanian tensions throughout the 20th 
century and an invitation to the United States to involve itself in Panamanian domestic 
politics. 
21Ramon E. Fabrega and Mario Boyd Galindo, Constituciones de 
La Repüblica de Panama (Panama: Talleres Gräficos de Impresiön 
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Incidents of U.S. Intervention in Panama During the U.S. Protective Imperialism Phase 
Year Location Reason 
1902 Panama City and 
Colon 
To Protect the Railroad During the Thousand 
Days War 
1903 Panama City and 
Colon 
To Protect Panama's Independence 
1916 Panama Disarmament of National Police 
1918 Panama & Colon Election Supervision 
1918 Veraguas Election Supervision 
1918-1920 Chiriqui Election Supervision and Protection of U.S. 
Nationals 
1921 Goto Panama-Costa-Rica Border Dispute 
1925 Panama & Colon Renters' Strike 
Table 5: From Conniff, p. 34 and Linares, p. 290. 
The 1918 election was the last election with U.S. involvement until the 1980's. 
While the United States occupation of Panama City and Colon lasted a relatively short 
time, the U.S. intervention to oversee elections in Chiriqui did not end as quickly. 
The U.S. Army's 5th Infantry Regiment, which was to conduct the election observation 
operation, became involved in the protection of a U.S. citizen and his property in the 
province and was not able to extricate itself until 16 August 1920.  Subsequently, the 
United States resisted further invitations to be involved in Panama's election process.22 
3. The Good Neighbor Era, 1933-45 
22Julio E. Linares, Enrique Linares En La Historia Politica 
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The Good Neighbor phase of Interamerican relations began with Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt's First Inaugural Address in 1933 when Roosevelt pledged that the 
United States would be a "good neighbor." This policy was further developed at the 
Pan-American Conference at Montevideo in 1933 as the United States and other 
Western Hemisphere states joined together in numerous resolutions to improve 
regional cooperation.  The most important change in U.S. policy under President 
Franklin Roosevelt was that the United States abandoned Theodore Roosevelt's 
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, thus giving up the U.S. right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of others.  This new U.S. policy brought the U.S. into line 
with the general sentiment of Latin American governments.23 
This change in U.S. policy was demonstrated by meaningful actions within the 
region.  However, the policy had its limitations in Panama.  While the U.S. had 
essentially ended its involvement in the electoral affairs in Panama in 1920 and had 
last intervened militarily in the renters' strike in 1925, the growing war sentiment 
reinforced the idea that the Canal was a vital and strategic U.S. resource.   So as the 
war approached, the U.S. was involved in Panamanian internal politics, at least 
covertly. 
4. The Cold War Anti-Communist Struggle, 1945-89 
The beginning of the Cold War marked a new era in U.S. relations with Latin 
America.  While the U.S. had remained the regional hegemon during the Good 
23Samuel Flagg Bernis, The Latin American Policy of the 
United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), pp, 
256-75. 
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Neighbor years, the United States had tended towards regional cooperation instead of 
coercion.  After World War II with the threat of communist expansion looming, the 
United States opted to reassert its role as regional hegemon and as a state willing to 
use military power to protect regional states from communist aggression.  In 1947, the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Pact, was signed by regional 
powers.  This document served as the basis of regional defense during the Cold War. 
The Organization of American States was officially established in 1951 and contained 
within its charter the non-intervention clauses of the 1933 Montevideo Conference. 
The degree of U.S. hegemony in the region during this era is difficult to assess. 
While there were clear challenges to U.S. power and influence and instances when 
U.S. policy failed, the region remained primarily within the Western camp during the 
Cold War.  Michael J. Kryzanek discusses the erosion of the U.S. influence in this 
region during the Cold War.  He points to several factors that contributed to the 
weakening of the United States' position: (1) the 1959 Cuba Revolution provided an 
alternative to U.S. domination for states in the region; (2) the "rise of competition" on 
the global scale made U.S. businessmen not the only show in town for Latin American 
businessmen; (3) the acceptance of the Sandinista victory in 1978; (4) the 1982 
Falklands/Malvinas War and the collapse of the Rio Treaty; and (5) the decline of the 
U.S. ability to provide substantial aid to the region.24 
240n the point that the Falklands/Malvinas War represents 
the failure of the Rio Treaty, this is Kryzanek's view and tends 
to fall in line with most Argentine thinking on the subject. 
Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: 
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The Reagan and Bush years are viewed by Kryzanek as an attempt to reassert 
hegemonic power.  Willingness to act in Grenada and Panama seemed to indicate a 
return to something resembling "Gunboat Diplomacy."25  One popular cartoon that 
appeared in 1990 just after the U.S. invasion of Panama features a thin and grinning 
George Bush being approvingly patted on the back by a robust, grinning Teddy 
Roosevelt.26 
Even though Kryzanek and others have pointed to the hegemonic decline of the 
United States in Latin America, what the failure of hegemonic power would mean is 
unclear.  The failure of the communist system and the 1991 breakup of the Soviet 
Union ended the super power competition in the Third World and ended the most 
direct challenge to U.S. hegemony in the Americas. 
5. Post-Cold War, 1989- 
While the obvious forms of manipulation and control of smaller powers by the 
United States seem inappropriate in the 1990's, the economic depravity of the Latin 
American region does make it beholden to outside forces, often bankers.  It could be 
argued that so long as there was an ideological option for regional states they had a 
greater degree of latitude in possible behavior.  Leaders could challenge the U.S. and 
knew that because of Cold War considerations (i.e. no second Cuba) that the U.S. 
would probably not censure them.  General Omar Torrijos's behavior during an 
episode described by Robert Pastor illustrates the latitude: 
25Kryzanek,   pp.   224-30. 
26Task Force on Latin America and the  Caribbean,   Panama:   the 








"General," [U.S. Ambassador Ambler] Moss said in Spanish, "I 
have a message for you from Secretary of State Haig."  He then read 
the message.  Haig let Torrijos know that the flabbiness in U.S. foreign 
policy had been firmed up; no longer would the United States tolerate 
Torrijos's adventures with Salvadoran guerrillas or Cubans.  Torrijos 
would have to shape up, or else. 
Torrijos listened without displaying any emotion—except that he 
began pulling more rapidly on his Cohiba [cigar]. When Moss finished, 
the General...asked if the ambassador would mind writing down his 
response... "Senor Haig, I cannot acknowledge receipt of this message. 
It was obviously sent to the wrong address.  It should have gone to 
Puerto Rico.  Omar Torrijos."27 
Torrijos could be blunt because he had ideological choices and was sure that 
the Soviets and Cubans would welcome him with open arms if he had chosen to join 
the other side in the Cold War.  The question is, now that the Cold War is over, do 
leaders have the option of going against the United States? 
If the United States does have a sphere of influence in the world, then it is 
Latin America.  The U.S. influence is much more real in Central America and the 
Caribbean than in South America. It has been said that the United States has never 
had much influence in the Southern Cone, but these countries have experienced 
Huntington's "Third Wave" of democratization like the entire region. 
If a new regionalism does develop and European Community-like integration is 
the wave of the future, then it seems clear that the Americas will be forced to band 
together for mutual economic benefit and defense.  Whether there will be one regional 
alliance for the Western Hemisphere or two (NAFTA in the North and a Brazil-led 
27Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton University 
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economic alliance in the South) is yet to be seen. 
Many theorists argue that the importance of military power is diminishing.  If 
U.S. military intervention in the region is passed, then Good Neighbor-type mutual 
respect is possible.  However, this option based on mutual respect may not be possible 
so long as regional monetary policy is largely directed from the first world. 
Another possibility is that Latin America will be increasingly marginalized, as 
the region is no longer the scene of superpower ideological confrontation.  Robert 
Ullman suggests that the U.S. policy towards Latin America could become one of 
"benign neglect."28  This is similar to the argument of the Africanization of Latin 
America, i.e. marginalization on the world stage.  This concept represents a challenge 
to the governments of Latin America;  their failure could mean that the region joins 
Africa as appearing hopeless and too big of a job for aid, diplomatic effort, or even 
military intervention. 
The end of the Cold War is most important for what Latin Americans have 
been able to do economically.  They have been able to discard leftist economic 
baggage and to implement neo-liberal policies.  This and the unchallenged acceptance 
of structural democracy are the two most important opportunities that the recent 
systemic change has allowed.  This view makes what Latin Americans do for 
themselves more important than the U.S.-Latin American relationship.  Should Latin 
Americans have success in this neo-liberal/democratic program then the possibility of 
28Richard H. Ullman, "The United States, Latin America, and 
the World After the Cold War", Lowenthal, Abraham F. and 
Treverton, Gregory F. eds, Latin America in a New World (Boulder: 
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what Mark Peceny terms a "Liberal ' Pacific Union'" is real.29  If Latin America fails 
at this new program, then the Inter-American relationship can do little to save them. 
In summary, the systemic change offers opportunity—not a panacea. 
The development of the European Community and the growth of regional trade 
arrangements such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, and APEC make the 
idea of a dissected world—at least economically—believable.  As such entities develop, 
there is the chance that trading blocs will increase intra-regional trade to the detriment 
of external trade. For example, since the creation of MERCOSUR, trade between 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay has increased to new levels.30 However, 
since the European agreement on a common agricultural market, opportunities for 
selling Western Hemisphere agricultural products in Europe have faced new barriers. 
This was especially hard on some of the single product nations, particularly those who 
grew Bananas. 
While regional trade pacts seem to be a clear trend, it is unclear if security 
pacts along similar lines will follow.  If this does become the case, then the Western 
Hemisphere may be in the future united as trading partners.  How this develops is yet 
to be seen.  But this trend to regionalism appears to be the dominant trend in the 
Interamerican system and one of which Panama and its leadership is well aware. 
29Mark Peceny, "The Inter-American System as a Liberal 
'Pacific Union'?," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 
(1994), pp. 188-201. 
30Vera Thorstensen, "Mercosul: The Road to NAFTA and the 
European Union," Development Policy; Newsletter of Policy 
Research, Inter-American Development Bank, December 1994, p. 1 
and Sergio Abreu Bonilla, "El Mercosur: una realidad en marcha," 
ADEBIM, Carta do Mercosul, February 1994, p. 3. 
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D. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
1. Linkages 
a. The World System and Panamanian Foreign Policy Behavior 
A comparison between the systemic polarity of the world and Panamanian 
foreign policies is interesting, but does not implicitly demonstrate any causal 
relationship (see table below).  There are two observations that may be made: 
(1) International system change—such as that at the beginning of World 
War II and that at the end of the Cold War-has occurred concurrently with violent 
government change within Panama, specifically the 1941 Panamanian military 
overthrow of President Arnulfo Arias Madrid and the 1989 U.S. invasion to oust 
strongman Manuel Antonio Noriega. 
(2) Loose bipolarity seemed to have provided more opportunity for 
Panama to solve the issue of sovereignty over the Canal Zone on favorable terms than 
did the era of multipolarity that had existed prior to World War H  Similar efforts in 
the 1920's and 1930's met with no great support from the international community 
comparable with the international support enjoyed by the Torrijos regime in the 
1970's.  The sense of Third World and Latin American unity on this issue, along with 
the support from the Soviet Union and other socialist states, was a phenomenon only 
possible in an era of loose bipolarity.  Rothstein theorized that neutrality or non- 
alignment, often couched in very idealistic terms, ultimately allow small states to take 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Systemic Polarity and Panamanian Foreign Policy Behavior 
Multipolarity Highly Cooperative Policies (1903-1920), Rising Anti-U.S. Sentiment 
(1920-1941), Refusal to Arm Merchant Vessels (1941) 
World War II: Highly Cooperative Policies (1941-45), Merchant Vessels Armed As 
System Transition Per U.S. Request (1941), New Basing Agreement for War Effort 
Loose Bipolarity Refusal to Renew Basing Agreement (1946-47), Lease on Rio Hato 
Air Base Renewed (1955), Relations Severed (1964), Renewed Treaty 
Negotiations (1964-67), Renewed Call for Treaty Negotiations (1971), 
Attempt to Embarrass U.S. at U.N. (1973), Acceptance of Carter-
Torrijos Treaties (1977-79), Worsening Relations Under Noriega 
(1987-89) 
Post-Cold Initially Cooperative Policies Under Endara (1989-90), Mixed 
War/System Cooperation on Drug Issue (1990-94), Highly Cooperative Policies 
Transition Under Perez Balladares (1994- ), Acceptance of Exiled Haitian 
Leadership (1994), Acceptance of Cuban Refugees (1994), Attempted 
Accession to GATT (1994- ), Demonstrated Desire for NAFfA 
Accession 
Table 6: Author 
less of a challenge to great powers.31  This proposition seems to have been supported 
by Panama's behavior in the 1970's. 
b. U.S. Hegemonic Influence and Panamanian Foreign Policy 
While the categories of U.S. hegemony and behavior towards the region are 
generally divided into the same periods as corresponding periods of systemic polarity 
considered above, there are some important observations that can be made from 
considering U.S. hegemonic policy's effect on the formation of Panamanian foreign 
policy (see table below). 
(1) One important factor in independence of Panama is the role that the 
United States played in guaranteeing the success of the rebellion.  This was only 
possible in the Protective Imperialist phase of U.S. expansion (1898-1933) and under 
President Theodore Roosevelt.  In geopolitical terms, the United States, by allying 
with the Panamanians, balanced the Colombian threat.  This seems to agreed with 
what Rothstein proposed in his theoretical discussion of small states: while great 
powers ally to balance the global system, small powers often ally "in terms of local 
balance."32 
(2) Panama's change in policy towards the United States in 1941 
resulting from the overthrow of Arnulfo Arias Madrid was separated from the 
beginning of the Good Neighbor era by eight years but more concurrent with the total 
31
 Ibid.,   pp.   2 8  and 254, 




l . ,,32 
~I id., . 
32
breakdown of the old international order.   This seems to indicate that Panama acted in 
the interest of self-preservation and not as quid pro quo following the more amicable 
U.S. policy towards the region and the 1936 Hull-Alfaro Treaty. 
(3) Panama has tended to seek very close and cordial relations with the 
United States in time of World War.  During both World War I and World War II, the 
level of cooperation between the two nations was unprecedented and Panama was 
treated in many ways as part of the United States.33 
(4) Anti-U.S. foreign policy stands have developed during periods when 
the United States could not or would not intervene militarily in Panama, i.e. between 
1920 and 1941 and in the 1970's.  The periods of the most pro-U.S. foreign policies 
were those with the highest degree of U.S. presence in Panama and willingness to use 
military power, i.e. 1903-1920 and 1941-45. 
33The best discussion of wartime cooperation is provided by 
Lawrence 0. Ealy, The Republic of Panama in World Affairs, 1903- 
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U.S. Hegemony Within the Interamerican System and Panamanian Foreign Policy 
Protective Highly Cooperative Policies (1903-1920), Rising Anti-U.S. Sentiment (1920-
Imperialism 1941), 
Good Neighbor Refusal to Arm Merchant Vessels (1941), Highly Cooperative Policies 
Era (1941-45), Merchant Vessels Armed As Per U.S. Request (1941), New 
Basing Agreement for War Effort 
Cold War Anti- Refusal to Renew Basing Agreement (1946-47), Lease on Rio Hato Air Base 
Communism Renewed (1955), Relations Severed (1964), Renewed Treaty Negotiations 
(1964-67), Renewed Call for Treaty Negotiations (1971), Attempt to 
Embarrass U.S. at U.N. (1973), Acceptance of Carter-Torrijos Treaties 
(1977-79), Worsening Relations Under Noriega (1987-89) 
Towards Regional Initially Cooperative Policies Under Endara (1989-90), Mixed Cooperation 
Free Trade on Drug Issue (1990-94), Highly Cooperative Policies Under Perez 
Balladares (1994- ), Acceptance of Exiled Haitian Leadership (1994), 
Acceptance of Cuban Refugees (1994), Attempted Accession to GAIT 
(1994- ), Demonstrated Desire for NAFTA Accession 
Table 7: Author 
rk 
The year 1989 marked a watershed as changes in systemic polarity occurred on 
the world scale and the transition from the Anti-Communist struggle to the Fight for 
Free Trade occurred within the Interamerican region.  While it is still hard to 
determine the new status of the world system and the theme of post-Cold War regional 
cooperation, it is interesting to consider the behavior of Panama during this new era. 
The current main goals of Panamanian foreign policy, (1) to prepare to assume 
control of the Panama Canal and (2) to join into NAFTA after Chile and significantly 
earlier than neighboring states, seem to indicate that the Panamanian leadership 
believes that the New World Order is essentially an economic order.   Domestically, 
the privatization program and neo-liberal reforms being attempted are demonstrating a 
seriousness to make Panama economically attractive to international investment. 
Panama's close cooperation with the United States, under the leadership of 
President Ernesto Perez Balladares, seems to indicate a willingness to restore the 
traditional partnership between Panama and the United States.  Panama's clear efforts 
to gain the favor of the United States through good will indicates that the Panamanian 
leadership implicitly recognizes the regional leadership role of the United States and 
that good relations with the United States could result in a favorable position for 
Panama in the emerging regional order.  If the world is dividing into blocks, Panama 
wants to be in on the ground floor and close to the United States. 
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IV. DANCING THE STICK:   THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter views Panama as a case of Primat de Innerpolitik, where domestic 
political considerations are overwhelming for leaders and dominate all policy-making 
processes, to include the development of foreign policy.  This study attempts to 
understand Panama's domestic political landscape through dissection.  The president, 
as the rational actor, is influenced by a variety of domestic political forces:   the elites, 
commercial interests, the military, political parties, U.S./Canal Zone leadership, and 
the masses.  His political survival is decided by how well he responds to the various 
sectors, especially the sector with the most domestic political power.  Over time, the 
power of various domestic interests varies. This means that leaders have to recognize 
the reality of the domestic political economy and act rationally within it.  For U.S. 
analysts interested in the formation of foreign policy in Panama, understanding the 
domestic political situation allows for estimation of what choices are possible for the 
Panamanian leader. 
A major challenge of this study was to control the argument and not allow 
domestic interests to be generalized into Marxist class categories.  Some have tried to 
interpret Panamanian politics in this manner, but a Marxist interpretation misses much 
of the nuance of Panamanian politics.  Graham Green views Panama in these terms. 
His hero, Brigadier General Omar Torrijos is the leader of the masses and the arch- 
63 
enemy is the oligarchical Arnulfo Arias Madrid whose family-according to Greene's 
account—ruled Panama for "over a half century."1  This simplistic approach distorts 
reality.  The fact that populism in Panama has been a tool of the left and the right and 
that no regime, not even that of Torrijos, has represented exclusively one sector seems 
lost if Panamanian politics is viewed as a case of class straggle.   While some of the 
terms in this paper overlap with Marxist concepts, the story is one of competing 
interests within a quasi-democratic framework.   If one begins with Justice Oliver 
Wendall Holmes's concept of a "marketplace of free ideas" and adds violence, one has 
the domestic political system that will be described here.2 Panamanian domestic 
politics is a Hobbesian-Malthusian construct in which the strong have a fighting 
chance at survival. 
a. Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 
In The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur 
A. Stein, the authors assert that the natures of domestic political systems have 
"determined key decisions and national policies toward the outside world."3 
1Graham Greene, Getting to Know the General (New York; Simon 
and Schuster, 1984), p. 30. 
2Justice Holmes used this concept to address the topic of 
free speech in the United States.  In his famous dissent in the 
case of the Jacob Abrams et al vs. the United States he stated 
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market..."  See Richard 
Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, 
and Free Speech (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 240, 
3Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, The Domestic Bases 
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Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Domestic Conditions 
Domestic Condition 
of Status Quo State 
Domestic Condition of Revisionist Power 
Constrained Permissive or 
Stimulative 
Constrained Peace from Mutual 
Restraint 
War/Deterrence 
Failure        , 
Permissive or 
Stimulative 




Balance of Power 
Table 8: From Rosecrance and Stein, 1993, p. 19. 
Application of table 1 to the Panamanian-U.S. relationship would begin with 
inserting the United States as the "Status Quo State" and Panama as the "Revisionist 
Power." These positions were constant from 1903 when the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
was signed (giving the U.S. rights to the Canal Zone) until 1979 when the instruments 
of ratification of the Carter-Torrijos treaties were exchanged.  Now, Panama and the 
United States are entering a new period and the positions of each in the table will 
have to be reversed.  While Panama is generally content with planned final 
implementation of the Carter-Torrijos Treaties on 31 December 1999, the United 
States could decide to reconsider total withdrawal and attempt to renegotiate.  If this 
occurred, then the United States would be in the position of revisionist power.  After 
considering past constraints on leaders, Perez Balladares' position will be considered 
using table 1. 
b. Dancing the Stick 






has usually been the president, but on three occasions a military leader:  Colonel Jose 
Antonio Rernon Cantera (1947-55), BG Omar Torrijos Herrera (1968-81), and General 
Manuel Antonio Noriega (1983-89).  To look to the president as "the only policy- 
maker" would not be possible in most cases, however this can be safely done in the 
case of Panama.  The traditional weakness of the legislative branch in Panama and the 
virtual absence of a professional bureaucracy permits looking at the executive alone as 
the policy-maker.  These leaders-past presidents and military leaders- while operating 
within the limits of the international system, have also had to navigate the sometimes 
treacherous waters of domestic politics.  Their actions can be best described with the 
Panamanian term "bailor la vara", literally "to dance the stick."  The term is used to 
describe politicians doing what they have to do to survive without getting the "stick".4 
More than one leader has gotten the "stick," which can be equated with losing power 
and many more have been bloodied to the point of ineffectiveness.  This harsh reality 
makes an understanding of domestic political environment necessary to understand the 
leader and his behavior. 
In 1931, in Panama's first coup, a group of civilians led by Arnulfo Arias 
Madrid, ousted the elected president, Florencio Arosemena.  Dr. Arias, a Harvard- 
trained physician was repaid many times for his role in the coup.  He was elected in 
1940, ousted in 1941, elected in 1948 and not allowed to take power, placed in power 
4The closest U.S. expression is "to go with the flow," but 
even this does not capture the essence of the Spanish term. "To 
go with the flow" implies passivity, however "to dance the stick" 
implies an actor struggling through to survive and prosper. 
Ideas, ideologies,   parties, and people are used and discarded as 
necessary. 
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in 1949 only to be removed 18 months later, elected in 1968 only to be removed 11 
days later, and denied victory by fraud in 1984.  Colonel Remön was another leader 
who received the "stick."  President Remön was assassinated at the National Racetrack 
in 1955.  While the whole truth has not been uncovered, it seems clear that his 
assassination was paid for by a domestic political rival.  It has also been asserted, but 
not proven, that the death of Torrijos was an assassination.5 
"Dancing the stick" during the Noriega era took on new meaning as the civilian 
presidents were shown who the real power was.  Aristides Royo, Torrijos's hand- 
picked president was removed in 1982 by the National Guard.  After 42-year old Royo 
came on national television and announced his stepping down due to a sore throat, 
Panamanians labeled the affair "El Gargantazo," the blow to the throat.6  Ardito 
Barletta, who was elected President in 1984, was removed in 1986 by Noriega.7  The 
vice president was Eric Arturo Delvalle, nicknamed "Tuturo."  Panamanians quickly 
changed this to "Tuturno," meaning "it's your turn."8 
"Dancing the Stick" or staying alive and in power is the goal of all Panamanian 
leaders.  This goal is more important than any other, to include the nature of the 
international system.  For Panama, which has been described as an emporium-state 
5This conspiracy theory of Torrijos's death pins the 
responsibility on the CIA, Noriega, or both.  While no well 
documented sources of this information exists it has been put 
forward in Graham Greene, Getting to Know the General. 
6John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (New York: Random House, 
1990), p. 144. 
7Ibid. 
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where commerce with the world is the most important aspect of national life, foreign 
policy is important.9  The number of embassies and consulates around the world may 
be some indication of the degree of importance that Panama places on external 
relations.  Foreign policy is important for elite businessmen and bankers who are 
interested in trade, for the middle-class professional who hopes to work for the 
Panama Canal Commission or a U.S. military base, and for the street vendor who sells 
fruit to Gringos.  Foreign policy is important to nationalistic students, to the large 
community with family ties to the United States, and to those who violently opposed 
the U.S. invasion in 1989.  As President Ernesto Perez Balladares "dances the stick" 
during his term, he will be challenged and threatened by all of those interested in 
foreign policy.  Mere survival will be a challenge, actually achieving success will 
prove Perez Balladares a true operator who can manage domestic politics. 
2. Significance of Domestic Politics: Is Panama Worthy of Micro- 
Analysis? 
Of all of the bilateral relationships in the Inter-American System, that between 
the Republic of Panama and the United States has been one of the most important 
since the Panamanian Revolution in 1903.  The Panama Canal is a great source of 
pride for the United States as a symbol of U.S. ingenuity; the Canal holds a special 
place is the U.S. national psyche.  For Panama, the Canal is viewed as a natural 
9The best available work on the nature of Panama and the 
national metaphysic is Ricaurte Soler, Formas Ideoloqicas de la 
Naciön Panamena: Panama y el Problema Nacional Hispanoamericano 
(Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1977). 
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resource, the national patrimony.10 
Any cursory review of the literature demonstrates that the United States and 
Panama have had a wide variety of relationships since 1903, from close friendship 
during the building of the Canal (1904-1914), to direct confrontation in the 1960's, to 
cooperation in the late 1970's, to violent hostility in the late 1980's, to limited 
cooperation in the 1990's.  Systemic factors do not explain this often-changing 
relationship.  This chapter will address domestic political determinants of Panamanian 
foreign policy and hypothesize that domestic politics in Panama places constraints on 
decision makers and are sometimes the main causal factor in foreign policy 
development.  If domestic politics in Panama does significantly constrain leaders, then 
an understanding of what leaders can do is a necessary prerequisite for planning 
foreign policy approaches to Panama.  For the United States, the presence of the Canal 
and U.S. military bases make a micro-analysis of Panama's domestic politics worth the 
effort and potentially valuable. 
B. PANAMANIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
In order to analyze Panama's domestic political economy since 1903, various 
time periods have been devised.  These are based on the relationships of the various 
domestic political players.  For this study, Panamanian domestic politics have been 
divided into six historical periods. 
10The references to the Canal as Panama's natural resource 
and patrimony were numerous during the presidential campaign in 
1994.  One example is an interview with President Perez 
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Table 9: Panamanian Domestic Pol itical Regimes, 1903-95; By Aut hor. 
1. Old Oligarchy, 1903-31 
The period from 1903 to 1931 in domestic politics is characterized by (1) 
structural democracy with minimal citizen participation, constitutional continuity, and 
occasional U.S.-intervention to restore order or to supervise the electoral process.  The 
principal actors were the presidents, which by and large came for the upper class of 
Panama City, what is referred to in this chapter as the elite.  The primary pressures on 
these actors were, in order of importance: (1) the U.S./Canal Zone (CZ) leadership, (2) 
the elite, (3) commercial interests, (4) political parties, (5) the masses, and (6) the 
military. 
a. U.S./CZ Leadership 
With the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in Washington, D.C. 
on 18 November 1903, the newly independent Republic of Panama became a U.S. 
protectorate—what Philander C. Knox referred to as a "vest pocket republic."11  United 
States intervention during this period was due to Panamanian domestic politics and not 
U.S.-Panama relations.12 After 1920, the United States did not become involved in 
Panamanian electoral politics again until the late 1980's.  This change in U.S. policy in 
1920 allowed for new forces to become predominant on the domestic political scene. 
b. Elites 
^Lawrence 0. Ealy, The Republic of Panama in World Affairs, 
1903-1950 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951), p. 20. 
12The best work on the U.S. interventions in Panama between 
1903 and 1920 is G.A. Mellander, The United States in Panamanian 
Politics: The Intriguing Formative Years (Danville, Illinois: The 
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For the upper-class of Panama City, the Panamanian Revolution and the 
building of the Canal was a boon.  Having long been big fish in a little pond, the 
Panamanian elite was poised to take advantage of the growth in Panamanian prestige 
on the world stage, the population growth, and the arrival of partners in the form of 
high-ranking employees of the Canal Zone.  It was the relationship of the Panamanian 
elite and high-ranking Americans like Dr. William Gorgas, Col. John Stevens, and 
Governor Charles Edward Magoon that dominated Panama's relations with the United 
States and closely tied the top echelons of the population to U.S. success in the Canal 
Zone.13 
c. Comumercial Interests 
During this period, the commercial and elite sectors were increasingly 
synonymous.  The old elite, which had consisted of Conservative Party leaders like 
President Manuel Amador and landed sons of colonial families, while clearly a power 
in 1903 at the time of Revolution, were not able to regain the presidency after 1908.14 
Panama's true nature as a commercial nation brought the bourgeois commercial class 
quickly to the helm of national power.  Trade thus became the most respectable 
13The ties between Panama's upper class and the U.S. during 
this period cannot be overstated.  President Amador's daughter 
was married to the American Vice-Consul Felix Ehrman.  One 
popular national politician was married to U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson's niece.  Several prominent families were of American 
descent, their forefathers all having settled in Panama at the 
time of the Gold Rush. 
14Historian Marco Gandäsegui calls these Conservatives 
"enemies of capitalist development."  Marco A. Gandäsegui,h., La 
Democracia en Panama (Mexico: Universidad Autönoma Metropolitana, 
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occupation in Panama and the old elite soon accepted this reality. 
d. The Masses 
The role of the general population in domestic politics was minimal. 
Suffrage was universal for citizens, but women were not citizens.15  Despite the right 
to vote, few exercised the right.  For example, in 1924 only 7.8% of the population 
voted—33,080 votes out of a population of 422,522.16 Election campaigning was not 
based on mass appeals but rather on organized parties of voters and private armies 
who fought out electoral conflict in the streets.  These partisan armies, referred to as 
"pie de guerra" (war footing), were a means of demonstrating the seriousness of a 
candidate's supporters.  The battles which often occurred around Santa Ana Plaza in 
Panama City should not be misinterpreted as an indication of mass sentiment, but 
rather as an indication how well the elite organizers were at mobilizing their 
supporters and how much a candidate was willing to pay for supporters, votes, and pie 
de guerra. 
e. Political Party Interests 
The two party system inherited from Colombia soon fragmented as the 
Conservatives faded and the Liberals spit into numerous parties.  The changes 
occurred so fast that no party was able to develop a following that could be 
maintained beyond a single candidate.  The possible party coalitions were only limited 
15Ramon E. Fäbrega and Mario Boyd Galindo, Constituciones de 
La Repüblica de Panama (Panama: Talleres Gräficos de Impresion 
Educativa, 1981), p. 268, Article 49. 
16Julio E. Linares, Enrique Linares En La Historia Politica 
de Panama (San Jose: Litografia e Imprenta LIL, 1989), p. 232. 
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by a candidate's savvy, family ties, and financial resources.  According to historian 
Marcos Gandäsequi, a major change that occurred in the 1920's was the transformation 
of the caudillo system from one of local caudillos to a single national caudillo.  This 
occurred with the elimination of the Electoral College and the rise of nationally known 
politicians like Belisario Porras.1' 
f. Military 
Panama's military tradition was inherited from Colombia and centered 
around a living symbol in the form of General Esteban Huertas.  Huertas, the 
Commander of the Garrison in Panama at the time of Panamanian Revolution, sided 
with the rebels and became a national hero.  The payment from the Revolutionary 
Junta to Huertas was $80,000—a fortune in 1903 Panama.18  A year after the 
revolution, William Howard Taft commented that the Panamanian Army was "not 
much larger than the army on an opera stage."19 General Huertas attempted only once 
in 1904 to become a political power but was rebuked by the political leadership.  His 
insinuation that the Panamanian Army might play a larger role in politics led to U.S. 
interest and disestablishment of the army.20  From that time until his death, the 
General was only seen annually at the 3 November celebration of Independence from 
Colombia. 
17Gandäsequi,   p.   18. 
18David McCullough,   The  Path  Between the  Seas   (New York: 
Simon and  Schuster,   1977),   p.   376. 
19Ibid.,   p.   379 = 
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Panama's ability to develop a military or significant police force was limited by 
the U.S. military presence and the U.S. right under Article 136 to intervene in 
domestic matters.  The limitations on developing any real force was emphasized in 
1916 when the U.S. intervened and disarmed the National Police.21  It was this 
enforced insignificance of military and police forces that allowed for a civilian coup in 
1931. 
2. Elite Populism, 1931-41 
The civilian coup on 1 January 1931 was a turning point for domestic politics. 
The coup leader, Arnulfo Arias Madrid and his brother Harmodio Arias Madrid 
brought to the forefront of domestic politics new interests and a new group of elites 
that remain very much engaged currently.  The coup allowed for the partial 
displacement of the old elite, encouraged mass participation in politics, and called for 
essential changes in the Panama-U.S. relationship.  Sectors of influence between 1931 
and 1940 were respectively: (1) commercial elite interests, (2) party interests, (3) the 
mass, (4) the military, and (5) the U.S./CZ leadership.  It should be noted that during 
this period elite and commercial interests faded together, the significance of political 
parties grew, and the military (national police) was strengthened. 
a. Commercial/Elite Interests 
The Arias brothers were not bom into Panama's elite, but they were part 
of the elite by the time of the coup in 1931.  The brothers were from Chiriqui 
province where their family farmed.  While not wealthy, they were ambitious. 
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Arnulfo managed to graduate from Harvard Medical School. This academic success 
placed Amulfo among the best educated people in Panama and provided the brothers 
with access to elite circles. 
It was this access that made the coup possible.  According to Julio Linares, 
author and brother-in-law of Amulfo Arias, Amulfo was always welcomed at the 
Palacio de las Garzas during the presidency of Harmodio Arias.  During a party the 
night before the coup, Arias used his unimpeded access to the various parts of the 
palace to unlock a window in the executive office.   This window was used by Arias 
and other members of Action Comunal in conducting the coup.22 
In the end, Amulfo Arias and other members of Action Comunal produced a 
change in domestic politics, what Gandäsequi calls a "a new bourgeois democratic 
formation."  The new leadership sought to insert the service economy of Panama into 
the international system.23 This movement brought the new commercial elite interests 
to dominate domestic politics.  This remained the case until 1941. 
The Communal Action organization that conducted the 1931 coup did 
not become a party in its own right.  Harmodio Arias ran and won on the ticket of the 
Liberal Doctrinaire Party {PLD-Partido Liberal Doctrinario) in 1932.  However, in 
1936 the Arias brothers supported the candidacy of Juan D. Arosemena of the 
National Revolutionary Party (PNR-Partido National Revolucionario) against 
22Ibid.,   pp.   287-8o 
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Domingo Diaz of the PLD.  Thus political parties continued to be weaker than the 
caudillos and kingmakers behind the scenes, but were larger and stronger than 
before.24 
c. The Mass 
The elite populism of the Arias brothers and Arnulfo's Doctrina 
Panamenista was met with wide popular approval.  Arnulfo identified closely with the 
Mestizo part of the population.  The mass approved of Arnulfo's racist and anti-U.S. 
rhetoric, as all of Panama's problems were blamed on English-speaking West Indians, 
Chinese merchants, and other "foreign" elements.  A good example of how widespread 
support for Arias's program was is the 1940 referendum on a new constitution.  The 
1941 Constitution stripped many minorities of their citizenship and was supported 
almost unanimously by Panamanians. 
In Favor of Reform 144,312 
Opposed to Reform 1,865 
Blank Votes 513 
Table 10: Results of the 1940 Constitutional Reform Plebiscite25 
d. Military 
The National Police began to gain prominence when the United States 
stopped interfering in electoral matters in 1920.  The period 1931-41 was a period of 
24Linares,   pp.   354-64. 
25Ibid., p. 370; It must be added that the system of pre- 
printed ballots, that was used, was not fair and did distort the 
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steady growth of the National Police and by 1940 the institution was powerful enough 
to serve as arbiter in national elections.  Arnulfo Arias had supported the strengthening 
of the police and so maintained their support during the 1940 presidential elections. 
Steve Ropp sees the police's part in the election clearly: "In support of the candidacy 
of Arnulfo Arias, the National Police shot it out and won against the civilian ' army' 
backing the opposition candidate."26 It was Arias' overestimation of his ability to 
maintain the support of the police that led to his overthrow in 1941. 
e. ILS./CZ Leadership 
The 1931 coup marked a further reduction of U.S. influence on 
domestic politics.  This was the first major political event on the isthmus without 
approval of the Canal Zone leadership.  While Action Comunal was worried that the 
U.S. might exercise its rights under the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty to intervene in 
domestic disturbances, the U.S. opted to only observe.  The lack of U.S. action 
indicated that domestic political actors could act decisively without U.S. approval and 
placed the U.S./CZ leadership's influence in domestic politics at a low point-where it 
would remain until the dawn of World War II. 
3. Elite Militarism!, 1941=55 
The 1940 election of Arnulfo Arias Madrid as President of Panama was 
problematic for the United States, the Panamanian police, and for many of the 
traditional elite.  Arias' harsh Panamenista doctrine and stated pro-Axis leanings 
26Steve C. Ropp, Panamanian Politics; From Guarded Nation to 
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represented a problem for the United States.   Arias denied Asians, West Indian Blacks, 
and other foreigners their citizenship and property rights, but these restrictions were 
not applied to the Japanese or Germans.    Japanese-owned businesses were allowed to 
operate freely during Arias' term, although Chinese merchants were forced to sell their 
property at a moments notice and for a pittance. 
While the United States did not take an active role in the overthrow of Arias, 
the move was definitely not frowned upon by the Canal Zone leadership.  The period 
of Elite Militarism (1941-55), which began with the coup against Arias and ended 
with the assassination of military president Jose Antonio Remön in 1955, was marked 
with a high degree of cooperation between the United States and Panama in insuring 
Canal security. 
a. Military 
The National Police, which was the nation's only significant force, was 
strengthened under Arias.  However, he was unable to control the institution.  The 
1941 coup began Alias's turbulent relationship with the military. 
During this period, the military grew and its name was change from the 
National Police to the National Guard.  The National Guard dominated domestic 
politics behind the scenes from 1941 until 1947, but became more openly in control in 
1947 when Comandante Remon was made president. 
b. U.S./CZ Leadership 
Alias's successor, Adolfo de la Guardia was able to have good relations 









to 130 additional sights outside of the Canal Zone.  The United States enjoyed access 
to Panama and worked together with the National Police to round up possible 
subversives.  As had occurred during World War I, Germans were transported to the 
United States and only returned to Panama for release after the war.  Although the 
United States maintained good relations with Panama throughout this period, the U.S. 
power as a domestic political actor in Panama diminished with the end of hostilities. 
Panama's oligarchy was divided by the 1931 coup and jolted again by 
Arnulfo Arias' election in 1940.  It was the divided state of the oligarchy that allowed 
the overthrow of Arias.  The military's power increased with Remön's consolidation of 
power as head of the National Guard and election to the presidency.   Simultaneously, 
the oligarchy lost influence.  Increasingly squeezed out by the military and the masses, 
the elite could do little more than provide figurehead presidents and enjoy tenuous 
relations with the National Guard. 
d. The Mass 
The mass was not the military's base of power during this period, rather 
the military depended upon the commercial elite and vice-versa.  Nevertheless, the 
popular classes were able to influence the government increasingly during this period. 
Various popular groups, such as the Federation of Students (FEP), the United 
Panamanian Teachers, and the Front for Patriotic Youth, were able to bring popular 
pressure to bear on some issues, such as (1) for new constitution in 1945 and (2) 
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against renewing the World War II bases agreement in 1947.27 
e. Political Parties 
Before Remön's electoral reforms in 1952, creating political parties in 
Panama was easy and done often.  Remön wanted to make the party structure mean 
more and thus sought to greatly limit the number of parties.  He made 45,000 
supporters a prerequisite for parties being legally recognized.  This eliminated all 
parties, except for his own National Revolutionary Party and one opposition party. 
Political parties meant very little during this period and were nothing without their 
leaders.  After Remön's death, the minimal number of supporters was lowered and the 
number of parties grew rapidly.28 
4. Middle Oligarchy, 1955-68 
Remön's death in 1955 ended the possibility of an alliance between the military 
and the oligarchy.  Who was responsible for the death of Remön is subject to debate, 
but it seems clear that there was a conspiracy and that prominent members of the 
oligarchy were involved.  While the military faded and the commercial elite became 
dominant, social pressures continued to increase.  This climaxed with the Flag Riots in 
1964, which forced the Middle Oligarchy to reconsider its relationship with the Canal 
Zone and the United States.  This period ended with Amulfo Arias coming to power 
for a third time and a National Guard coup against him eleven days later, on 11 
27George Priestly, Military Government and Popular 
Participation in Panama (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 15. 
28Brian Hunter et al, eds., The Stateman's Yearbook 1958 
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October 1968. 
a, Commercial Elite 
During this period the oligarchy was deeply split over economic policy. 
The National Confederation of Private Enterprise (CONEP) was split into two groups. 
The Chamber of Commerce was opposed to joining the Central American Common 
Market and wanted to make the whole nation a free-trade zone.  The Industrial 
Syndicate wanted protective tariffs to continue and favored a very gradual approach to 
regional integration.29 
b. Political Parties 
Many of the parties from this period formed the basis for the modern 
party structure.  The Christian Democratic Party was founded in 1960.  The 
Panamenistas were organized again under the leadership of Arnulfo Arias.  By 1968, 
Amulfo Arias was viewed as less of a bete-noire by the oligarchy.  Many non- 
Amulfistas, including Liberals, joined in support of Arias in 1968.  This pro-Arias 
grouping could be viewed as the predecessor of the ADO coalition of the 1980's.  The 
National Patriotic Coalition, which had been led by National Guard Commandant 
Remön, survived into this period and ran second to Arias in 1968.  It could be argued 
that this grouping was the predecessor of the PRD-led Torrijistas of post-1968 
Panama.  The coalition was pro-National Guard and Anti-Arias.  However, it lacked 
the social justice emphasis that Torrijos was able to place at the center of his populist 
militarism. 
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Arnulfo Arias Panamenistas 175,432 
David Samudio National Patriotic Coalition 133,887 
Antonio Gonzalez Revilla Christian Democrats 11,371 
Table 11:  Results of the 1968 Presidential Election 30 
c. Military 
While this was clearly a civilian-dominated period of domestic politics, 
the military was strong enough to guarantee security.  Very late in the period, when 
pro-Arias representatives in the National Assembly impeached President Marco A. 
Robles, the National Guard supported Robles and allowed him to remain in power. 
During this episode, Alias's offices were attacked by the Guard and some Arias 
supporters jailed.31 
d. The Mass 
It was the popular class that changed most between 1954 and 1968.  By 
1964, popular opinion was a real worry for the oligarchy and for the military.  The 
Flag Riots in 1958 and especially in 1964 were led by student groups and many point 
out the presence of communist instigators.32  What ultimately matters is that the 
actions of the students who challenged U.S. authority in the Canal Zone were widely 
supported by the Panamanian people.  In fact, the 1964 Flag Riots were a critical 
30T JHunter, Brain et al, eds., The Statesman's Yearbook 19 6! 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 19 68), p. 2 64. 
31Priestly, pp. 25-6. 
32The most extensive discussion of this can be found in 
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event in shaping the psyche of the Panamanian nation.   Those who died were 
considered national martyrs and as one Panamanian writer says it was the "Calvario de 
un Pueblo" (Calvary of a People).33 
The actions of President Rodolfo Chiari (1964-68) demonstrated the new 
strength of the popular classes in 1964.  When faced with a situation growing out of 
control in the Fourth of July Avenue area, the President opted to withdraw the 
National Guard forces from the area.  This left no one between the growing crowds 
and the American forces inside the Canal Zone.  The result was disaster as 21 
Panamanians and 5 Americans were killed.34  President Chiari, as a representative of 
the oligarchy, had decided to join the popular forces in opposition to the U.S. Canal 
Zone instead of being trampled by the masses.35 
e. U.S./CZ Leadership 
The United States was very weak as a force in domestic politics during 
this period.  In 1964 when President Chiari broke relations with the United States, 
President Johnson realized that a new arrangement would have to be reached with 
Panama and he understood from the start that the end of the U.S. Canal Zone was 
33For a nationalistic view of the crisis see Julio Yau, El 
Canal de Panama: Calvario de un Pueblo (Madrid: Editorial 
Mediterräneo, 1974). 
34Aristides Martinez Ortega, "Panama Explodes; The 1964 Flag 
Riots," Philip E. Wheaton, Panama Invaded (New York: Red Sea 
Press, 1992), pp. 68-71 and Denison Kitchel, The Truth About the 
Panama Canal (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978), p. 87. 
35Arnulfo Arias was in Panama at this time and once again 
stirring up popular sentiment against the U.S. presence.  With 
Arias on the right and the Marxists on the left, President Chiari 
was being sgueezed out of the political spectrum. 
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Panama and he understood from the start that the end of the U.S. Canal Zone was 
only a matter of time. 
5. Military Populism, 1968-89 
The military coup against Arnulfo Arias on 11 October 1968 was led by 
Colonel Boris Martinez, Omar Torrijos Herrera, and others.  These men, like 
American diplomats who were assigned to Panama, recognized that all of the talk 
about "a new Arnulfo" meant very little after the inauguration.  At the ceremony, 
Arnulfo demanded the immediate return of the Canal Zone and soon began a massive 
shuffling of officers within the National Guard.36 During the first year of military 
rule, Torrijos gained control and personally made this period of military rule different 
from the Remön era.  Torrijos' movement, now referred to as Torrijismo, was military 
populism.  While most military regimes had close ties with the right of the political 
spectrum, Torrijos allied himself with the left and a variety of popular concerns. 
While Remön had tried and failed to ally with the commercial elite, Torrijos opted to 
ally the National Guard with the masses. 
To simply say that Omar Torrijos was a leftist would not capture the subtlety 
of his politics.  Torrijos was pragmatic, yet simultaneously idealistic.  He could be 
friends with Fidel Castro, lend his support to the independence movement in Belize, 
and send forces to help defeat General Antonio Somoza in Nicaragua, and deal 
pragmatically with the United States.  Domestically, Torrijos behaved similarly.  The 
cabinets of his era reflected a broad section of the political spectrum, including 
36William J.   Jorden,   Panama  Odyssey   (Austin:   University  of 









"conservative businessmen and Marxists."37 Torrijos said, "I have certain benchmarks. 
If I move too far to the right, then Adolfo Ahumada and Römulo Escobar [two leftist 
ministers] will yell at me. If I move too far to the left, the Gabriel Lewis and 
Fernando Eleta [two businessmen] will start to scream."   Clearly Torrijos was an 
expert at bailando la vara?% 
The National Guard, renamed the Panamanian Defense Forces 
(PDF/FDP-Fuerzas de Defensa Panamenas) in 1983, was the centerpiece of Torrijismo. 
Torrijos envisioned the National Guard carrying out civic action programs like those 
taught to Latin American officers in U.S. military schools and he wanted to copy the 
military populism of General Velasco Alvarado's government in Peru. 
The ethnic composition of the military is an interesting consideration.  During 
the Remön era, the military was opened up to the lower sectors of Panamanian 
society.  By 1968 there were only a few officers with family ties to the oligarchy, like 
Commandant Bolivar Vallarino.  The majority of the officers were from the lowest 
classes.  This made the average member of the National Guard racially darker, with 
more in common with the lower classes than with the commercial elite.  These 
officers and their peers were very different from Bolivar Vallarino, a member of the 
elite, and Jose Antonio Remön, a poor member of a prominent family.  The nature of 
37Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), p. 5. 
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the changing ethnicity of the National Guard made challenging the oligarchy possible. 
For the first time the oligarchy and the military were two separate groups, from two 
separate Panamas. 
b. Mass 
The military program of Torrijismo was a challenge to the oligarchy, 
especially the extreme right represented by Arnulfo Arias.  While both of these leaders 
were populist, they were on very different parts of the political spectrum and appealed 
to different, but partially overlapping constituencies.  Torrijos reached out to lower 
class urban Panamanians, especially to Black West Indians who had previously 
suffered under Arias.  In the interior of the country, the division between those in 
favor or opposed to Torrijos was less clear.  Arias had traditionally appealed to the 
Cholo, the mestizo farmer in Panama's interior.  However, Torrijos reached out to 
these groups also and was very successful in gaining support.  The Torrijos-era 
legislature, called the National Council of Community Representatives, was actually 
weighted by Torrijos to favor rural areas.39 
c. Commercial Elite 
The 1968 coup made the commercial elite's arguments over economic 
policy meaningless.  The real choice after 11 October 1968 was whether to join with 
Torrijos or to challenge him.  Many of Panama's commercial elite did support the 
Torrijos regime and continued to support the military into the Noriega years. 
President Ernesto Perez Balladares is an example.  He was from a prominent and 
39Steven C. Ropp, Panamanian Politics: From Guarded Nation 
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wealthy family and educated in the United States.   Despite these elite credentials, he 
opted to serve Tonijos and Noriega.40 
On the other side, it should be noted that in the 1970's and especially the 
1980's this class provided the impetus for opposition to military rule.  The National 
Civic Crusade was made up of many civic organizations that had upper class 
leadership.  Arnulfo Arias never gave up his opposition until his death in 1988 and his 
widow Mireya Moscoso de Gruber continued the civilista effort.  By late 1989, the 
fight in Panama was largely a fight between the Rabiblanco-led civilistas and the 
Noriega-led Mulatto lower classes.41 
Upon seizing power in 1968, the National Guard disbanded all political 
parties, with one exception.  The communist party of Panama, called the Panamanian 
People's Party (PPP-Partido del Pueblo Panameno) was allowed to operate.  However, 
the PPP never gained significant power and may have served Torrijos in controlling 
the extreme left. 
40President Perez Balladares served the Noriega regime in 
1989 by serving as the campaign manager for the Noriega supported 
candidate of the COLINA coalition« 
41The best graphic portrayal of the racial aspect of the 
democracy movement in Panama is found in Newsweek, 22 May 1989, 
p.34.  The photograph was taken during a dignity battalion attack 
on the newly elected leaders of Panama.  In the photograph a 
Black Noriega supporter and member of a dignity battalion is 
beating Vice President elect Billy Ford, a Rabiblanco member of 
the elite.  The term Rabiblanco means literally "white tail" and 
refers to Panama's European upperclass who are distinguishable 
from the masses by their "whiteness."  See Panama: A Country 
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The process of approving the Panama Canal Treaties convinced Torrijos of the 
need to democratize.  He was encouraged to do this by President Carter and by many 
U.S. Senators who hoped to turn the Canal over to a democratic Panama.  Political 
parties were allowed to form in 1978.  The official Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD-Partido Revolucionario Democratico) was Torrijos's attempt to demilitarize the 
Torrijista movement.  He envisioned the PRD to have a role in Panama similar to the 
role that the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI-Partido Revolucionario Institutional) 
played in Mexico.  Smaller official parties were also founded, such as Labor Party 
(PALA-Partido Laborista) in 1983 and Broad Front of Professionals (FRAMPO-Frente 
Amplio de Profesionales);  these parties were to represent different wings of the 
Torrijista movement within the pro-military coalition. 
The opposition formed (or re-formed) a variety of parties including: Arias's 
Panamenistas, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberal Republican and National 
Movement (1981).   Despite their various agendas, opposition parties were able to 
unify in 1984 and 1989 to challenge the military's candidates. 
e. U.S./CZ Leadership 
The United States was not significant as a domestic player in Panama 
from 1968 until 1987.  During this period, the Canal negotiations were an important 
issue, but this action was government to government and did not involve the U.S. as a 
domestic player in Panama.42 Anti-U.S. sentiment was equated with nationalism 
42This division between the United States behavior within 
Panama as a domestic actor and in its bilateral relationship is 
cumbersome but critical to this study.  In normal state-to-state 
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during the period and Torrijos used this nationalistic energy for his domestic program 
and in the diplomatic straggle with the United States.  To say that the United States 
had no influence during this period might push the argument too far.  It should be 
remembered that—according to some sources—both Torrijos and Noriega were on the 
CIA payroll.43 
With the 1987 indictment of Manuel Antonio Noriega by Federal Attorney 
Robert MerWe, the United States once again became a player in Panamanian domestic 
politics.  The role was demonstrated by the transfer of Canal profits to the ousted 
DelValle government instead of to the Noriega-controlled Solis Palma government, 
and by the U.S. emphasis on having fair elections in 1989.  With former President 
Carter directly confronting the military-controlled Electoral Tribunal as they attempted 
to steal the 1989 election, a degree of U.S. involvement in electoral matters unseen 
since 1918 had seemingly returned. 
The period of military populism ended with Operation Just Cause, the U.S. 
name for the 20 December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama.  This action temporarily 
the equality of states is an old one, one for which Panama always 
argued when it was active in the League of Nations.  Certain U.S. 
dealings with Panama have been traditionally conducted along 
these lines, with all of the protocol that would exist in a 
relationship between symmetrical states.  However, in other 
dealings with Panama the United States has clearly recognized the 
relationship as asymmetrical and has gone beyond the traditional 
boundaries usually associated with bilateral relationships.  In 
this behavior as a domestic actor, the U.S. has overseen 
elections in Panama, intervened in local land disputes, and 
sought to influence the outcomes of national elections. 
A3See Seymour M. Hersh, "The Creation of a Thug; Our Man in 
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renewed U.S. dominance in domestic Panamanian politics.  As the elected president 
(Guillermo Endara) and vice presidents (Ricardo Arias Calderön and Billy Ford) were 
sworn in on Fort Clayton as the invasion began, it was clear that a new era in 
domestic politics was beginning.  As U.S. Military Judge Advocate General (JAG) 
officers jointly held court with their Panamanian counterparts, as U.S. military police 
were joined by members of the new U.S.-created Panamanian National Police (PNP) 
on joint patrols throughout Panama, and as the United States in numerous other ways 
assisted the new government to start over, it was clear the new democracy in Panama 
would be significantly different long after the U.S. troops were withdrawn.  This was 
the foundation of the New Oligarchy. 
6. New OUgarchy, 1989- 
President Guillermo Endara, a Panamenista (later Arnulfista) leader, led the 
civilista coalition against Noriega in the May 1989 elections.  His victory was 
recognized by the Catholic Church and the international community, however the 
elections were nullified by the Noriega regime.  Endara and his two vice presidents, 
Billy Ford and Ricardo Arias Calderön, came from Panama's elite.  Their interests 
were largely commercial and in good international relationships and trade when 
advantageous.  While from similar backgrounds and interests, these three men were 
very different politically.  Endara was in his heart an Arias Panamenista, but he had 
none of the Arias charisma and could hardly appear too nationalist and anti-United 
States.  Ford was openly pro-United States and questioned Panama's ability to run the 








doctrine, as a Christian Democrat he could not appear to be too close to the oligarchy. 
These differences led to the breakup of the Democratic Opposition Aliance (ADO- 
Alianza Democrätica Opositoria), to Arias Calderön's ouster from the Endara cabinet 
in early 1991, and to the civilista defeat in 1994.44 
The New Oligarchy is dominated by the commercial elite, whose members 
include Endara, Ford, Arias Calderön, and Perez Balladares.  While Perez Balladares 
and other member of the PRD would reject calling their rule an oligarchy, the change 
of power from Endara to Perez Balladares marked no restructuring of domestic 
politics. 
Like many Panamanian politicians, Perez Balladares could be described as a 
chameleon.  In the videos of the Noriega era (1983-89), Perez is pictured as a Noriega 
insider, the manager of the dictator's handpicked candidate in the fraudulent 1989 
Presidential Election.  This is the image on which the civilista candidates in the 1994 
election hoped the electorate would focus.  On the other hand, there is Perez the 
businessman, schooled at the University of Notre Dame and the Wharton School.  The 
former Citibank executive seems friendly enough.  It was Perez Balladares, the U.S.- 
trained banker, that met with and impressed President Bill Clinton on 20 July 1994 
and it is this Perez Balladares that has Panama on a neo-liberal economic track.45 
a. U.S./CZ Leadership 
^Shirley Christian, "Panama Reaches High But Stays Mired in 
Pain," New York Times, 29 April 1992, ISLA, Vol.44, No. 4, p. 89. 
45Eric Schmitt, "New Panama Leader: An Enemy Becomes an 
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The United States played the key role in ending the era of military 
populism with Operation Just Cause.  This operation was supported by an 
overwhelming majority of the Panamanians (nine out of ten) and resulted in the return 
to structural democracy.46 The U.S. role in domestic politics was dominant from 20 
December 1989 and into the first months of 1990, but faded quickly as U.S. forces 
redeployed to their home bases. 
So long as political democracy in Panama remains, the U.S. is likely to play a 
minor role in domestic politics until U.S. forces are withdrawn and the Canal is turned 
over to Panama on 31 December 1999.  After that date, the United States will likely 
no longer be a significant enough force in domestic politics to warrant a category. 
b. Commercial Elite 
While the domestic power of the U.S. faded fast after 1989, the 
predominance of the commercial elite appears more permanent.  Almost all of the 
major political parties draw their leadership from this group.  While still somewhat 
divided on trade and development issues as they were in the 1960's, the commercial 
elite is unchallenged for national leadership. 
Despite any claims to the contrary, President Ernesto Perez Balladares has the 
interests of the commercial elite very much in mind in following a neo-liberal path to 
economic development.  His monetary policy is very much like that of Endara and 
very different from what the populist rhetoric of Torrijismo has traditionally 
advocated.  In addition to privatizing the National Institute of Telecommunications 
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(INTEL), Perez Balladares has ambitious goals of (1) joining the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), (2) reforming the Labor Code, and (3) joining the North 
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA).   To pacify those concerned with social 
welfare, the government is promising to use the money made from privatization of 
INTEL to eradicate poverty.  This is a massive job, considering the economic reverse 
that Panama suffered during the last two-years of the Noriega regime.47 
The beginning of the Torrijos "abertura" (opening) in 1978 marked the 
renewal of a long struggle for Panama's political parties.48  The era of military rule 
divided the country into two opposing camps: those who supported the military and 
those who opposed the military.  This struggle gave rise to a multi-party, but basically 
two-coalition system.  The PRD clearly led the parties in favor of the military and the 
Panamenistas were the largest opposition party and led the civilista coalition. 
What is significant is that the parties survived and came to mean more than 
just ad hoc support for an ever-changing procession of political strongmen.  The PRD 
not only survived the death of Torrijos, but the end of military rule.  The 
Panamenistas (now Arnulfistas) survived the death of Amulfo Arias and supported a 
47
"The Economy Under the PRD," Panama Update, No,11 (Winter 
1995, p. 5, 
A8The term "abertura" is not usually associated with Panama, 
however the national vote on the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, the 
legalization of political parties, the strengthening of the 
civilian office of the presidency, and the plan to hold 
presidential and legislative elections in the 1980's all indicate 
that there was a Torrijos abertura from 1978 until BG Torrijos's 
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little-known Guillermo Endara as candidate in 1989.  These and other parties now 
seem to have a history of their own and to be beyond their former status as 
transitional groupings used and disposed of by caudillos. 
d. The Masses 
The position of the masses in domestic politics is an important 
consideration in determining the nature of the current regime and the potential pressure 
that popular forces could place on the government.  The Endara administration 
experienced labor unrest, in the form of a teachers strike and a transportation strike. 
During the education strike the government barely responded to the teachers' demands 
and instead simply waited for the educators to return to work.  President Endara's 
Controller General Ruben Dario Carles was the fiscal conservative who was known for 
always saying "No" on behalf of the Endara government.  He was known for being 
honest and even handed, i.e. he said "No" to everyone who asked for more money.49 
On issues regarding the Canal the desires of the populace have since 1979 
counted for nothing.  Endara made it clear that he would not reopen negotiations with 
the United States on bases or the Canal—despite calls by many labor leaders to do so 
and polls indicating that a majority desired that the U.S. military forces remain in 
Panama.  President Perez Balladares has indicated that he is willing to discuss the 
matter, but that the United States will have to ask if basing rights are desired.50  On 
the issue of the Canal, there is no question.  As a member of the commercial elite, 
49Tracy Wilkinson, "Panama's Economy Rests in his Hands," 
Los Angeles Times, 24 August 1993, ISLA, Vol.47, No.7, p. 122. 
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Perez Balladares views the Canal as the national patrimony and believes that 
Panamanians can operate it successfully at great profit.  This view is shared by most 
of the elite commercial class in Panama and allows the government to disregard 
popular opinion that questions Panama's ability to successfully operate the Canal and 
the reverted areas. 
The most comprehensive nationwide study conducted on public opinion on this 
issue is a study by Dr. Carmen Quintero Russo of the University of Panama's Institute 
of the Panama Canal and International Studies.51  Some important findings are listed 
below: 
(1) "Is economic benefit more important that sovereignty?" Answer: 66.7% No, 
17.2% Yes. 
(2) "Opinion concerning the Torrijos-Carter Treaties" Answer: 11.4 Very Good, 
29.6 Good, 3.9% Indecision, 43.2 Regular, 7.1 Bad, 4.8 No Opinion. 
(3) "Do the Torrijos-Carter Treaties prejudice the economy with the 
disestablishment of military bases?" Answer: 41.9% Yes, 37.5% No, 20.6% I do no 
know. 
(4) "Will the Canal be more efficient under Panamanian administration?" 
Answer: 55.6% No, 13.1% Yes, 31.3% I do not know. 
(5) "Does Panama's inability to defend the Canal justify the U.S. military 
51Carmen Quintero Russo, Opiniones y Expectativas Acerca del 
Canal de Panama, Bienes y Areas Revertidas (Panama: Imprenta 
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presence in Panama?" Answer: 48.6% Yes.52 
In summary, the Panamanians interviewed were in theory very nationalistic, 
stating that Panama was not a U.S. invention and that sovereignty was more important 
than the economy.  However, when the questions became more substantive, the 
majority of Panamanians believed that Panama would not administer the Canal better 
than the United States and that the Rail Road failed because of bad administration. A 
plurality believed that the departure of military bases was putting the economy in 
jeopardy and that Panama's lack of ability to defend the Canal justified the U.S. 
military presence.  The study could be criticized for having overrepresented the 
populations of Colon and Panama City and for having disproportionally represented 
the student population (40.6% of those interviewed).53  It could be argued that this 
overrepresentation of students could give the study an anti-U.S. and idealistic bias. 
Other studies have shown a much stronger opinion among Panamanians that 
the U.S. military presence should remain in Panama.  One study published that 80% of 
Panamanians wanted the U.S. to remain, but most estimate of this sentiment seem to 
be around 70%.54 However, as a demonstration of the popular class's position during 
the period of New Oligarchy under both Endara and Perez Balladares, these popular 
sentiments are not reflected by policy-makers or any significant faction of legislators. 
52The study does not provide a breakdown of all of the 
answers to this question, only the percentage that chose "yes" 
Ibid., p. 45. 
53Ibid., p. 11. 
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The presidential candidates in 1994 were unanimous in supporting the implementation 
of the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, with only one exception.  Former Controller General 
Ruben Dario Carles, who was a presidential candidate on the MOLIRENA, MORENA, 
and Renovacion Civilista tickets, favored renegotiation of the treaties.  However, 
Carles only won 16.2% of the vote.  This would seem to indicate that Panamanians 
voted their nationalistic, abstract convictions on the issue of the U.S. presence, or 
voted on other issues.55 
Defeated and disbanded during Operation Just Cause, the Panamanian 
Defense Forces does remain a political force in Panama in several ways.  The 
Panamanian National Police (PNP) is made up of many former PDF members, some 
75-80 percent in 1992.56 The PRD has sought close connections with those interested 
in military matters and Perez Balladares has approved amnesty for some PDF.  Even 
though the extreme Noriegista factions of the PRD, has sought to represent the militant 
side of the Noriega era military, the moderate wing of the PRD has sought to remake 
the party's image.  The party president Gerardo Gonzalez is the standard bearer for the 
populist Noriegista wing of the Party and finds support among the anti-U.S. Tendencia 
faction.  Perez Balladares has been at the forefront of this effort to reshape the PRD 
and to portray it as a civilian-led, Social Democratic party.  Increasingly, the 
55Latin American Weekly Report, 19 May 1994, p. 1= 
56Percent of PNP that were formerly PDF is from PNP Chief 
Osvaldo Fernandez.  Shirley Christian, "Panama's Police Force is 
Already Under Fire," New York Times, 1 September 1992, ISLA, Vol 
45, No. 3, p. 109„ 
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Noriegista side of the PRD is obscured. 
The future of the military in domestic politics is unknown.  The constitution is 
undergoing revision;  this is much needed as the 1972 document still preserves a large 
role for the military.   It seems that the military will be formally disbanded and that the 
PNP will remain the lead service in protecting the Canal.  It is likely that the prestige 
and power of the institution will grow as the U.S. forces depart. 
C. DOMESTIC ACTORS 
1. Commercial Elite 
This union of the old conservative elite of Amador and the newer more 
bourgeois commercial elite of Arias, Endara, Ford, and Perez Balladares has been the 
predominant domestic political force during much of Panama's history: 1920-1941, 
1954-1968, and 1989 to present.  Although not always in agreement on economic 
policy or the proper relationship with the United States, this group is united in viewing 
Panama as a world emporium and the Canal as the national patrimony.  Author 
Humberto E. Ricord dives the capitalist class of Panama into four groups: (1) the 
commercial bourgeois, (2) the industrial capitalists, (3) the financial sector, and (6) the 
large landowners.57 The term "commercial elite" is used in this study because the 
commercial sector dominates elite circles.  The commercial elite, centered around 
membership in the Club Union, view themselves as "serious people" who can lead 
business and Panama into the 21st century. 
57Humberto E. Ricord, Los Clanes de la Qliqarquia Panamefla y 
El Golpe Militär de 1968 (Panama: Colecciön : Polltica y Sociedad 
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2. The'Masses 
The Panamanian people in the abstract are nationalist, but are also known for 
voicing their everyday concerns.   They did this face to face with Torrijos in his town 
meetings and they did this at risk of great personal peril on both sides of the national 
struggle during the end of the Noriega era.  The group's sense of nationalism was 
shaped by the Flag Riots of 1964, the Torrijos Revolution of 1968, the Struggle for 
Democracy in the late 1980's, and the 20 December 1989 U.S. invasion.  As a result, 
it is suspicious of both the United States and the Panamanian oligarchy. 
At the same time, the Panamanian mass is malleable and responsive to political 
rhetoric.  It is a population that is willing to overwhelmingly support seemingly 
contradictory forces, such as (a) Arnulfo Arias in a fascist reorganization of national 
life, (b) the populist militarism of BG Omar Torrijos, (c) the U.S. invasion in 1989, 
and (d) Endara's presidency initially, in 1990.  These obvious and great changes in 
Panamanian public opinion indicate that the masses are easily influenced and that 
elite-populists and military-populists are skilled at mass manipulation. 
3= Political Party Interests 
In the early years of the republic, political parties in Panama meant little.  They 
were disposable tools of national caudillos.  The political groupings after the Arias 
coup in 1931 and from 1954 to 1968 were more important and provided the basis for 
the modern party structure.  The party system that developed after 1978 and especially 
after 1989, is the strongest in Panama's history.  Parties have been able to survive the 
deaths of their leaders, indicating a degree of institutional strength.   Current electoral 
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law is encouraging a smaller number of parties and it is conceivable that in the long 
run a two-coalition system could re-emerge, one similar to that of 1984 and 1989. 
4. Military 
The Panamanian military—in its various guises as the National Police, the 
National Guard, the Panamanian Defense Forces, and the Panamanian National Police- 
-has traditionally held a position of importance inverse to that of the U.S./CZ 
leadership.  In the early years of the republic, when the United States did not hesitate 
to use its treaty rights to intervene domestically, the Panamanian military counted for 
little.  As the U.S. grew more reluctant to intervene, the Panamanian military grew 
stronger and was able to become a political actor—the arbiter of national elections by 
1941.  The military coup of 1941 marks an anomaly in relations between the 
Panamanian military and the U.S. military.  The two militaries worked closely together 
during the Second World War. 
The Torrijos era of military rule was a transformation of the military's position 
in domestic politics.  The military after 1968 was no longer a tool of the oligarchy nor 
in alliance with the oligarchy, as had been the case under Remön.  The National 
Guard after 1968 was in political union with the masses, the social origin of the 
majority of National Guardsmen.  The United States, in contrast to the Panamanian 
military, was virtually a non-player in domestic politics during the Torrijos and 
Noriega eras, until very late in the 1980's. 
The resurgence of the U.S. as a domestic political actor in Panama- 








1989 elections, the tunneling of Canal profits to the ousted government, and ultimately 
Operation Just Cause—marked the decline of the Panamanian military's role in 
domestic politics.  Whether or not this change is reversible is unknown, but it is likely 
that the stature of the PNP will grow as U.S. forces are withdrawn in accordance with 
the Carter-Torrijos Treaties. 
5. United States/CZ leadersMp 
The role of the United States as a domestic political actor within an 
independent, foreign country is unusual.58  The U.S. Governor of the Canal Zone, the 
President or Chairman of the Panama Canal Company or Commission, and the 
Commander of the Southern Command have all played important roles within Panama. 
These players have been dominant on three occasions, from 1903 to 1920, during 
World War n, and in late 1989-early 1990.  It does seem that Operation Just Cause 
represented the last period of dominance for the U.S. and its local representatives in 
Panamanian domestic politics.  The final military withdrawal in 1999 and the turnover 
of the Canal will mark the end of an era and will probably end any residual role that 
the U.S. has played in post-Just Cause Panama. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
1. Linkages: The Importance of Domestic Politics in Foreign Policy 
levelopimi 
58Some parallels could be draw between U.S. activities 
within Panama and U.S. activities in the Philippines and Cuba in 
the first half of the 20th century and U.S. activities within 
Japan and Germany after World War II. 
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During the early years of the Republic when the U.S. played a major role in 
domestic politics via the Canal Zone officials, Panama was clearly close to the United 
States diplomatically.  Early diplomatic efforts to advertise the accomplishments being 
made in Panama, to oppose the Drago Doctrine, and to unify efforts during World 
War I demonstrate the pro-U.S. bias of Panamanian foreign policy during the first 20 
years of the Old Oligarchy (1903-31).  During this same period the U.S. was the 
arbiter in domestic politics as demonstrated by U.S. administration of national 
elections.  The ties between the U.S. elite, in and out of the Canal Zone, and the 
Panamanian oligarchy were strong through blood and friendship. 
The period of Elite Populism (1931-1941) was dominated by the Arias Madrid 
brothers and the new bourgeois interests that they represented.   Arnulfo Arias' anti- 
American, pro-fascist Panamenista doctrine called for a revision of the Panama-U.S. 
relationship.  While the Old Oligarchy lacked the will to motivate the populace against 
the United States, Arnulfo Arias had no such qualms.  The 1936 Hull-Alfaro Treaty 
answered at least some of the Nationalist concerns, as the United States gave up its 
right to intervene in Panama.  Ultimately, however, Arnulfo Arias was too much for 
the United States to accept.  His emphasis on Panamanian sovereignty in the months 
leading up to the U.S. entrance into World War II soured the relationship. 
The period of Elite Militarism (1941-1955) began with pro-U.S., pro-United 
Nations cooperation in the war effort.  The regime wanted good relations, especially 
good mihtary-military relations.  Panamanian ships were armed, U.S. forces in Panama 






relationship between Panama and the United States grew cold as the U.S. refused to 
leave World War II bases. 
The 1947 U.S. abandonment of the bases relieved the immediate tension and 
the 1953 Remön-Eisenhower agreements allowed for renewed goodwill.  Clearly, it 
seems that Remön's interests were those of his two most important constituencies, the 
commercial elite and the military.  The commercial elite wanted more business 
opportunities.  The National Guard wanted good relations with the U.S. military, 
knowing that this would likely result in an improved National Guard.  The more 
populist demands were not reflected in the Remön -Eisenhower talks, reflecting the 
fact that Remön's power was not based on support from the masses. 
The Middle Oligarchy (1955-68) began as a period of few demands for further 
changes in the U.S.-Panama relation.  However, Panamanian popular sentiment 
encouraged by nationalist students and some Marxist groups grew to the opinion that 
major change in Panama's foreign policy towards the U.S. was necessary.  President 
Chiari, as leader of the Middle Oligarchy, did not decide to challenge the U.S. over 
the issue of the Canal Zone.  He was, in the face of an angry Panamanian mob in 
1964, forced to take a firm anti-U.S. stand.  The treaty that was negotiated by the 
Middle Oligarchy represented the interests of the commercial elite and was not 
acceptable to mass sentiment.  After 1964, the middle oligarchy did not have a free 
hand to ratify the kind of treaty that reflected the interests of the dominant commercial 
elite, i.e. the shelved 1967 agreement. 








control of the populace by standing with popular sentiment.  His stand insisting that 
the United States turn over control of the Canal Zone reflected the nationalist opinion 
of his supporters.  His reaction to the United States was also a rejection of all that had 
occurred before him, i.e. the work of the oligarchy.  The Panama-U.S. cooperation 
from 1979 to 1986 was possible because of the good feelings after the Carter-Torrijos 
treaties were approved.  The 1987-89 hostility was more a reflection of Noriega's 
personal feelings towards the United States and President Bush than a reflection of 
military or mass sentiment. 
2. New Oligarchy Compared to Previous Similar Periods 
a. The Nature of Oligarchic Rule in Panama 
If domestic politics are important in the formation of foreign policy, then there 
should be lessons available from the past that can be used now (in the New 
Oligarchy).   Looking at the political economy of the various periods, there does appear 
to be similarities between the current era and the Old Oligarchy (1903-31) and the 
Middle Oligarchy (1955-68).  During both of these periods, the commercial elite was 
the principal domestic actor.59 During the Middle Oligarchy and the New Oligarchy, 
political parties have played important roles, second only to the commercial elite.  The 
masses and military have never been higher than third place during oligarchical rule 
and the United States has been a minimal actor in fifth place, except during the first 
17 years of the Old Oligarchy and the first six months of the New Oligarchy. 
This summary does not hold true during the first 17 years 
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During each of these three periods, Panamanian demands for revision of the 
bilateral relationship have not been vigorously pursued by leaders.  No attempts have 
been made to utilize the masses against the U.S., however the masses have sometimes 
acted on their own and sometimes been led by forces outside of governmental control. 
Generally speaking these periods of rule have been characterized by leaders interested 
in development and good business relations. 
b. What Were the Threats to Oligarchic Leaders? 
. (1) in 1931? The threat that removed President Florencio 
Arosemena from office was an unrecognized change in national sentiment, personified 
by Amulfo Arias.  Arias was able to appeal to the masses for support and they 
responded to his racist, anti-American rhetoric.  He gave the mestizo population a 
sense of nationalism and he and his brother appealed to the popular classes as 
outsiders, as real Panamanians from the interior contrasted with elite Panamanians, like 
President Arosemena, who were insiders and part of a corrupt system. 
(2) in 1941?  While the Arias Madrid brothers came to power 
portraying themselves as outsiders, they married into, grew into, and became a part of 
the Panamanian oligarchy.  The commercial interests represented by the Arias Madrid 
brothers were soon accepted by Panama's traditional elite, as the two interests melded 
into one commercial elite oligarchy.  Amulfo Alias's downfall in 1941, while at the 
hands of the Panamanian National Police, was clearly a result of larger issues. 
Amulfo Alias's failure to support the United States to the degree in which some 
United States policy-makers desired, place President Arias out of step with the 
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regional effort to prepare for World War DL  The Panamanian military and anti-Arias 
politicians understood this and recognized their opportunity to step into power in 
Panama.  Close cooperation with the United States assured those who successfully 
conducted the coup United States support and good relations.  While some would 
insist that the United States was heavily involved in this overthrow, this allegation 
cannot be substantiated. 
(3) in 1968? The threat in 1968 was similar to that of 1931, but 
instead of a civilian coup, the action was carried out by the National Guard.  Arnulfo 
Arias, instead of being the anti-oligarchical coup leader, was the coup victim.  Arias 
had made too many enemies over the years and threatening the National Guard was 
the final straw. 
3. Perez Balladares Dancing the Stick 
a. The Limits of Acceptable Behavior 
Perez Balladares as the face of the New Oligarchy has advantages over 
Arosemena and Arias, advantages that make his term potentially more successful. 
Perez Balladares' credentials as a Torrijista and a businessman give him support from 
the two groups that were the threats in 1931 and 1989, the commercial interests 
supported by the masses and the military supported by the masses.  If he is able to 
continue satisficing all sectors as he seems to be doing now, a wide latitude of 
behavior is open to him.  The PNP and former PDF members are largely supporters of 
the President, who has provided amnesty and who will likely build up the police as an 






community excited over potential growth and profits.  His base in the party system is 
firm and he has been able to build a majority coalition in the Assembly.  Perez 
Balladares' potential biggest problem is with the masses, but his mantel as a Torrijista 
helps and his emphasis on reducing poverty will help more. 
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Domestic Conditions in 1995 Panama 
Domestic Conditions 
in Panama 
Domestic Conditions in United States 
Constrained Permissive of 
Stimulative 













Balance of Power 
Table 12: After Rosecrance and Stein, 1993, p. 19. 
b. How This Affects Panama's Foreign Policy Behavior 
In summary, the New Oligarchy under Perez Balladares is healthy and 
capable of a wide range of options in foreign policy.  Using Rosecrance and Stein's 
table 1, a comparison of Perez's relatively "unconstrained" position as leader of the 
status quo power (i.e. the power satisfied with the current Carter-Torrijos Treaties) is 
interesting.  If Perez Balladares is relatively "unconstrained" (i.e. facing "permissive" 
domestic conditions) and the table is predictive then the outlook for negotiation with 
Panama seems good.  The table indicates that major conflict is not likely with such a 
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Ernesto Perez Balladares may dance the stick better than anyone so far.  This 
may be the only characteristic inherited from his mentor, BG Omar Torrijos Herrera. 
While Perez Balladares may be a political survivor and able to accomplish many 
things, his actions indicate that his political and economic policies are very different 
from those of Torrijos.  In fact, Perez Balladares is using his strength to dismantle and 
privatize much of Panama's state industrial holdings.  Domestically, Perez Balladares 
is to Torrijos what Argentine President Carlos Menem is to Juan Perön.   In the area of 
foreign policy, only time will tell, but it seems clear that President Perez Balladares 
will make his own foreign policy and not simply restate old policies inherited from his 
ideological mentor.  If he continues bailando la vara so well, then possibilities in the 
foreign policy behavior for Panama may only be limited by Perez Balladares' 
imagination and his continuing understanding of the relative strength's of the 
commercial elite, the political parties, the masses, the military, and the fading 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panamanian Domestic Politics By Regime* 
Year Regime Foreign Policy (Theme) U. S. Mil C P M 
1903-31 Old Oligarchy Cooperation (Commercial) 1-3 5-4 3-1 4 4-5 
1931-41 Elite Confrontation (Sovereignty) 5 3 1 2 4 
Populism 
1941-55 Elite Cooperation 1-5 2-1 3-2 4 5-3 
Militarism (Security/Sovereignty/ 
Commercial) 
1955-68 Middle Limited Confrontation 5 3 1-2-1 2-3-2 4-1-4 
Oligarchy (Sovereignty/Commercial) 
1968-89 Military Confrontation 5 1 3-2-3 4-3-4 2-4-2 
Populism (Sovereignty) 
J 
1989- New Oligarchy Limited Cooperation 1-5 5-4 2-1 3-2 4-3 i 
(Commercial) 
-- - -- - - -
. -
.. C-Commerclal E lte P-Polltlcal p y 
Parties M=Masses 
(1) Number rankings indicate the relative importance of sectors in the domestic polit . 
"1" means that the sector is the most powerful in the regime; "2" means that the s t r  
less powerful that the "1" sector, but more powerful than the others; and so forth. 
(2) Numbers assigned as those of the author. 
(3) When a sector has more than one number assigned during a regime, this reflects t 
the sector's ranking varied. For example, the ranking of the "U.S./CZ leadership" ri  
the New Oligarchy (1989- ) is shown as "1-5;" this means that the U.S./CZ lead i  
began the regime as the most powerful sector, but then fell to the weakest positio . 
Table 13: Author 
V. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN PANAMA: 
CAN ONE MAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
The importance of political leadership is often debated in political science. 
Many theories stress the limitations on leaders or the importance of the bureaucracy 
and tend to overlook the obvious importance of political leadership and the character 
of the men and women who hold leadership positions.  Failing to consider the human 
factor in politics and foreign policy formation is a mistake. 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This level of analysis, political leadership, is one of three used in this study. 
The other two levels of analysis—the international systemic level and the domestic 
politics level—represent limitations on leadership and provide the context for decisions. 
It is, however, at this third level of analysis where the decisions are made; to 
paraphrase Harry S Truman, "the buck stops" at this level of analysis. 
1. The Regional Tradition 
In Latin America, the concept of political leadership is a strong one. The Wars 
for Independence in the early 19th century produced strong military generals who were 
often able to translate their military power into a political base.  The great men of 
early Latin American history include Simon Bolivar (1783-1830), Jose de San Martin 
(1778-1850), and Jose Artigas (1764-1850).  The post-independence history of the 
region has continued to be resplendent with great figures who asserted decisive 
leadership: Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia (1766-1840) in Paraguay, Juan Manuel 






the tradition of great figures dominating nations has not been abandoned.  Juan Perön 
(Argentina), Alfredo Stroessner (Paraguay), Fidel Castro (Cuba), Augusto Pinochet 
(Chile), and many others made history and largely determined the fate of their nations 
by mere force of personality and determination.  These men and many like them have 
virtually controlled the foreign policies of their nations. 
The foreign policies of these men and their nations cannot be explained by the 
Organizational Process Model (Allison II) or the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Allison 
HI), but only by studying the men themselves.1  Stephen D. Krasner points out the 
fallacy of recent thinking in an article entitle "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or 
Allison Wonderland)": 
Who and what shapes foreign policy?  In recent years analyses have 
increasingly emphasized not rational calculations of the national interest or the 
political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and 
bureaucratic politics.2 
My argument here is that this vision is misleading, dangerous, and 
compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the president; 
dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by 
relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it offers 
leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable 
reinterpretations and publications.3 
While Krasners comment on the overemphasis of bureaucratic politics 
questions the Allison models' application in explaining U.S. foreign policy, the 
1Graham Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 
2Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or 
Allison Wonderland)", Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 
159-179. 










Ublic ti  
r'
1 r lli ! s  f ~ xplai i  uba  
i sil  risi  ork: ittl , r  o pany, 71). 
2St  . rasner, r  ureaucraci s porta t  r 
ll  onderland)", r i  li , o.7 er 72), . 
- 9. 
3I i ., . 9. 
 
question is certainly applicable in Latin America where bureaucracies are not as 
developed as that in the United States and where presidential power is traditionally 
strong. 
2. The Leadership Tradition in Panama 
The early leadership of the Republic of Panama was civilian.  The leaders of 
the 1903 Revolution and members of the governing junta were drawn from the elite of 
Panama City.  While none of these men were particularly charismatic and powerful 
leaders, larger personalities loomed in the shadows of Panama's independence: Phillipe 
Bunau-Varilla, Theodore Roosevelt, William Nelson Cromwell.  Political leaders 
within Panama were largely local caudillos.  It was two decades later, in the 1920's, 
when Belisario Porras-the first of Panama's truly national leaders-changed the nature 
of the caudillo system from a local to a national system. 
3. The Methodology of This Chapter 
In this chapter, five past national leaders and the current president will be 
studied as individual leaders. 
a. A Psycho-Political Approach, in the vein of E. Victor Wolfenstein's 
The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi will be taken.4 This 
approach should provide insight into the values, fears, and desires of the leaders to be 
studied and into what Otto Klinberg calls the "pictures in our heads."5  In order to 
4E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: 
Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1967). 
5Otto Klienberg, The Human Dimension in International 
Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 33, 
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accomplish this task systematically, a list of "Salient Background Variables" developed 
by Lewis J. Edinger will be used; these include such categories as personal history 
(biological and Socio-psychological factors) and political history (recruitment and 
experiences).6 
The education and training of each leader will be studied in the acculturation 
and socialization category.  The leaders have a mixed educational experience, with 
some receiving education in the United States and some in other nations.  Also, three 
of the leaders received military training and three were exclusively civilian. How 
these factors relate to their foreign policy behavior is of interest.  Otto Klonberg 
studied the effects of education abroad on leadership.  His approach could be valuable 
if applied in the case of Panama.7 
b. The relationship between the leader and the led will be considered. 
Max Weber's concept of charisma will be used in the form of his three classifications 
of "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority": 
There are three pure types of legitimate authority.  The validity of their 
claims to legitimacy may be based on: 
1. Rational grounds—resting on a belief in the "legality" of patterns of 
normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands (legal authority). 
2. Traditional grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising 
authority under them (traditional authority); or finally, 
3. Charismatic grounds—resting on devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, 
6Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political 
Biography," Glen D. Paige, ed., Political Leadership; Readings 
For an Emerging Field (New York: The Free Press, 1972) , p. 235 
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and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic 
authority).8 
4. On Case Selection 
The leaders that will be studied here include Amulfo Arias Madrid, Jose 
Antonio Remön Cantera, Omar Torrijos Herrera, Manuel Antonio Noriega, Guillermo 
Endara Galimany, and Ernesto Perez Balladares.  Some discussion of why these 
individuals were selected is necessary.  The first four leaders were selected because of 
the importance of then rule in Panama.  The first three are among the most important 
political leaders in Panama's history and each dominated their eras. 
Arnulfo Arias (1901-1988) led a civilian coup against the elected government 
in 1931 and was subsequently elected to the Presidency in 1940, 1948, and 1968.9 
Although he was never able to serve more than half his term, he was clearly one of 
the major forces in 20th century Panamanian politics until his death in 1988.  His 
legacy continues in the form of the Arnulfistas, the renamed Panamenista Party. 
Jose Antonio Remön Cantera (1908-1955) was the first of Panama's military 
leaders.  In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Remön was the arbiter of power in 
Panama.  His experience provided valuable lessons for future Panamanian military 
strongmen and he provides an interesting comparison to Omar Torrijos and Manuel 
Noriega. 
^ax Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, S.N. 
Eisenstadt, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 
46. 
9Some argue that Arnulfo Arias also won in 1964.  The 
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Omar Torrijos Herrera (1929-1981) is an obvious choice.  As a participant in 
the 1968 National Guard coup against Arnulfo Arias, Torrijos was clearly one of the 
designers of modern Panama.  From his consolidation of power in 1969 to his death in 
1981, Torrijos dominated domestic politics.  While he defied political categorization, 
he challenged the United States and brought the most significant change in 
Panamanian-U.S. relations in history. 
Manuel Antonio Noriega (1934-     ), while increasingly less important, 
sidelined, and viewed as an anomaly in Panamanian history, nevertheless was the 
major actor in Panama during the 1980's.  As military strongman, Noriega almost 
singlehandedly brought on bad relations with the United States.  His actions prompted 
the United States to impose economic sanctions that ruined Panama economically and 
to conduct an invasion that rearranged the nation politically and swept the Defense 
Forces from power.  Regardless of current opinions on Noriega and the fact that many 
Panamanian politicians would like to distance themselves from him, he was one of the 
most important figures in Panama's history. 
The selection of Guillermo Endara Galimany (1936-     , and president 1989-94) 
is the most difficult of the cases selected to justify as being included.  Endara's 
importance is as a transitional figure.  He provides an excellent contrast to the other 
leaders.   His relative weakness as a leader and failure to develop a unique foreign 
policy stand could be explained by his character, his training, and the basis of his 
authority. 





leader, but rather because he and his leadership are the central focus of the whole 
thesis.  It is Perez Balladares that this chapter of the thesis is attempting to explain. 
He will be studied and compared and contrasted with the other leaders.  It should be 
noted that the character of Perez Balladares that is reflected in this thesis is only a 
preliminary view and based on his behavior in office up to mid-1995. 
A word is also necessary on why many significant characters in Panamanian 
history were not selected.  Were this study being conducted with limitless resources 
and time, it would be ideal to study each of Panama's military and civilian leaders. 
However, this is not feasible for the purposes of this thesis.  Other possibilities for 
inclusion that were considered include: Manuel Amador, Panama's First Constitutional 
President; Belisario Porras, three-time president and the first real national political 
caudillo; Harmodio Arias, president, brother of Arnulfo but leader in his own right, 
who was President during the Hull-Alfaro Treaty negotiations;  Marco Robles, 
president (1960-64) during the Flag Riots and the beginning of the 1964-67 treaty 
renegotiation process.  These and others were left out in the process of attempting to 
choose the most important figures of Panama's political landscape. 
B. LEADERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Arnulfo Arias Madrid 
a. Psycho-political approach 
(1) Personal History 
a. Biological factors.  Born on 15 August 1901, Arnulfo 
Arias was 29 years old when he and other members of Acciön Comunal overthrew the 
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civilian government in 1931.  He was 39 years old on assuming the presidency in 
1940, 50 years old on assuming the presidency in 1951, and 67 years old upon 
assuming the presidency in 1968.  His final run for the presidency was at age 83 in 
1984.  Amulfo Arias was of medium build and remained in good health into his late 
70's.  Arias suffered from a heart condition late in life and it was heart failure that led 
to his death in 1988. 
b. Socio-psychological factors 
(1) Social background.  Amulfo Alias's origins 
have been described as humble.  He was raised in Penonome in the province of Code 
and the Arnulfista version of his early life indicates that the family "suffered from 
economic depravity."10 Although Amulfo Arias's parents, Antonio Arias and Carmen 
Madrid de Arias are described as humble, they obviously valued their children's 
education greatly and eventually sent Amulfo to school in the United States. 
a. Acculturation and socialization.  Amulfo 
Arias, upon leaving Panama, first studied at the University of Chicago and then at 
Harvard Medical School.  Panamanian historian that Vega Mendez writes that it was 
during this period that, "we are told that Amulfo Arias's attitude polarized each time 
more strongly in the defense of our sovereignty in the Canal Zone."11  This 
interpretation, which is provided in a very politicized history, may very well be a 
reinterpretation of Amulfo Arias's thinking during his education in the United States. 
10Dem6stenes Vega Mendez, El Panamenismo y su Doctrina 
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Upon return to Panama, Arias was faced with a new opportunity.  With his 
M.D. from Harvard, he was now one of the most educated men in Panama and 
welcome into the centers of power.  He married Ana Matilda Linares.   She was the 
daughter of Enrique Linares, who held a variety of important positions in the 
government including that of designado (vice president).12 His brother Harmodio was 
an increasingly respected member of the society. 
(2) Personality Characteristics 
a. Attitudinal patterns.  Arnulfo Arias's life 
is a lesson in dogmatism.  From his first involvement in politics in 1931 until his 
death, Arnulfo was something of a possessed man.  In his mind, he was a great man 
who deserved to rule Panama.  He was a man who thought that he could handle 
whatever challenge, and that he could push matters a little further. 
b. Behavioral patterns.  Arnulfo Arias's 
behavior was typically to overreach his actual ability to control matters.  In each of his 
three falls from power, he had pushed matters too far.  In 1941, he refused to 
cooperate further in preparations for World War II and disenchanted the United States 
and the National Police.  In 1952, he attempted to demonstrate real power—when it 
was clear that Colonel Jose Remön was actually in charge.  And in 1968, he attempted 
to take revenge on the National Guard-despite claims that "a new Arnulfo" had 
developed and despite his own assurances that he would not reorganize the National 
Guard.  In 1941, 1952, and 1968, it was always a case of pride before the fall. 
12Julio Linares, Enrique Linares En La Historia Politica de 
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(2) Political History 
a. Recruitment into political activity.  Arnulfo Alias's 
first political involvement seems to have been after his return from Harvard.  He 
became involved as a member in a secret group called Action Comunal.  He was not 
a founding member, but his access to the Palacio de las Garzas made him the key 
actor in the 1931 coup.13 
b. Political experiences.   After successful conduct of the 
coup in 1931, and his brother Harmodio's election as president in 1932, Arnulfo was 
assigned to Europe as a diplomat.  He is known to have met with both Adolf Hitler 
and Benito Mussolini, and to have admired both.  He drew on their political ideas to 
build his own Panamenista doctrine.  It was with this background that Arnulfo Arias 
was elected president in 1940.14 
b. Source of Legitimacy 
In 1931, as a member of Action Comunal and leader of the coup that 
overthrew the elected civilian government of Florencio Arosemena, Arnulfo Arias 
demonstrated that he believed that legitimacy could be based on charisma.  While 
Florencio Arosemena's legitimacy was based on rational and traditional grounds, 
Arnulfo and the members of Action Comunal made it clear that they did not want a 
leader who led legalistically, but a real leader.  Arnulfo Arias lived his whole life 
13See Linares, Ch. 16 for a discussion of the secretive 
intrigues of the Accion Comunal temple. 
14Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark Ruin, Party Politics and 
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believing that he was that leader, that he was "El Hombre" ("the Man"). 
As president on three occasions, Arnulfo combined his charismatic legitimacy 
with rational legitimacy.  He was elected by majorities on at least three occasions. 
Some contend that he may also have been the actual winner of the 1964 and 1984 
elections, but he was denied these victories through government fraud. 
A demonstration of Alias's charisma is the level of support that he enjoyed.  In 
1940, after coming to the presidency Arnulfo Arias proposed a new constitution.  The 
constitution contained his personal vision of Panamanian government and his political 
philosophy of Panamenismo.  The document contained racist sections that denied 
Panamanian citizenship to Asians and West Indian Blacks.  Despite the ideas that 
would be considered divisive in most cases, Arias was able to get nearly unanimous 
support for his new constitution. 
Even Alias's natural opponents recognized his power as a charismatic leader. 
In November 1949, Police Commandant Remön invited Arias back to the presidency 
to claim the victory that he had originally been denied by Remön.  Remön, however, 
overestimated his ability to control the situation and underestimated Alias's 
determination to gain real power. 
Remön's decision to remove Arias came in May of 1951 and Arias resisted. In 
response to the National Police's messenger who proposed that Arias depart the palace, 
Arnulfo Arias killed the captain in cold blood in the presidential palace. 
In 1968, once again the military leadership overestimated their ability to 















Arnulfo Arias prepared to challenge the National Guard.  Upon assuming power on 1 
October 1968, he immediately began a major reshuffling of the organization.  It was 
this that caused Omar Torrijos and others to remove Arias in order to protect their 
institution. 
Arnulfo Arias, as a charismatic leader, enjoyed a large a dedicated following in 
Panama for most of his life.  That following now makes up the Arnulfista Party and a 
large part of the civilista movement.  One writer described the 1994 election as a "race 
between two dead men."  Arnulfo Arias was one of those dead men, a dead 
charismatic leader whose followers continue to affect national politics and whose now 
remarried widow—Mireya Moscoso de Gruber—was almost elected president in 1994. 
c. The Foreign Policy of Panama Under Annilfc Arias 
(1) First Term, 1940-41.  The movement in which Arnulfo Arias 
became politically active was clearly in favor of change in Panama and change in 
Panama's relation with the United States.  It could be said that the 1936 Hull Alfaro 
Treaty, signed during the administration of Harmodio Arias, carried out some of this 
program.  When Arnulfo Arias became president in 1940, his anti-American, anti- 
immigrant ideas were well developed.  These ideas, which together form the 
Panamanist Doctrine {La Doctrina Panamenista), matured while Arnulfo was in the 
diplomatic service in 1930's Europe.   His flirtation with fascism seemed to encourage 
his challenge to the United States.  The most significant policy choice made by 
Arnulfo Arias came in August of 1941 when the U.S. government asked the Arias 









armed for convoy duty.  Arnulfo Arias refused. 
Additionally, some interpreted the racist features of the implementation of the 
Arias constitution.to be anti-American.  While the constitution forbid immigration by 
all Asians and West Indian Blacks and did not allow for these foreigners to be 
merchants, the laws were selectively enforced.   Chinese merchants—potential U.S. 
allies in the coming fight against Japan—were forced to close their stores.  However, 
Japanese merchants were allowed to continue with business as normal throughout the 
Arias administration.15 It has been documented by Jules Dubois that these Japanese 
merchants, often barbers, were ranning a very large spy operation.  Most of the 
barbers were actually Japanese Imperial Navy officers and they were known to 
conduct reconnaissance of the Canal and Canal Zone.16 
(2) Second Term, 1949-51.  These years are difficult to judge, because 
the real power in this period was Police Commandant Remön.  Alias's overall 
emphasis was on establishment of domestic political power.  Alias's rise to the 
presidency did cause problems for Washington.  With the line of succession broken, 
there were initially no formal relations with the Arias government.  The United States 
wanted to wait for the reaction of other regional governments.  The United States 
finally recognized Arias after a dozen other states had done so.  In announcing 
15Some of the criticism suffered by Arnulfo Arias at the 
hands of U.S. authors is unfair considering the fact that U.S. 
immigration policy before and during World War II was highly 
restrictive and contained anti-Asian exclusionary rules. 
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recognition, the State Department added that the recognition did not represent approval 
of the way Arias came to power.  At the end of his rule, Arnulfo Arias began to stress 
the communist problem in Panama.  Arias personally discussed the problem with his 
Charge d'affaires in Washington, Guillermo Endara Paniza, and Endara in turn 
reported the issue to the press.17 
(3) Third Term, 1-11 October 1968.  Eleven days is not long enough to 
demonstrate any direction in foreign policy.  However, it seemed clear from the 
inauguration that there was no "new Arnulfo." His speeches were filled with fiery, 
anti-American rhetoric. 
Viewing Arnulfo Alias's specific actions as a politician and foreign policy- 
maker is helpful.  Without such a detailed look, Arias is lost in myth and his virulent 
anti-Americanism is obscured by his and his disciples later being involved in the pro- 
democracy civilista movement.  This could serve as a reminder that being anti-military 
in Panama does not necessarily equate to being pro-American. 
2. Jose Antonio Remön Cantera 
a. Psycho-political approach 
(1) Personal History. 
a. Biological factors.   Born in 1908 in Panama City, Jose 
Remön was 39 years old when he became First Commandant of the National Police on 
17New York Times, 10 May 1951, p. 5, cited in Larry L. 
Pippin, The Remon Era: An Analysis of a Decade of Events in 
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14 February 1947 and 44 years old when he became president in 1952.18  Remön was 
only 47 when he was assassinated in 1955.  Remön suffered from no known health 
problems.  He was portly and certainly bordered on being overweight.19 
b. Socio-psychological factors 
(1) Social background.  According to Larry Larae 
Pippin's account of Remön's background, the Remön family came to Panama in the 
early 19th century and "some members were recalled for their cultural zeal, welfare 
work, and interest in justice for the poor."20 Jose was the sixth of seven children born 
to Alejandro Remön and Maria Cantera de Remön.  Jose was nicknamed Chichi (baby 
face).  The father, Alejandro, was an alcoholic and led his family to "the status of 
"poor relatives' within the Remön clan."21  Alejandro died in 1914 and his widow 
Maria sewed in order to feed and clothe her children.  Jose Antonio Remön attended 
public school in Panama City and graduated from the Instituto Nacional, the nation's 
most well-known public high school.22 
a. Acculturation and socialization.  Upon 
graduation from high school, Remön worked in a pharmacy and later with a sugar 
company.  His mother sensed that he was dissatisfied and envied his classmates who 
18Pippin,   p.   1. 
19This  observation  is  based  on my  reading of  the photograph 
in  Pippin,   p.   107. 
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were going abroad to study.  She discovered that the Mexican government was giving 
scholarships to the Academia Militär de Mexico and sought successfully to win her 
son a place.  Panamanian President Harmodio Florencio Arosemena gave Jose a grant 
to cover some of the out of pocket expenses.   Little has been written about Remön's 
experience in Mexico.  The program was  a three year program of study and Remön 
finished third in his class.23 
Upon returning to Panama, Remön kept the rank of captain that he had been 
granted upon graduation in Mexico and was given the position "chief of the first 
section of the corps."  Captain Remön seemed to thrive, demonstrating his highly 
disciplined training and pleasing his superiors.  In 1935, Remön was dropped from the 
force.  As a friend of the Diaz family, he was "closer to the political ' outs' than to the 
"ins.'24 Domingo Diaz was the opposition candidate in 1936, running against 
Harmodio Alias's hand picked successor—Demöstenes Arosemena.  During this period 
(1935-40), Remön worked as circulation manager at the newspaper El Panama- 
America and then purchased a service station.25 
Remön's reinstatement to the National Police came in 1940.  He was 
immediately sent to Fort Riley, Kansas to attend a basic cavalry course.  On returning 
to Panama on 9 October 1941, Remön was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and made 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid.,   p.   2. 
25Ibid. 
126 
a   
o
o












23 I i  
24 I    
25 I  
 
Second Commandant of the National Police.26 During the war, Remön was 
instrumental in preparing Panama for the war effort and in building support for the 
United Nations cause. Colonel Remön headed Panama's "continental defense" effort by 
directing cadet battalions in the schools, a scouting organization, the national militias, 
the Red Cross, and the First Battalion of the Isthmus-a crack unit of 500 men based 
in Panama City.27  Remön worked very closely with a U.S. Army liaison officer. 
As Second Commandant, Remön came to outshine the First Commandant, 
Colonel Rogelio Fäbrega.  According to Remön's wife, the position of First 
Commandant was offered to Remön as early as 1945.  Regardless, its seems that 
Fabrega's heavy drinking and the fact that he rarely came to headquarters, left Remön 
as "de facto First Commandant."28 In was on February 14, 1947 that Remön actually 
received appointment as First Commandant. 
(2) Personality Characteristics 
a. Attitudinal patterns.  Remön used his 
position as First Commandant to meet the needs of the National Police.  Recognizing 
that his base of support was in the rank and file of the National Police, Remön took a 
personal interest in the personal welfare of his police officers. 
Remön seemed to be pragmatic, instead of dogmatic.  He approached problems 
logically, carefully considering the interest of the National Police and of himself.  He 
26Ibid.,   p.   3. 
27Lawrence 0.   Ealy,   The Republic of Panama  in World Affairs, 
1903-1950   (Westport,   Conn.:   Greenwood Press,   1951),   p.   117. 

















is said to have accumulated a multimillion dollar fortune during this period.  He was 
involved in cattle, race horses, gasoline, and illegal drugs and was part-owner of a 
house of prostitution in Panama City.29 
b. Behavioral patterns.  As First 
Commandant during the 1946 riots that occurred while the National Assembly was 
considering the Hines-Filos Treaty, the press attempted to pin the blame for alleged 
police brutality on Remön.30 Remön was quick to deny any responsibility and 
announced that he deplored the "unpleasant incidents."31  He further pointed out that, 
as a police officer, he had simply followed the mayor's instructions.  Other scapegoats 
included the Arias brothers and communist agitators.32 
Another demonstration of Remön's elusive behavior came in 1948.  In the 
election, it appeared that Amulfo Arias had won the polling—a result that was 
unacceptable to the opposing Diaz camp and to many in Panama who feared a return 
to rule by Arnulfo Arias.  Violence became very heavy and the police had to step in 
to end the fighting.  Then the police commandants, including Remön, and other 
prominent leaders met with incumbent Jimenez and insisted that he resign.  The 
National Assembly took part by ramming through a resolution naming as president 
Pippin, p. 8. 
30This agreement, which was not ratified by Panama, would 
have extended the World War II basing agreement and allowed the 
U.S. continued use of some bases outside of the Panama Canal 
Zone. 
31Pippin, p. 17. 
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Henrique de Obarrio, Remön's brother-in-law.  During this whole series of events, 
Remön remained surprisingly aloof.  The incumbent president Jimenez and the new 
pretender de Obarrio both claimed police support.33  In fact, the police did cooperate 
with both sides.  In the end, First Commandant Remön remained in support of the 
Jimenez government and the Jimenez government remained in power.34  Why Remön 
did not continue with his initial intention to force Jimenez out of power cannot be 
clearly explained.  It does seem clear that the real Remön fear was the election of 
Arnulfo Arias.  It is likely that by agreeing to not allow Arias to be declared the 
winner that Jimenez regained the support of Remön and was able to finish his term as 
president.  What is certain is that Remön did not want to end up on the wrong side. 
To accomplish this aim, he was perfectly willing to be on both sides in the conflict. 
(2) Political History 
a. Recruitment into political activity.  Remön's choice to 
attend the military academy in Mexico was the beginning of his military and political 
career, these two careers being inseparable in Panama during his era.  During World 
War JJ, Remön's actions as Second Commandant, above and beyond the call of duty, 
were essentially political in nature. 
b. Political experiences. As a captain in the National 
Police, Remön suffered dismissal at the hands of the Arias brothers because of his 
friendship with the Diaz family.  This forced him into the anti-Arias camp in the late 
33Ibid.,   pp.   24-5 
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1930's.  As Second Commandant and First Commandant in the 1940's, Remön faced 
the challenge of social upheaval caused by the agitation of the Arias brothers and 
communists.  From his political experiences, Remön recognized the importance of 
having friends in high places and the danger of having enemies, like Arnulfo Arias, in 
power. 
A review of Remön's involvement in politics demonstrates a military officer 
who was increasingly involved and increasingly open about his power over political 
events in Panama.  While Remön was content to pass off responsibility for his actions 
to the civilian authorities in 1946, by the time of the 1948 election he was willing to 
play a king-maker role behind the scenes.  By 1950, when challenged by President 
Daniel Chanis, Jr, who requested Remön's resignation, Colonel Remön was no longer 
reserved about demonstrating his powers and the loyalty of his men and was quick to 
place a loyal vice president and cousin, Roberto F. Chiari Remön in power.35 
When faced with intransigence on the part of some in the Supreme Court and 
National Assembly to recognize his coup against Chanis, Remön took even more 
drastic action to publicly challenge his opposition.  He threatened to place Amulfo 
Arias Madrid in power, noting that it was actually Arias who had won the stolen 
election in 1948.  Remön's opposition was shocked and refused to believe that the 
Commandant would actually go through with placing Arias in power.  Remön 
apparently believed that he was in a strong enough position to protect his interests 
from Arias and that he could play the role of king-maker and ultimate arbiter of 
35
















This, of course, was not the case, as Arnulfo sought to establish himself as the 
real power. By unilaterally reinvoking the 1941 constitution, Arnulfo Arias began his 
fall from power. The Commandants and other Panamanians were concerned that Arias 
was the same as always — power hungry. There was concern that Arias's constitution 
extended his rule by at least two years. This attempt by Arnulfo Arias to assert real 
power, directly challenged the role that the military had been playing in Panama since 
1941, and forced Remön to act by removing Arias from power in May 1951. 
b. Source of Legitimacy 
It is difficult to label Remön as a charismatic leader.  He was not 
known for his speeches and his followers did not adulate him as those of Torrijos or 
Arnulfo Arias did.  There were, however, some charismatic features to Remön.  He 
was able to gain influence and respect above his peers.  He was able to outshine the 
Commandant to the point that he was viewed as the one actually in charge.  His 
highly disciplined men stood by Remön even when directly challenged by sitting 
presidents. 
The source of Remön's legitimacy appears to be partly explained by his 
charisma, but more explained by the tradition of the military playing a praetorian role 
in Panamanian society.  This tradition was not an old one, but rather developed in the 
1930's and was solidified in the 1940's as Remön's own career progressed.  Remön's 
most important power was that of traditional authority over his men. 










The Remön era can be divided into two parts: (1) Remön behind the 
scenes (1947-52);  and (2) Remön as president (1952-55).  The 1947-52 period is 
difficult to discuss because of the varying degree of power exercised by Remön on 
various issues.  It was a case of rule by command override.  Presidents were allowed 
to carry out their own policies until they conflicted with the personal interests of 
Colonel Remön or the institutional interests of the National Police/National Guard.  In 
the area of foreign policy, the period was little activity.  The bases fiasco with the 
United States had ended in December of 1947.  During the negotiations Remön was 
blamed for a police attack on protestors—but in no way drove the National Assembly's 
consideration or rejection of the proposed treaty.36 
Under President Domingo Diaz (1948-49) Panama attempted to improve 
relations with the United States, calling for a return to the relations enjoyed during the 
construction era.37 It was in 1948 that Panama and the United States began 
negotiating a commercial air agreement.   Up until that time, Panama's international air 
traffick went through Albrook Air Base in the Canal Zone.  The treaty, signed on 31 
March 1949, effectively transferred international commercial air to Tocumen 
International Airport.  This opened a new era in Panama-U.S. relations and brought 
new feelers from Panama for reopening base negotiations.38  These feelers went 
unanswered. 
36 See  Pippin,   Ch.   2 
37Ibido,   p.   29 
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Once in the presidency, Remön took a more active interest in foreign affairs. 
He did seek—like most Panamanian leaders between 1920 and 1979—a change in the 
U.S.-Panamanian relationship.  However, the changes proposed by Remön were 
moderate and not hostile to U.S. interests.  In building support for a new agreement 
with President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-61), Remön made a now famous speech 
saying that he was asking for "neither millions nor alms, we want justice" ("ni 
millones ni limosnas, queremos justicia") from the United States.39 
Remon's desires were put into a joint Remön-Eisenhower letter while Remön 
was in Washington in October 1953.  The basics were: 
1. There should be an equitable benefiting of the two nations which 
made possible the construction of a canal as well as enabling of the commerce 
and industry of Panama to take advantage of the market offered by the Canal 
Zone and by the ships transitting the Canal. 
2. The principle of equality of opportunity and treatment must have full 
effect in regard to the citizens of Panama and the United States employed in 
the Canal Zone as set forth in the exchanges of notes of March 2, 1936 on this 
subject. 
3. The advisability of giving due consideration, in the cases of lands 
granted in the past for canal purposes which are no longer needed for such 
purposes, in order that arrangements may be agreed upon for the transfer of 
these lands to the Republic of Panama.40 
This was later agreed upon in treaty negotiations.  The Remön-Eisenhower 
Treaty was finalized in December 1954 and was ratified after Remön's death.41  This 
agreement slowed further calls for a change in the U.S.-Panamanian relationship for 
39Ibid., p. 106. 
40Ibid., p. 110. 
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several years.  To summarize Remon's foreign policy towards the United States:  He 
was pragmatic and evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary.   His approach was 
straight-forward, as he went to Washington and asked for justice. 
3. Omar Torrijos Herrera 
(1) Personal History 
a. Biological factors.  Born on 13 February 1929, Omar 
Torrijos was 39 years old when he participated in the overthrow of Arnulfo Arias in 
October of 1968.  He was in power until his death in a plane crash at age 52.  In 
effect, Omar Torrijos was in power during the prime of his life.  Torrijos was fit with 
no known major health problems.  He did enjoy smoking cohiba cigars and consuming 
excessive alcohol on occasion. 
b. Socio-psychological factors 
(1) Social background.  Omar Torrijos was a 
product of Panama's rural middle class.  Both of his parents were school teachers in 
Santiago, the capital of the Veraguas Province.  Young Omar did not want a career in 
teaching, but rather chose the military.  It should be noted that when Torrijos chose 
his career path in the late 1940's, the Panamanian military was at the height of its 
power under the leadership of Colonel Jose Remön.42 
a. Acculturation and socialization. 
Torrijos's entry into the National Guard was via the military academy of El Salvador. 
42Current  Biography   19 73   (New York:   The  H.W.   Wilson  Company, 
1973),   p.   418. 
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This institution, located in San Salvador, had strong German and Chilean influences 
and emphasized a Prussian-style military discipline that was rare in the Panamanian 
National Guard.43 
After graduation from the military academy and commissioning as a second 
lieutenant in the National Guard, Torrijos received additional training in Venezuela 
and in the United States.  In the 1960's, Torrijos attended U.S. military schools in the 
U.S. Canal Zone:  counter-insurgency (1962, 1963), motor vehicle maintenance (1964), 
and military administration (1966).  It has been suggested that the U.S. training 
influenced Torrijos's later thinking greatly.  While the United States was encouraging 
nation-building and social action programs as a means of countering insurgencies, 
Torrijos later used the same type of social-oriented programs to win support for 
himself and the National Guard. 
(2) Personality Characteristics 
a. Attitudinal patterns.  Describing the 
attitudinal patterns of Omar Torrijos, it must first be pointed out that there was no 
pattern.  Omar Torrijos was many things to many people.  He was both idealistic and 
pragmatic.  On average, he was not as dogmatic as Arnulfo Arias but he did have his 
moments of seeming irrationality. 
Torrijos was intensely loyal to those who supported him, especially those who 
supported him during the 1969 coup attempt.  Manuel Noriega was one officer that 
43For one of the best works on the role of European military 
missions in Latin America see:  Brian Loveman and Thomas M. 
Davies, Jr., eds., The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in 
Latin America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978). 
135 
t
43 r st or s r ili
issi ati eri : ri a as .
avies, ., s., olit ntipoliti s: ilit
ati eri i l : niversit ebr r ss, 8).
supported Torrijos early on and was rewarded.  Torrijos came to Noriega's rescue on 
many subsequent occasions. 
b. Behavioral patterns.  Torrijos was not 
always logical and reasonable.  A good example of this is the incident described by 
Ambassador William Jorden:  when Torrijos announced the ratification of the Panama 
Canal Treaties, he went on to say that had the treaties not been passed that Panama 
would have taken immediate military action against the Canal.  This was a threat 
which Ambassador Jorden took seriously.44 It could be said that Torrijos was 
reasonable and pragmatic, but he was susceptible to irrational flights of fancy that he 
later regretted. 
(2) Political History 
a. Recruitment into political activity.  The first inherently 
political act for Omar Torrijos was the coup of 1968. Earlier that year, Torrijos had 
taken part in repression against Arnulfo Arias and his supporters who were threatening 
a civilian coup against the outgoing government.  As the new Commandant in 1968, 
Omar Torrijos faced an immediate threat from Arias—a threat to the National Guard as 
an institution.  As Arias began to gut the National Guard and Torrijos was given word 
to prepare for an assignment to the Central American Defense Board in El Salvador, 
Torrijos and others decided to act.45 
b. Political experiences.  It was 1969 when Torrijos 
44William J. Jorden, Panama Odyssey (Austin:  University of 
Texas Press, 1984), p. 329. 
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became the clear leader of the so-called "Panamanian Revolution."  Fellow National 
Guard officers attempted a barracks coup while Torrijos was in Mexico City and 
Torrijos was forced to return to take firm control of Panama and to recognize the 
treacherous water of politics internal to the National Guard.   Staying in power and 
knowing who was loyal was thus a preoccupation after 1969. 
b. Source of Legitimacy 
Torrijos was one of Panama's most charismatic leaders.  As a military 
leader he was not afraid of democracy.  In fact, during his era it has been pointed out 
that popular participation in Panama actually increased.46 According to the account of 
Ambassador Jorden, many U.S. Senators who visited with General Torrijos during the 
process of treaty ratification in 1977-79 were surprised at the way Torrijos interacted 
with the Panamanian people.  His town meetings, where people really did speak their 
minds, and his visits to rural villages, where he heard the concerns of the rural 
population, were impressive and made the Panamanian system under Torrijos seem (to 
some leftist observers) more democratic than the U.S. system.  Even the Senators were 
influenced by Torrijos's charisma. 
Since his death in 1981, Torrijos has been elevated to a mythical status.  The 
various versions of his death are similar to the hypothesizing that has occurred in the 
^The best study of Torrijos Era Democracy in Panama is 
George Priestly's Military Government and Popular Participation 
in Panama: The Torrijos Regime, 1968-1975 (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1986).  It has to be noted, however, that while there was 
more popular participation in Panama during this period, that 
this participation meant less.  The fact that Torrijos was a 
dictator—although a popular one—seems to get lost in Priestly's 
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United States about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.  Considering the fact that 
Torrijos was carrying out a process of democratization and demilitarization when he 
died, many have posed questions about how the 1980's might have been different had 
Torrijos lived.  There is the argument that had Torrijos lived, Noriega would have 
never come to power, and Panama's "lost decade" of the 1980's might have never 
occurred.  In this sense, Torrijos is a character similar to Abraham Lincoln-someone 
who was not around during an important transition—and we are only left to wonder 
what might have been. Nevertheless, the legend of Torrijos seems to have developed 
into a permanent part of Panama's political heritage. 
c. The Foreign Policy of Panama Under Omar Torrijos 
During the first three years of military rule in Panama (1968-71), there was 
little indication of a desire by the Torrijos regime to change the course of Panamanian 
foreign policy.  There was the lingering desire of almost all segments in Panama to 
renegotiate the bilateral relationship with the United States vis-ä-vis the Panama Canal 
Zone.  This lingering desire was not unique to Torrijos, but rather inherited from the 
government of President Marco Robles (1964-68).   The treaties that were negotiated 
subsequent to the 1964 Flag Riots had been shelved in 1967 and one option was to 
revisit and ratify those documents.  Torrijos, however, used the issue for populist ends, 
and argued that the 1967 treaties had been negotiated by the oligarchy and that he 
wanted to negotiate new and more legitimate treaties for the Panamanian people. 
By September 1970, the Panamanian government had decided that the 1967 











agreement public.47  Torrijos wanted the nations' presidents to come to an agreement: 
"If there is a real political understanding, the technicians can work out the details, but 
if there is no basic agreement on issues it is dangerous to reopen negotiations."48 
The political understanding that Torrijos wanted was not forthcoming and in 
late 1971 and early 1972 Panama somewhat reluctantly shifted from a policy of 
cooperation to one of confrontation.  In October of 1971 the issue of the Canal Zone 
was raised by Panama at the United Nations; this was the first mention of the enclave 
since the 1964 Flag Riots.49 
Torrijos was most brilliant domestically.  To many American policy-makers he 
seemed to be holding back an angry Panamanian mob, while in reality he clearly 
recognized the utility of threatening a repeat of the 1964 Flag Riots.  In a speech on 
11 October 1971 at a celebration-called a "rendezvous with destiny"-- to mark three 
years of the Panamanian Revolution, Torrijos made this statement, clearly aimed for 
consumption in Washington and in the Canal Zone: 
Our enemies want us to march on the Zone today.  When all hope is 
lost of removing this Colonial enclave, Omar Torrijos will come to this square 
to tell you, "Let's advance."  Omar Torrijos will accompany you and the 6,000 
rifles of the National Guard will be there to defend the integrity and dignity of 
47Margaret E. Scranton, Changing United States Foreign 
Policy; Negotiating New Panama Canal Treaties, 1958-1978 
(Pittsburg, Penn.: University of Pittsburg PH.D. Dissertation, 
1980), pp. 288-9. 
^New York Times, 3 September 1970, p. 11 cited in Scranton, 
1980, p. 289. 
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the people.  But today we are not going to the Zone.50 
Throughout the process of treaty negotiation, Torrijos and the other top 
Panamanians involved understood clearly that they could succeed through personal 
interactions and friendship, and by invoking the threat that the Panamanian people 
would only wait so long before taking violent action.  The capabilities of the 
Panamanians to conduct violent attacks was demonstrated on many occasions.  The 
U.S. embassy was attacked and damaged on several occasions.  At the same time, the 
polished, seemingly pro-American, and English-fluent Panamanian negotiators made 
their case with Teflon-like isolation from the anti-American violence in Panama City 
and the anti-American diplomatic efforts internationally. 
To suggest that Torrijos was behind the whole plan to bring American 
capitulation on the Canal might be overestimating his leadership, but the results were 
impressive.  As Robert Pastor wrote, "Few leaders in the region acted more 
independently than he did, and none was better at handling the United States."51  In 
the end, Torrijos was successful in gaining a new treaty relationship with the United 
States.  His behavior as the guiding hand behind 1970's Panamanian foreign policy 
towards the United States, suggests real genius.  He was essentially able to defeat the 
United States at the negotiating table, but leave American negotiators feeling that they 
50New York Times, 17 October 1971, IV, p.6, cited in 
Scranton, 1980, p. 343= 
51Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton University 
press, 1992), p. 5 
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had a friend in Panama's Omar Torrijos.52 
4. Manuel Antonio Noriega 
a. Psycho-political approach 
(1) Personal History 
a. Biological factors.  Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno 
was born on 11 February 1934 in Panama City.53 He was 49 years old when he 
became head of the Panamanian Defense Forces in 1983 and 55 when he was ousted 
from power in 1989.  He is known to suffer from migraines.54 His problem with acne 
is so severe that is it the source of his derisive nickname "Pineapple Face" {Cora de 
Pina). 
b. Socio-psychological factors 
(1) Social background.  Manuel Noriega was born 
and raised at the lowest stratum of Panamanian society in the community of Terraplen. 
Terraplen, located in the old section of Panama City, is close to the former Canal 
Zone and has traditionally been home to unskilled Canal Zone workers and more 
recently descendants of West Indian Canal Zone workers.  It was in this rough climate 
52Some would argue with my statement that Torrijos was able 
to "defeat" the U.S. at the negotiating table, but I believe the 
term is applicable.  While some point out that the United States 
gained the rights to base troops in Panama until 31 December 
1999, to operate the Panama Canal, and to defend the neutrality 
of the Canal in the future--these treaty gains are not new rights 
for the United States, but rather restrictions on existing rights 
and agreements. 
53Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled 
Affair with Noriega (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1990), p. 37. 
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near Panama City's old market that the young, fatherless Manuel Noriega was an 
orphan by age five.  After contracting tuberculosis, Noriega's mother returned to her 
home in the Darien Province and died.  She left young Manuel with his godmother, 
Luisa Sanchez.55 
Noriega's real father, Ricaurte Tomas Noriega, is described by author Frederick 
Kempe as "philandering and alcoholic."56 He was a lower middle class civil servant 
who eventually drank himself onto the disability rolls.  Noriega's mother was working 
as a cook for Ricaurte Tomas when she became pregnant.  While not all of the facts 
about Noriega's childhood and background are known or agreed upon, what is clear is 
that Noriega was clearly bothered by his own past—so much in fact that he ordered 
that all references to his youth be classified as "Top Secret."57  For populist reasons he 
did point out his humble origins on his own terms and commissioned a small book to 
be published about himself titled El Criollo de Terraplen (The Creole of Terraplen).58 
a. Acculturation and socialization. 
Growing up on the streets of Chorrillo, young Noriega's poverty did not stand out but 
rather equalled that of almost every one else.   As he worked the streets selling 
newspapers, he was able to observe how the powerful in Panama worked and lived. 
He lived relatively close to the Palacio de las Garzas, the Club Union, and the 
55Rempe,   pp.   37-39 
56Ibid.,   p.   37. 
57Ibid.,   p.   38. 
58John Dinges,   Our Man  in  Panama   (New York:   Random House, 
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National Guard Headquarters.59 By the time Noriega was a teenager, he carried a 
small pistol for self protection.60  Noriega's godmother, who raised him and who he 
called Mama Luisa, taught school and instilled in Noriega the desire to read.  Noriega 
eventually studied at the Institute Nacional.  He was remembered as being above 
average, but not brilliant.61 
(2) Personality Characteristics 
a. Attitudinal patterns.  Noriega grew up 
despising the Panamanian oligarchy and the Americans.  He resented their wealth and 
his poverty.  As a stone-throwing activist in his student days, Noriega developed a 
leftist view of the world.  Ultimately, however, this view did not provide any future 
for Noriega. 
It was during his time working at the Santo Tomas hospital, with little hope of 
a better life, that Noriega decided to opt for a military career.  It was his only option 
for advancement.  His relationship with U.S. intelligence provided more opportunity. 
Far from the leftist medical doctor that Noriega had wanted to be, he developed into 
everything that he had despised in his student days.  He chose for his mascot the toad 
(el sapo), which in Panamanian slang means "informer." 
b. Behavioral patterns.  Noriega was 
cunning and has been compared by some to J. Edgar Hoover.  He remembered useful 
59Ibid.,   p.   31. 
60Ibid.,   p.   32. 
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information for later use.  In his personal life he was often reckless.  He was known to 
have raped a prostitute while a cadet in Peru.62  After returning to Panama, Noriega 
was involved in a similar incident in Colon, but was rescued from serious discipline 
by Torrijos.63 
(2) Political History 
a. Recruitment into political activity.  It was 
during high school that Noriega met his half-brother Luis Carlos Noriega Hurtado. 
Luis Carlos did not know that Manuel existed, but they discovered each other through 
a mutual friend.  It was Luis Carlos that introduced Manuel to student politics.  Luis 
Carlos, who was shunned by his own family because of his homosexuality, was the 
leader of the socialist student movement at the Instituto Nacional.64  Manuel was 
elected in 1949-50 to the National Congress of Students with the help of Luis Carlos 
and friends, Jorge Ulueca and Römulo Escobar Bethancourt.  The vote was likely 
rigged.65 
By the time, Manuel Noriega graduated from high school, he had participated 
in protests against the National Guard and could have been considered an activist.  In 
his high school yearbook, he wrote an essay on the peasantry and on how agrarian 
discontent could turn into revolution.66 According to Pedro Brin who knew Noriega at 
62Ibid.,   pp.   47-8 
^Dinges,   p.   37« 
64Kempe,   p.   40. 
65Ibid.,   p.   41. 
66Ibid.,   p.   42. 
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the time, "He was the anti-military prototype."67 
Upon graduation in 1953, the young, leftist Noriega had no place to go.  He 
had wanted to be a psychiatrist or medical doctor—like Arnulfo Arias—but could not 
afford medical school.68  While taking occasional night courses at the University of 
Panama, Noriega worked in the Santo Tomas hospital in the pharmacy.69 When he 
found out that his acquaintance from high school, Boris Maritinez, had a military 
scholarship to the Mexican military academy, Noriega grew interested in a military 
scholarship as an escape from his dead end job at Santo Tomas.  His half-brother Luis 
Carlos had recently been assigned to the Panamanian embassy in Lima, and so it was 
to him that Manuel made his appeal.  There were two slots in the Peruvian academy 
for Panamanians, but both had been filled and Manuel was already too old.  Luis 
Carlos, however, sympathized with his half-brother and eventually agreed to falsify 
Manuel's age and to find him a sponsor important enough to edge out one of the other 
candidates.  The sponsor found by Luis Carlos was Aquilino Boyd, the Panamanian 
foreign minister, who had been a friend of Luis Carlos at the university.  Boyd's letter 
of support guaranteed Manuel a place in the Peruvian Military Academy.70 
It was at the Peruvian Military Academy that Noriega developed his 
67Ibid., p. 45. 
^Kempe points out that Noriega had gone to the streets in 
1951 to throw stones at the military when Colonel Remon had 
ousted President Arnulfo Arias.  See Kempe, p. 49. 
69Ibid. , p. 49. 
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relationship with U.S. intelligence.71  According to Kempe, this was accomplished 
through Luis Carlos, who offered Manuel to the station chief and to the military 
attache.72 At the academy, Manuel Noriega provided U.S. intelligence on future coup 
makers and, in the words of Kempe, "fed the giant maw in Langley that couldn't get 
enough data on Latin Communists."73  In Peru, Noriega's military scholarship, his half- 
brother's connections, and the spending money from U.S. intelligence opened up a 
whole new world. 
b. Political experiences.   It was the relationship with 
Torrijos that was most important to Noriega's rise to power.  In 1964, Torrijos was 
given the unsavory task of roughing up the Arnulfistas in Chiriquf.  He passed the task 
on to Noriega, who approached this assignment with a vengeance, and attacked many 
mainstream citizens.   Reports of torture and rape led to Noriega being relieved of duty 
for ten days.  By 1967, Noriega was the head of intelligence in Panama's north zone. 
The military coup of 1968 offered Noriega a new opportunity, as chief of intelligence 
in the area where Arnulfo Arias enjoyed a large base of support.  It was only at this 
point that Noriega was promoted to captain. 
Noriega's relationship with Torrijos was solidified in 1969, when an attempted 
barracks coups against Torrijos was attempted.  Noriega remained loyal to Torrijos and 
71Seymour Hersh believes that the U.S. intelligence 
relationship with Noriega began when Noriega was a student at the 
Instituto Nacional.  See Hersh, p. 83. 
72Kempe, p. 51. 
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provided him a base of support within the National Guard from which to reestablish 
authority and successfully challenge the coup.74 By August of 1970, Noriega was a 
Lieutenant Colonel and the commander of the National Guard's G-2.  By the late 
1970's Noriega was known as the most feared man in Panama.75 
It was the death of Torrijos in 1981 that facilitated Noriega's rise to the top of 
the National Guard.  There were several officers senior to Noriega and they were 
eliminated one by one until Noriega was made Commander of the Defense Forces on 
12 August 1983.  In toasting his predecessor, Colonel Ruben Dario Paredes, Noriega 
offered a paratrooper's toast, "Buen salto, Ruben" (Good Jump, Ruben).76  Noriega 
soon reversed his pledge to help Paredes to the presidency, and the powerless Paredes 
faded from the scene, only to say in 1989: "Power in Panama is like a viper.  You 
have to let go very cautiously...or it will bite you."77 Noriega obviously understood 
this lesson very well. 
It was as head of the Panamanian Defense Forces that Noriega carried his 
actions to an extreme.  The political killing of Dr. Hugo Spadafora in 1985 and 
continued involvement in drug trafficking brought condemnation from the opposition 
and from the U.S. Congress.78  This put pressure on the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to break with Noriega.  Noriega was being paid "upwards of $100,000" 
74Dinges,   pp.   46-7. 
751988  Current Biography Yearbook,   p.   429. 
76Kempe,   p.   117. 
^Ibid.,   p.   113. 











per year by the CIA.79  The indictment of Noriega in 1987 brought a change in 
Noriega's politics, it was only then that he seriously used anti-U.S. rhetoric and 
nationalism to attempt to build support for his cause.  It was in defending himself 
from U.S. charges that he literally raised his machete publicly in defiance.  He stated 
in late 1987, "When the Americans need something, they picture it very nicely and say 
you're a hero, but when they don't need you anymore, they forget you."80 
be Source of Legitii 
Noriega's rule was not based on charisma, but rather on fear.  By late 
1988, he had lost virtually all public support.  His source of legitimacy appears to 
have been more close to Weber's concept of "traditional" legitimacy, in that he 
succeeded into an established role as military strongman.  Had it not been for Torrijos 
to establish the position and role, neither Noriega nor Paredes could have ever served 
as such.  They did not and could not create the position, they simply filled it poorly. 
While Panama's charismatic leaders, Arnulfo Arias and Omar Torrijos, could 
fill the streets with supporters, Noriega had no such appeal.  He had to depend on his 
thugs and paid henchmen, who acted out of fear or for personal reward, and not out of 
any sense of idealism or personal loyalty. 
c. The Foreign Policy of Panama under Manuel Noriega 
Under Noriega, Panama did not attempt to remake Panamanian-U.S. 
relations.  In the wake of the Carter-Torrijos treaties, Panama was basically satisfied 
79Hersh,   p.   87. 
80Washinqton Post, 11 October 1987, cited in 1988 Current 
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and Noriega and his cronies were content to share the spoils of returned properties that 
were being turned over to Panama by the U.S. government.  Publicly, Noriega 
basically did what the U.S. asked-he assisted Oliver North in arming the contras and 
symbolically helped the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the war on 
drugs.81 
It was what Noriega did domestically and in his private business dealings that 
brought a failure in his relationship with the United States.  His political repression 
and his involvement with Colombian cartels could not be tolerated by the United 
States in the second half of the 1980's. 
In the final analysis, Noriega is unique among Panamanian leaders.  He wanted 
no change in the relationship between Panama and the United States, but the 
relationship was so bad that it eventually brought on Operation Just Cause and sent 
Noriega to prison. 
5. Guillermo Endara Galimany 
a. Psycho-political approach 
(1) Personal History 
a. Biological factors.   Guillermo Endara Galimany, the 
president of Panama from 20 December 1989 to 1 October 1994 was born 12 May 
1936 in Panama City to Guillermo Endara Paniza and Elsa Galimany de Endara.82 
He was 53 years old when he assumed the presidency and 58 when he turned power 
81Kempe,   p.   161 
8219 91 Current Biography Yearbook, p. 199 
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over to his elected successor.  Endara is of European ancestry and weighs a hefty 245 
pounds.  His nickname is "pan de dulce" (sweet bread).83 
b. Socio-psychological factors 
(1) Social background 
a. Acculturation and socialization.  Endara 
was known for being a bright student and attended secondary school in Argentina and 
a military academy in Los Angeles, California.   He attended the University of Panama 
and graduated at the head of his law class. He returned to the United States and 
continued his law studies at New York University.  After completing education in 
New York, he returned to Panama in 1963.  As a founding partner in the law firm of 
Solis, Endara, Delgado, and Guevara, Endara specialized in labor law.84 
(2) Personality Characteristics 
a. Attitudinal patterns.  Endara has 
consistently shown himself to be an idealist—in going to jail in 1971 for political 
reasons, in running for president in 1989 out of a sense of duty to his mentor Amulfo 
Arias, and in maintaining his presidency and policies with little domestic support from 
1990 until 1994. 
b. Behavioral patterns.  He is the type of 
person who carries out his responsibilities.  He never attempted to create a legacy of 
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his own, but only to maintain the legacy of Arnulfo Arias.  It was Endara's idealism 
that gave him coinage to stand up to the military.  One U.S. government official 
pointed out, "Nobody doubts his courage, but it's a lot easier to get yourself beaten up 
than to put a country together from scratch."85 
(2) Political History 
a. Recruitment into political activity.  In the political 
arena, Endara became a fervent supporter of Arnulfo Arias-reflecting his father's 
political stands.  The elder Endara had been Arnulfo Arias's Charge d'affaires in 
Washington D.C. during Arias's second term, 1949-51.86 The younger Endara served 
twice in the National Assembly as a member of the Arias-led opposition.  In 1968, 
when Arias returned to power as the elected president, Endara became Planning and 
Economic Minister and served until the coup eleven days later.  After the coup, 
Endara went into hiding.  He was captured by the military regime in 1971 and spent a 
short time in jail.87 
b. Political experiences.   During the Panamanian 
abertura, after 1978, Endara helped Arnulfo Arias to rebuild the organized opposition 
to the Torrijos regime.88  He served as the movement's spokesman until Arias's death 
in 1988. Initially, following the death of Arnulfo Arias, Endara held control of the 
85 
86 
1991 Current Biography Yearbook, p. 201 
Pippin, p. 74. 
87Ibid., p. 200. 
^During the Panamanian abertura_(opening), from about 1978 
to 1981, General Torrijos allowed for the creation of political 
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Panamenistas.  However, he soon lost control to Hildebrando Nicosia.  Endara then 
became leader of the Liberal Authentic Party.89 
Endara was chosen as the opposition's candidate in the 1989 presidential 
election as a result of a political compromise.  Endara's strength was not in any 
personal trait or political power, but in the fact that he was close to Arnulfo Arias and 
relatively non-controversial.  It was with some reluctance that Endara accepted the 
nomination of the civilista coalition.  On his selection Endara said, "I'm not an 
Orientalist, I'm not a Buddhist...But I've read books, and I learned that karma was 
something you have to accept.  I was surprised, but I felt an obligation to do my best, 
to finish the work of my teacher, my maestro, my mentor."90  His reference, of course, 
was to Arias. 
b„ Source of Legitimacy 
La Prensa reporter Sanchez Borbön said of Endara in 1990, "I think he 
is a good choice.  He's a very humble man, very placid—anything but charismatic.  But 
he may surprise people."91  Endara's source of legitimacy as leader was rational.  He 
was not charismatic and did not assume leadership as successor to Noriega on 
traditional grounds, rather Endara's only source of legitimacy was the fact that he was 
the winner of the 1989 election.  His victory of 74.2 percent was announced by the 
Catholic Church immediately following the vote and ratified by the Electoral Tribunal 
89Ibich 
90Endara to David E. Pitt of the New York Times, cited in 
1991 Current Biography Yearbook, p. 200. 
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after the U.S. invasion.92 
c. The Foreign Policy of Panama Under Guillermo Endara 
Endara's relationship with the United States was a love-hate relationship. 
He recognized before Operation Just Cause that military action might be necessary to 
remove the Noriega regime, but did not encourage such action.  After Operation Just 
Cause, he was beholden to the United States for placing him in power and dependent 
on U.S. assistance in rebuilding Panama.  Nonetheless, similar to his mentor Amulfo 
Arias, Endara never enjoyed his relationship with the United States and regretted the 
necessity of U.S. military action. 
Endara, like Noriega, was not revisionist with regards to the Carter-Torrijos 
treaties.  During the campaign in 1989, he stated: 
We have no plans or interest in amending the current Panama Canal 
Treaties.  When the treaties were introduced in 1977, we pointed out things in 
the treaties that we found objectionable.  We even asked people to vote against 
those treaties.  However, now that they have been approved, now that they 
have been ratified, they constitute law for Panama and the United States.  We, 
on behalf of Panama, will abide by all the treaties' clauses.  Moreover, we will 
demand that the United States do the same.  We have no plans to amend those 
treaties.  They will remain as the are.93 
This stand was maintained throughout the Endara administration.  Any suggestion that 
Panama extend the U.S. presence in Panama was met with an Endara refusal to enter 
into discussions on the subject. 
92EFE 1018 GMT, 9 May 1989, FBIS. 
93Panama City Telecinco Television, "Endara Says If Elected, 
Treaties Will Remain," FBIS Latin America Daily Report, 20 April 
1989, p. 24. 
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The main issues of contention between the United States and Endara were drug 
trafficking and money laundering.  Endara's law firm had long been rumored to have 
been involved in money laundering.  Endara admitted that some of the firm's clients 
could have been involved in drug trafficking or money laundering, but insisted that he 
never knowingly represented a client involved in such.94 These allegations were 
problematic for the U.S.-Panamanian relationship, as many U.S. reporters drew the 
conclusion that nothing had changed after Operation Just Cause.  By 1993, such 
rumors gave way to official U.S. government complaints, and reports that the U.S. 
government was distancing itself from the "scandal-plagued" Endara government.95 
Warren Christopher, shortly before becoming Secretary of State, testified before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that despite Operation Just Cause, the situation in 
Panama "is not much better."96 
Putting more pressure on Endara, was the discussion in Miami that defense 
attorneys in a drug case planned to call Endara and one of his law partners to testify 
about their relationship with accused drug traffickers Augusto Falcon and Salvador 
Maguluta.  Endara insisted that he had not been aware of his clients' activities when 
he and his partner set up five companies for them in Panama that were subsequently 
used for money laundering.  The U.S. Ambassador to Panama was, however, not 
941991 Current Biography Yearbook, p. 19 9» 
95Tod Robertson, "U.S. Sounds Alarm on Drug-Linked 
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forgiving and stated that "Failing to check client credentials may not be illegal, but 
now that the corrupting criminal threat is widely perceived, such neglect is at best 
irresponsible and immoral...Know your client."97 
6. Ernesto Perez Balladares 
This section, on President Perez Balladares, is longer than those preceding 
because it is the current and future foreign policy behavior of Perez Balladares that 
this thesis centers around.  While preliminary analysis is carried out, it should be used 
very carefully.  President Perez Balladares is just beginning his term.  While the other 
national leaders were viewed historically, this sketch is predictive with a heavy 
emphasis on current events and stated—but not yet implemented—policy.  The overall 
theme of this sketch is positive and predicts that Panamanian-U.S. relations under 
Perez Balladares may be the best relations enjoyed by the two nations under any of 
the leaders covered by this chapter.  These relations, however, could sour and this 
chapter could become overcome by events by 1999.  Only time will tell. 
a. Psycho-political approach 
(1) Personal History 
a. Biological factors.   Ernesto Perez Balladares was born 
on 29 June 1946 and was 48 years old upon assuming the presidency.98 He is tall and 
stocky and of European descent. 
b. Socio-psychological factors 
97Ibid. 
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(1) Social background.  Perez Balladares comes 
from a privileged background.  He was bom in Panama City to Dr. Ernesto Perez 
Balladares (a medical doctor) and Maria Enriqueta Gonzalez Revilla de Perez 
Balladares.  He attended secondary school in David, Chiriqui at the Colegio San 
Vicente de Paul.  He then went to the University of Notre Dame where he earned a 
Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration in 1967 and completed 
postgraduate studies in economics in 1969.  He also attended the Wharton School of 
Business at the University of Pennsylvania and earned an Master of Business 
Administration degree." 
(2) Personality Characteristics 
a. Attitudrnal patterns. Perez Balladares, 
once committed to a cause, is loyal until the bitter end.  He is basically pragmatic.   He 
is decisive and willing to take charge like no Panamanian leader since Torrijos.  His 
nickname "Toro" (Bull) might prove insightful into his character.  His style and 
nickname are certainly in sharp contrast to "Sweetbread" Endara.  Unlike others who 
have fallen accidentally into leadership positions, Perez Balladares has known all of 
his life that he wanted to be president.100  In the first weeks of his presidency the 
magazine Vistazo complained that the Perez Balladares administration was "Energia 
sin Cortesia" (Energy without Courtesy): 
99E1 Panama-America, Elecciones '94 (supplement), 
"Candidatos A La Presidencia En Las Elecciones de 1994" 8 May 
1994, p. 6 
100Herasto Reyes, "Presidente Electo de Panama; Ernesto Perez 
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Very rapidly passed the days of wine and roses.  The governmental 
decision to take decisions "yesterday," immediately, without doubt nor 
vacillation, that confronted    of every type.  Chancellor Lewis Galindo, 
reflecting the energy of control of the government of Perez Balladares, 
expressed:   "No one can accuse this government of not doing things, but of 
doing things whatever the cost."101 
b. Behavioral patterns.  Perez Balladares is 
a pragmatist.  He is a respectable member of Panamanian society who has 
demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to those he has chosen to follow, to General 
Omar Torrijos for example.  He has also demonstrated a great deal of loyalty to his 
party, the PRD.  He remained loyal to his party during the fraudulent election in 1989 
when he managed the candidacy of Carlos Duque-Noriega's hand-picked candidate- 
and even after the U.S. invasion of Panama.  Perez Balladares remained with his party 
and informed Endara in January of 1990 that he and the PRD would be in the 
opposition.102 
Perez Balladares proved himself, during the 1994 electoral season, to be 
thoughtful and logical.  His speeches were often conciliatory in tone, but he did react 
harshly when criticized for having been an insider in the Noriega regime.  An example 
of such a reaction was the PRD news conference following the use of the national 
television channel (Cadena National) to air a film on Noriega-era atrocities.  The film 
included a photo of Perez Balladares.  He, as would be expected, condemned Endara's 
101Vistazo, "Los Primeros 30 Dias de Gobierno: Energla Sin 
Cortesla," No. 23, October, 1994, p. 4. 
102Panaraa City TVN Television Network, 0123 GMT, 12 May 1994, 
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use of the presidency to influence the election and filed an official protest.103 
(3) Political History 
a. Recruitment into Political Activity. 
Upon returning to Panama in the late 1960's, Perez Balladares took his place among 
Panama City's businessmen.  He was a manager with Citibank in the capital.  By 1975 
he had joined the Torrijos government, where he serve in 1975 and 1976 on a 
legislation commission, from 1976 until 1981 as the Minister of Agriculture and 
Treasury, and from 1981 to 1982 as Minister of Planning and Political Economy.  In 
1983, Perez Balladares became director of the Institute) Nacional de Recursos 
Hydrolicos y Electricos (IRHE)—the state-owned national water and electric company. 
In addition to serving on a variety of boards, he was also a founding member of the 
PRD and worked with the Panamanian negotiating team on the Carter-Torrijos 
treaties.104 
Perez Balladares is very proud of his service in the Torrijos government and 
his presence at the creation of the PRD. The pragmatism of Perez Balladares's 
calculated rise to the presidency can be seen. He was no wide-eyed idealist member 
of the Torrijos team, nor a blind supporter of Noriega. Rather, Perez Balladares has, 
through the years, done what was best for his own advancement. During the 1970's, 
this meant supporting General Omar Torrijos, in the 1980's this meant being loyal to 
General Manuel Noriega. 
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b. Political experiences.  Perez Balladares 
and his supporters often allude to his service in the Torrijos regime very positively. 
This contrasts with his service in the Noriega years.  During this time Perez Balladares 
is often pictured—by his supporters—as an outsider who was not a friend of Noriega 
and someone who did not make it a habit to visit the military often, as did some other 
Panamanian politicians. 
It must be noted that there seem to be two faces of Ernesto Perez Balladares. 
Throughout the 1994 campaign for the presidency, cartoonists in Panama portrayed 
Perez Balladares as a facade for former Noriega thugs.  To some degree, this view is 
justified.  The scrappy party president, Gerardo Gonzalez, is the standard bearer of the 
populist Noriegista sectors of the PRD.   Gonzalez's son, Pedro Miguel, is wanted for a 
10 June 1992 terrorist attack that killed U.S. Army Sergeant Zak Hernandez.  Party 
president Gonzalez does not admit his son's participation in the attack, but says that it 
should not come as a surprise that such attacks occurred in the wake of the U.S. 
invasion.  While President Perez Balladares stated before the election that he wanted 
no amnesty for past politically-motivated crimes, Gonzalez planned to use his seat in 
the legislature to push for an amnesty.105 
Perez Balladares himself, in playing the role of a moderate, has distanced 
himself from the Noriega era.  Attempting to unify his party and broaden its appeal, 
Perez has invoked the image of Torrijos.  Perez's challenge is to maintain control of 
105Tim Johnson, "Case of Slain G.I. A Test For New Panamanian 
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the more radical elements within his party as vital issues are addressed. 
In dealing with the United States, it is clearly the moderate face of Perez 
Balladares that is shown—the U.S.-trained banker.  It was this character who met with 
and impressed President Clinton on 20 July 1994. 106 
While clearly more charismatic than his predecessor, President Perez 
Balladares is far from an Amulfo Arias or an Omar Torrijos.  Rather, he is something 
more of a technocrat.  While it is true that his approval rate in Panama has been very 
high to mid-1995, his approval rate seems to be based on the public's perception of his 
performance.  Although he barely won the election, Perez Balladares's source of 
legitimacy is rational.  He was accepted by President Endara and almost all 
Panamanians because he won the election. 
(1) Economic Development.  During the 1994 presidential 
campaign, Ernesto Perez Balladares ran as a Torrijista, in essence the Panamanian 
version of a Social Democrat.  He, like most of the other candidates, was not specific 
on details of an economic program.  His stands, however, were interpreted to mean 
that he was opposed to neoliberal policies.107 With an estimated 50% of Panamanians 
living in poverty and with 27% unemployment in 1994 Panama, economic policy was 
106Eric Schmitt, "New Panama Leader: An Enemy Becomes an 
Ally," New York Times, 21 July 1994, p. A6. 
107Emilio Sinclair, "Labor Union Endorses Perez Balladares 
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an important part of the electoral debate.108 
The March 1994 communique, in which the National Central Organization of 
Panamanian Workers (CNTP) announced their support for candidate Perez Balladares, 
is unmistakable in expressing the groups interpretation of what Perez Balladares's 
economic policies would be:   "with this decision ' we will achieve the return of the 
Torrijista forces to power to stimulate the process of national liberation.'"  The 
communique went on announcing support for other pro-labor candidates, including 
Legislative Assembly candidate Rolando Miller "who showed ability and honesty 
against the neoliberal and persecution policies of the current [Endara] regime."109 
Perez Balladares did stress the development of the national infrastructure 
during the campaign.  He pointed out during the election on several occasions that the 
highways required major work, specifically the Transistmica which connects Panama 
City and Colon and the Pan-American Highway that goes northwest of Panama City to 
Chiriqui and the Costa Rican border. 
(2) Labor.  During the presidential campaign, there was no 
indication by candidate Perez Balladares of an intention to make major changes in the 
labor code or in the labor practices of the Panamanian government.  His assumed 
stand was that of a traditional Torrijista and it was this stand that gained him the 
support of the CNTP. 
(3) Amnesty.  During the campaign, as candidate Perez 
108Renato Pereira,   "El  PRD:   De  la Clandestindad al Poder?," 
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BaUadares attempted to distance himself for the Noriegistas, he indicated that he 
wanted no amnesty for past politically-motivated crimes.110 
(4) Canal Area Transition.  In discussing the future of the 
Panama Canal Area, Perez BaUadares made his most direct comments around the time 
of the visit to Panama of U.S. Representatives Phil Crane and Howard Phillips.  On 8 
April 1994 Perez BaUadares told the congressmen that "Compliance with the Torrijos- 
Carter Treaties is the most advisable thing for the United States and Panama."  He 
added that his government would be "willing to hold talks" in response to a United 
States request to consider defense issues and a U.S. military presence in Panama 
beyond the year 20Q0.111  While some labor leaders called for talks on continued 
basing because of fear that the loss of Department of Defense jobs resulting from base 
closure will make unemployment grow even higher, Perez BaUadares rejected this 
argument saying, "...the problem of the bases is not economical, their leaving or 
remaining is a military issue.  Foreign bases exist in a nation because the states, agree 
that the situation favors both nations.  In the case of Panama, the North Americans 
have said that they are not interested in being permanently in Panama.  Panamanians 
are capable of acimiriistering well these military bases as commercial activities."112 in 
July after the election, Perez BaUadares continued with this line, saying that military 
110Tim Johnson, "Case of Slain G.I. A Test For New Panamanian 
Leader," Miami Herald, 18 May 1994, ISLA. 
111A. Sanchez Belisle, "Perez BaUadares Outlines Position of 
Treaties," La Estrella de Panama, 9 April 1994, p. 1, FBIS. 
112La Prensa, 13 April 1994, p. 6A. 
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bases "exist due to military needs, not economic conveniences."113 These stands have 
been consistently maintained by Perez Balladares—as candidate, president-elect, and 
president. 
On the subject of the Canal itself, Perez Balladares has never publicly 
expressed any doubt that Panama can successfully maintain the canal.  He has stated 
that he "has discarded the possibility that the United States will impede delivery of the 
Panama Canal to Panama."114 Like nearly all Panamanian elites, Perez Balladares 
views the Panama Canal as a national patrimony that will be received by Panama on 
31 December 1999.  He stated, "Thanks to the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, now it is going 
to be our Canal and we can utilize these areas to generate riches..."115  This was the 
view of candidate Perez Balladares and is still held by President Perez Balladares. 
d. Activities in Office 
(1) Economic Development.  The economic policies that are 
being followed by the Perez Balladares government in mid-1995 were not fully 
developed prior to Perez Balladares's inauguration.  Even in August of 1994, the 
incoming Minister of Planning Guillermo Chapman was making comments against 
neo-liberal thinking:  "We will not accept conditions imposed by international financial 
113Panama  City  Telemetro  Television Network,   "President-Elect 
on  Closure  of  U.S.   Military Bases,"   1730  GMT,   14  July  1994,   FBIS. 
114Ibid. 
115Tracy Wilkinson, "An Uneasy Passage in Panama, " Los 
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organizations, nor will Panama instill measures which go against our vision of 
development."116  However, others in the administration were beginning to paint a very 
neo-liberal future.   On the subject of economic integration with Central America, 
Perez Balladares was quoted on 18 August, "Integration should be designed to help all 
of us win, not all of us lose."117    Nitzia de Villarreal, the incoming Minister of 
Commerce and Industries, was quoted on 19 August saying that joining NAFTA was 
more advisable for Panama than Central American integration, and that joining GATT 
"in less than a year" was advisable.118 
By 10 October, a more complete economic consensus had developed within the 
Perez Balladares and this resulted in a published document entitled: "The National 
Economic Plan," informally called the "Chapman Plan."  Critics have complained that 
the Chapman Plan is identical to the "Ford Plan"-the neoliberal plan of the Endara 
Administration.119 The new document alludes to the inaugural address of Perez 
Balladares: 
"Vested interests, the selfishness of particular groups, and the lack of 
sense of solidarity with the general interests of society have prompted everyone 
116Panama Update, No. 10, Autumn 1994, p. 2.  Such a 
statement by Guillermo Chapman is somewhat ironic;  he is 
described by George Priestly as "A Christian Democrat and 
neoliberal economist" in NACLA Report on the Americas, September- 
October 1994, Vol.28, No.2, p. 11. 
117Panama City ACAN, 1906 GMT, 18 August 1994, FBIS. 
118Juan Manuel Diaz C, "Commerce Minister-Designate on 
NAFTA, Trade Goals," El Panama-America, 19 August 1994, p. 2A, 
FBIS. 
119Juan Luis Batista, "Report on the President's First 100 
Days in Office," La Prensa, 11 Dec 1994, p. A-6, FBIS. 
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to call for a change, but very few are willing to make these changes in 
themselves."120 
The nature of Panamanian economic history was also addressed: 
The country's economic and social structure has created a "short-term 
mentality, which then requires that authorities make a tremendous effort "to 
promote change." 
It is not possible to make society take a medicine whose purpose is to 
cure an illness from which society does not know it is suffering.121 
In defining the "principal problems" the document sounds very populist and 
very much social democratic: 
Approximately 20 percent of Panamanian families do not earn the 
necessary income to eat adequately.  An additional 25 percent cannot fulfill 
their basic needs, although they are able to purchase food. 
Recent and past overall  growth has not resulted in more opportunities 
for the poor.  The thick wall that prevents access by deprived groups to the 
benefits of growth is constructed by the privileges granted by the government 
so that a few may reap the profits of food production, distribution, and imports 
at very high prices.  It has limited the possibilities for productive employment... 
The wealthiest 20 percent of the population has an income 45 times 
higher that the average income of the poorest 20 percent.  In this area, as in 
others, we have the second worst distribution of income, second only to 
Brazil...122 
Drawing from Perez Balladares's inaugural address, the important of foreign 
investment is noted:   "the outlook for our economy is not as bright as what we 
wanted.  It could be worse if significant foreign investments are not made."123  The 
importance of generating foreign income via service industries was also addressed: 
120Ernesto Perez Balladares, National Economic Plan: Public 
Policy for Fundamental Development With Economic Efficiency, El 




123Ibid., quote from Perez Balladares's inaugural address. 
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The most important stimulus to growth in a small economy, particularly 
the Panamanian economy, is the generation of resources.  In our case, three- 
fourths of these resources, correspond to the export of services, mainly those 
tied in one way or another to the Canal.  These services are long-standing slow 
growth activities, particularly those of the Canal itself, the oil pipeline, and the 
U.S. military bases, that will be withdrawn over the next five years.  The 
exception had been the Free Zone... 
Internationally, the Panamanian economy is not very competitive.  Our 
production costs prevent exports by the majority of our manufacturing 
industries and of a substantial portion of agricultural products... 
In addition to being a poor country, Panama uses its resources 
inefficiently.  Panama is proving that we need much more investment that other 
countries require in generating a unit of production...124 
The move to privatize public services was justified: 
Relative to international norms, electricity, telephone, water, and ports 
services are exceedingly expensive and inefficient.  The cost burden that this 
imposes on productive activities has adversely affected competition... 'to 
convert the companies that provide electricity, telephone service, and water into 
corporations.  This would allow us to incorporate the contribution of the private 
sector to reorient and improve services as well as to reduce tariffs.'125 
Protectionism was addressed: 
The excessive protectionism constitutes a tax on the cost of living, 
salaries, and the price of inputs, and makes exports more expensive.  The low 
purchasing power of Panamanian salaries is explained to a great extent by the 
level of protectionism is this country, considered the highest on the continent. 
"To be competitive, the economy must be open and free.   We will 
therefore review the quota system and trade barriers aimed at promoting greater 
levels of exchange between Panama and other nations and regions.'126 
As had been addressed during the campaign, the state infrastructure was also a 
subject of the economic plan:  "The highway network, the capacity to generate electric 
power, the supply of drinking water, and telephone density, to mention a few 
124Ibid, 
125Ibid/ quote from Perez Balladares's inaugural address. 
126Ibid„, quote from Perez Balladares's inaugural address. 
166 
  









124I i  0 
125 I i , t ro er  all dares'  ural ress.
1~ .f t ro er  all dares'  ural ress.
 
examples, remain stuck in the past."127 
The "Objectives of the Plan" are express in two general objectives and then 
expanded: 
1. Significantly reducing extreme poverty before the end of the 
governments five year term.  This reduction of poverty will be reflected in a 
relatively better distribution of income... 
2. Broader and permanent economic growth will be strengthened by 
efficiency and greater productivity.  The government will establish quantitative 
goals for this growth, as this will depend not only on what we do domestically, 
but also on international factors. 
In fact, the participation of various productive sectors will be expanded 
to the extent that this expansion is not artificially or temporarily promoted by 
excessive incentives, special duty exemptions, or unregulated monopolies, 
which contravene the process of sustained development.128 
Trade issues were most directly address in the section titled: "Foreign Trade 
Policies." It is interesting to note, that this section is unique in that the language used 
indicates that certain actions "shall" be taken: 
Membership in GATT shall be formalized,  the ensuing commitments, 
including, among others, reducing customs duties, adopting a ceiling on 
customs duties, eliminating non-customs duty barriers, and adopting 
nondiscriminatory goods and services trade measures, shall be placed into 
effect. 
As for integration issues, our joining the broader markets shall be 
actively promoted by immediately conducting a systematic study of the most 
suitable option, which will give priority to the feasibility and strategy of 
directly joining NAFTA.129 
(2) Labor.  Directly confronting a key issue for Torrijistas, the 
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A guarantee of universally accepted, fundamental labor rights is the 
cornerstone of the position on this issue.  The objectives of the labor policy are 
to create the necessary labor market conditions for reaching high 
unemployment; to draft legislation competitive with labor policies in other 
countries that are also attempting to attract foreign investment; and to achieve a 
level of productivity that will strengthen our international competitive position. 
Fulfillment of these goals is essential to modernizing the economy and to 
overcoming unemployment which requires within the short term modification 
of the labor code.130 
This indicates that the Perez Balladares government is willing to dismantle the 
current Labor Code—a construct of the Torrijos era—in order to make Panama 
competitive in the international labor market. This appears to be the work of Perez 
Balladares the banker, as opposed to Perez Balladares the Social Democrat. 
(3) Amnesty.  The fact that President Perez Balladares did opt 
for granting pardons to some criminals convicted for perpetrating political crimes 
during the Noriega regime did cause some friction.  Critics argued that the move 
tarnished the image of justice in Panama.  The President argued that he made the 
decision "in favor of national reconciliation."131  In essence, he kept his campaign 
pledge to not seek an amnesty;  instead, individual pardons have been granted in large 
numbers. 
(4) Canal Area Transition.  On the subject of the implementation 
of the Panama Canal treaties, the stand of President Perez Balladares has remained 
consistent.  His administration is planning for Panama's receiving the Panama Canal 
on 31 December 1999.  In addition to working to get a new title passed for inclusion 
130Ibich 
131
 Juan Luis Batista, "Report on the President's First 100 
Days in Office," La Prensa, 11 December 1994, p. A-6, 
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in the Panamanian constitution, President Perez Balladares has insinuated that he wants 
to control the reversion process closely.  This had led to closer presidential control the 
Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI-la Autoridad de la Region Interoceanica)—an 
institution that was formerly advertised to be apolitical.  Perez Balladares seems to 
believe that through personal involvement, the reversion process might be more 
successful.132 
On the subject of managing the Canal itself, Panama is preparing for the task. 
A congress on the Canal is being planned for 1997 which will likely be attended by 
high level leadership of user nations.  The congress seems to be developing as an 
opportunity for Panama to give users assurances of their detennination to maintain a 
high level of professionalism in the operation of the Canal. 
The Minister Counselor of the Panamanian Embassy in Washington, Fernando 
Eleta C. indicated that there are many ways that Panama could possibly give 
assurances to international users.  He mentioned the possibility that Panama could 
nominate international members to the post-1999 Panama Canal Commission.133  The 
issue of a smooth employee transition has also been considered by the Perez 
Balladares administration and the administration is concerned that any large exodus of 
U.S. employees at the time of turnover cold adversely affect operations.  The solution 
132Juan Pritsiolas, "Perez Balladares Wants Say in ARI 
Decisions," El Panama-America, 25 November 1994, p. 1A, FBIS. 
133Fernando Eleta C, Embassy of Panama, Washington, D.C., 
interview with author, 29 March 1995.  The examples of possible 
post-1999 board members that were given by Mr. Eleta were 
interesting:  a Dutch Sea Captain, a U.S. Admiral, a Japanese 
government minister. 
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that may eventually be worked out would include the governments of the United 
States and Panama and the workers;  the workers, if they were planning to remain 
beyond a certain date (such as in 1997) would be asked to contract themselves to stay 
beyond the transfer date (perhaps, at least until 2003).  To encourage U.S. workers to 
remain, the Panamanians are indicating that Canal workers will continue to receive the 
same pay that they are now receiving.134 
On the issue of U.S. military bases in Panama beyond 1999, neither side has 
publicly broached the issue.  Perez Balladares has not, since inauguration, made 
comments against post-1999 U.S. basing.  He has maintained his stand that his 
government is willing to discuss the issue, if the United States indicates its desire to 
do so.  He has stated that his government would take the issue to a national 
referendum, as is required by the constitution. 
Mr. Fernando Eleta C, at the Panamanian Embassy in Washington, indicated 
that whether or not there is a "bases issue" is up to the United States government. 
Hew indicated three basic considerations:   (1) any agreement has to be passed by 
national referendum, (2) any agreement has to be economically significant for Panama 
(this could mean jobs and "not necessarily rent"), and (3) Panama expected the United 
States to be interested in mamteining forces in the Howard-Rodman-Kobe (HOROKO) 
complex and in the Jungle Training Site on Fort Davis.135 
134Ibid=, Mr. Eleta Co suggested that, in the years after 
2000, perhaps Canal worker's raises could be limited to bring 
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e. Desired Legacy 
It seems clear that President Ernesto Perez Balladares wants to be 
known as the president who put Panama back on track after the "lost decade" of rule 
by Noriega and Endara.  Economic growth in Panama is clearly the President's number 
one priority.  His foreign policy strategy is as follows: 
...the Foreign Ministry's tasks are: 
A. Preparing a harmonious transition from a U.S. administration to a 
totally Panamanian administration of the Panama Canal. 
B. Promoting foreign investment in Panama. 
C. Working closely with Mexico, the United States, and Canada to 
achieve Panama's acceptance into NAFTA, following our acceptance in GATT. 
D. Fostering and ensuring close relations with the United States in 
fulfilling the Torrijos-Carter treaties and in all areas of mutual interest (the 
fight against drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal immigration, and 
trade and cultural exchanges. 
E. Achieve Panama's entry into APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation).136 
Mr. Fernando Eleta C, from his vantage in the Panamanian Embassy in 
Washington, indicated that the main foreign policy goals were (1) preparation for the 
transition of the Canal; and (2) entry into NAFTA.  This indicates a high degree of 
consistency throughout the Perez Balladares government. 
From developments through mid-1995, it seems that the legacy desired by 
President Ernesto Perez Balladares is similar to that of Argentina's President Carlos 
Menem. Like Menem, Perez Balladares has a strong political mentor whose populist 
economic policies have been overcome by the neoliberal economic wave.  The 
challenge for both men is to hold onto and use the populist legacy, while making 
136La Estrella de Panama, "Ministry Outlines President's 
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tremendous changes in their party's traditional stands on economic policy.  Like 
Menem, it is likely that Perez Balladares is willing to shift his position along the 
political spectrum in order to achieve success.  Movement to the right puts extreme 
pressure on the Christian Democrats, Arnulfistas, and MOLIRENA, which may loose 
part of their supporters to Perez Balladares, as he attempts to broaden his coalition. 
In the realm of economic policy, Panama is clearly attempting to follow Chile. 
Mr. Fernando Eleta C. has indicated that Panama would like to be the next country 
after Chile to accede to NAFTA.137  Also like Chile, Panama would like to join APEC 
and is taking preliminary steps towards membership.138 These are large steps for a 
small nation, but clear signs that Panama is attempting to emulate Chile's economic 
performance and approach to economic integration. 
President Perez Balladares greatest challenge is to maintain the support of the 
populist factions of his own party, the PRD.  He has taken some actions to appease 
them—the pardons list, declaring 20 December 1994 a national day of mourning for 
Panamanian who died during Operation Just Cause, and couching even neoliberal 
policies in populist terms.  However, the President has clearly indicated that he desires 
a legacy greater than any past PRD politician.  He wants to be known in history as a 
national leader who prepared Panama for the 21st century—someone who stood up 
against corruption and dealt evenhandedly with society's problems. 
137Fernando Eleta C, Embassy of Panama, Washington, D„C, 
interview with author, 29 March 1995. 
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Location of Education and Foreign Policy Behavior139 
Leader High School University Foreign Policy: Foreign Policy: 
Revisionist ? Ranking of 
Relations 
Arias Panama U.S. Yes 5 
Remon Panama Mexico Yes 3 
Torrijos Panama El Salvador Yes 4 
Noriega Panama Peru No 6 
Endara Argentina; U.S. Panama; U.S. No 2 
Perez B. Panama Panama; U.S. ?140 1 
Table 14: Author 
139The answers in the category titled "Foreign Policy: Revisionist?" correspond to my 
reading of history. The ranking of "Foreign Policy Relations" from 1 to 6 reflect the 
quality of the bilateral Panama-U.S. relationship during each leader's rule. One (1) 
reflects the best bilateral relations of the five, while six (6) reflects the worst 
bilateral relations. These numbers reflect the overall period of rule and are based on my 
own subjective observation, reading, and research. Of course, the assignment of the "1" 
to Perez Balladares is only based on his behavior in office through mid-1995; this score 
is contingent upon a continuation of similar Panamanian-U.S. relations. 
140This category for Perez Balladares can only be answered with a "?" for now. 
C. LINKAGES 
1. Education and Foreign Policy Behavior 
There seems to be no relation between location of education and foreign policy 
behavior.   Considering the two leaders under which bilateral relations were worst- 
Noriega and Arias—Noriega was educated in Peru and Arias was educated at the 
University of Chicago and Harvard Medical School.   On the other end of the scale, the 
two past leaders under which Panama enjoyed relatively good bilateral relations- 
Remön and Endara—also had very different educational experiences: Remön in El 
Salvador and Endara in Panama and the United States.   Should President Perez 
Balladares continue to enjoy good relations with the United States, some positive 
correlation between education in the United States and good relations could be drawn. 
So far, the only conclusion that we can draw from history is that contact between 
potential foreign leaders and the United States does not guarantee any sense of 
common interests in the future.  In the case of Panama and based on this limited but 
important sample, it seems that education in the United States has not affected the 
foreign policy behavior of Panamanian leaders.  Other research has indicated a 
negative relationship between studies in the United States and friendliness towards the 
United States.141 
141
 See Otto Klinberg, The Human Dimension in International 
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Military vs. Civilian Govenunent and Foreign Policy Behavior 
Military or Civilian Forei icy: Foreign Policy: 
Rev t ? Ranking of 
Relations 
Civilian Yes 5 
Military Yes 3 
Military Yes 4 
Military No 6 
Civilian No 2 
Civilian ? 1 
Table 15: Author 
As with educational background, the difference in the foreign policy behaviors 
of civilian and military governments does not seem to be significant.  Both military 
and civilian governments have sought revisions in the U.S.-Panamanian relationship. 
Of the two leaders under which U.S.-Panama bilateral relations were at their worst- 
Noriega and Arias—one was civilian and the other was military.   Of the two leaders 
under which U.S.-Panamanian bilateral relations were best-Remön and Endara—one 
was military and the other was civilian.  The case of Arias should serve as an example 
that elected civilian leaders are not necessarily democratic in nature or pro-U.S. in 
foreign policy outlook. 
3. Class Origins amd Foreign Policy Behavior 
Otto Klineberg's The Human Dimension in International Affairs and T. W. 
Adorno et al's The Authoritarian Personality discuss the importance of ethnocentricism 
and prejudice in the conduct of international relations.142  Basically, there seems to be 
a correlation between the level of prejudice and authoritarianism.  Class origins also 
seemed to be important: 
Individuals who are relatively uneducated, for example, or who are low 
in economic status, are more likely to obtain high scores (to show more 
authoritarianism) than those who might be described as having a greater degree 
of social sophistication.143 
142T,   W.   Adorno,   E.   Frenkel-Brunswik,   D.   J.   Levinson,   and 
RJ.   Sanford,   The Authoritarian Personality   (New York:   Harper  & 
Row,   1950). 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Class Origins and Foreign Policy Behaviorl44 
Leader Social Class O ban F i  licy: Foreign Policy: 
 l t ? Ranking of 
Relations 
Arias 4 Rural Yes 5 
Remon 3 Urban Yes 3 
I 
Torrijos 5 Rural Yes 4 
Noriega 6 Urban No 6 
Endara 2 Urban No 2 
Perez B. 1 Urban ? 1 
Table 16: Author 
144Fore ign policy categories are as in previous charts. Assigned numbers in the 
"Social Origins" category are from one to five and are relative to each other. One 
represents the most elite background and five represents the most humble social 
background. The urban/rural category reflects whether the leader was from rural Panama, 
i.e. outside of Panama City, or from urban Panama, i.e. within Panama City. The assigned 
numbers are based on my own subjective observation, reading, and research. 
There are some interesting correlations between social class and urban or rural 
origin and foreign policy behavior.  The two past leaders under which the Panama and 
the United States maintained the best bilateral relations—Remdn and Endara—were both 
from Panama City (urban) and from relatively elite backgrounds (numbers two and 
three in this class ranking of leaders).145  Should Perez Balladares continue his pursuit 
of good relations with the United States and remain deserving of a "1" ranking, this 
will further emphasize the apparent correlation between class ranking and good 
relations in Panama-U.S. relations.  Of the three leaders under which the United States 
and Panama enjoyed the worst bilateral relationship—Noriega, Arias, and Torrijos—they 
were ranked in the lowest three places in terms of social class in this study.  While 
Arias and Torrijos were both from rural areas, Noriega—under which the U.S. and 
Panama had the worst bilateral relations—was from Panama City. 
This view of leadership and social class and origins in Panama, seems to 
indicate that the best relations between Panama and the United States have occurred 
when upper class Panamanians from Panama City were in power. 
4. Soorce of Legitimacy amcl Foreign Policy Behavior 
If Noriega is left out of this chart as an anomaly, then there would be a 
noticeable relationship between a charismatic source of legitimacy and poor bilateral 
145The social class ranking assigned to Remon may reflect 
more of a self definition than reality.  The ranking was assigned 
based on Pippin.  Also, the differentiation in social class 
between Endara and Perez Balladares and the assignment of a "1" 
and "2" was problematic, as it was difficult to differentiate 
their place in Panamanian society.  This said, it could be added 
that they could be tied for a "1" in the category of social 
class. 
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relations between the United States and Panama.  The cases of Arias and Torrijos both 
serve as examples of charismatic leaders who sought revision in the bilateral 
relationship and presided over periods of relatively poor bilateral relations (ranked four 
and five in this study). This may indicate that leaders who rule with a rational source 
of legitimacy (or traditional) are more likely to enjoy good bilateral relations with the 
United States.  Certainly these leaders are less likely to use mass demonstrations 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source of Legitimacy and Foreign Policy Behavior146 
Leader Source of Legitimacy Forei  icy: Foreign Policy: 
Revi i t ? Ranking of 
Relations 
Arias Charismatic Yes 5 
I Remon Traditional Yes 3 
Torrijos Charismatic Yes 4 
Noriega Traditional No 6 
Endara Rational No 2 
Perez B. Rational ? 1 
Table 17: Author 
146The answers in the 01 Source of Legitimacy" column use Weber's categories, s 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS:  POLICY OPTIONS, PREDICTIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
In considering the implementation of the Panama Canal 
Treaties, there are three possible options that the U.S. and 
Panamanian governments can adopt:  (1) complete 
implementation with no changes; (2) complete renegotiation 
with major changes; and (3) partial renegotiation.1  There 
are gains and costs associated with each of these routes. 
1. Option 1:  Complete Implementation with No Changes 
This option represents the absence of changes to the 
1977 Carter-Torrijos treaties.  With no renegotiation or 
unilateral changes, the withdrawal of military forces from 
Panama will continue.  Finally, on 31 December 1999 at 1200 
the Canal will become controlled and owned by Panama and 
there will be no U.S. military forces in Panama.  The 
following section summarizes the major advantages and 
1In choosing to present three alternatives, this chapter is 
going against the prudent recommendations of futurist Peter 
Schwartz.  In The Art of the Long View, Schwartz writes "Beware 
of ending up with three scenarios, though in practice we often 
do.  People not familiar with scenarios or their use will be 
tempted to identify one of the three as the "middle" or "most 
likely" scenario and then will treat it as a single-point 
forecast, and all the advantages of a multiple-scenario 
methodology will be lost." (p. 233)  Because speculation on the 
future of U.S.-Panamanian relations are so uncontrolled, the 
three scenario approach in this case may serve to inform and to 
bring divergent views closer together, that is, closer to a 
middle path. 
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disadvantages of complete implementation for the U.S. and 
Panamanian governments. 
a„ From the U.S. Point of View 
(1) Advantages 
(a) U.S. vessels will be able to use the 
Canal. 
(b) Defending the Canal from internal 
sabotage will become a Panamanian problem.  Defending it 
from international threats will be an international problem. 
(c) The regime of Permanent neutrality 
legally gives the United States the right to intervene 
militarily to ensure the operation of the Canal.  Also, it 
ensures that no other non-Panamanian military force can ever 
be stationed in Panama. 
(d) Economically, the Canal has never 
been profitable for the United States.  The Canal has been 
self-sustaining, but U.S. forces in Panama cost 
approximately $80 million per year.  Therefore, the United 
States might be able to  expect savings.2 
(e) Another economic consideration is 
that the Canal is a well-oiled antique and modifications are 
being planned,, i.e. additional locks.  By reverting the 
Canal on schedule, the United States will no longer be 
responsible for providing the funds to maintain or improve 
2Stephen Fidler, "Panama Party of Dictators Set for 
Victory," Financial Times of London, 6 May 1994, ISLA, Vol.48, 
No.5, pp. 75-6. 
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the Canal. 
2. Disadvantages 
(a) The Canal could fall into a state of 
disrepair.  In an extreme case the Canal could become 
unusable, requiring U.S. military vessels and general 
shipping to take alternative and more costly routes.3 
(b) The loss of military bases will make 
logistics in Central and South America more difficult. 
Currently, flights from Howard Air Force Base support U.S. 
Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense missions 
in the region, particularly embassy resupply and aerial 
surveillance (AWACS).  At Rodman Naval Station U.S. Navy 
ships are serviced and resupplied for their nearby counter- 
drug missions. 
(c) It could be argued that the 
departure of U.S. troops from Panama could impact regional 
security negatively.  While this concept is impossible to 
prove, it deserves consideration.  Many forces in Latin 
America that have anti-democratic or anti-U.S. agendas might 
be less reluctant to act, knowing that there are virtually 
no U.S. forces in the region.  While the U.S. has not 
traditionally asserted the importance of U.S. presence in 
3Clifford Krauss, New York Times, 23 January 1991, p. A4 
provides a discussion of the worsening material status of the 
Canal.  Some in the shipping industry believe that the process of 
decay is well underway.  For another similarly negative view, see 
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affecting the behavior of Western Hemisphere states, U.S. 
strategic planners clearly understand this concept in other 
areas, such as the Mediterranean and Persian Gulfs»  In 
these areas, even small forces have been viewed as 
symbolically important. 
(d) United States Southern Command, 
which is the Unified Command with responsibility for the 
land area from Guatemala to Tierra del Fuego, and which has 
been located in Panama for many years, will return to the 
continental United States.  Some on the SOUTHCOM staff argue 
that they are better able to support U.S. regional policy 
while located in the region.  However, current plans are to 
move the Headguarters to Miami. 
(e) There are differences in 
understanding of what the Treaty on Permanent Neutrality 
means.  The DeConcini Amendment, which gives the United 
States the right to intervene in Panama to protect the 
neutrality of the Canal after 2000, is viewed in the United 
States as strengthening U.S. rights within the context of 
the Carter-Torrijos treaties.  However, among intellectuals 
and legal scholars in Panama this amendment is viewed as 
illegal given that it was added to the treaty after Panama 
had approved the original treaties in a national plebescite. 
While this U.S. Senate amendment was agreed to by General 
Omar Torrijos, it was not approved by national referendum as 
reguired by the Panamanian Constitution.  In effect, future 
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governments might reconsider this U.S. "right" and determine 
that it was not properly ratified and thus has no basis in 
law.4 
b. From the Panamanian Point of View 
(1) Advantages 
(a) Symbolic—the recovery of national 
sovereignty. 
(b) Gaining operational and 
administrative control of the Panama Canal, one of the 
world's most strategic waterways.  This will give Panama a 
greater status on the world stage. 
(c) Returned properties can be 
developed, providing space for new growth in crowded Colon 
and Panama City. 
(2) Disadvantages 
(a) Loss of U.S. government jobs.  It is 
estimated that the 10,000 U.S. troops stationed in Panama 
contribute $250 million annually to the economy, 5% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).5 
(b) Loss of possible future U.S. funding 
for modernization of the Canal. 
2. Option 2: Complete Renegotiation with Major Changes 
4For a good discussion of the Panamanian view on the 
subject, see Oyden Ortega Durän, "Neutralidad, Defensa y no 
Intervencion en Los Tratados Torrijos-Carter," Tareas 83 
(January-April, 199 3) (Panama: Centro de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos, 1993), pp.3-13. 
5Fidler, pp. 75-6, 
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There are two important facets to the 1977 Carter- 
Torrijos treaties that this option would reject:  (1) 
Panamanian control of the Canal on 31 December 19 9 9;  and 
(2) U.S. military departure from Panama, in accordance with 
the current schedule and no later than 31 December 1999» 
This option represents a reversal in U.S. and Panamanian 
foreign policy and could result in the maintenance of the 
status quo, i.e. U.S. control of the Canal and U.S. 
maintenance of military facilities. 
Presenting this option in hypothetical terms, as is 
being done here, in no way suggests that this option is 
possible, feasible, or desirable.  However, there are enough 
people on both sides of this issue who favor a total or 
nearly total reversal in policy, to justify looking at the 
advantages and disadvantages of this option. 
Such an option would represent a great deal of 
political risk for both governments.  While the U.S. 
government is under political pressure to save bases at 
home, there would likely be very little sympathy for 
maintenance of the status quo in Panama.  President Perez 
Balladares, even if he wanted to, cannot suggest that the 
status quo be maintained.  While there appears some 
flexibility with regards to basing, there is none with 
regards to Panamanian control of the Canal on 31 December 
1999. 
a« From the U.S. Point of View 
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(1) Advantages 
(a) This option could allow the United 
States to retain the status quo, i.e. control of the Canal 
and military bases.  This could insure the efficient 
operation of the Canal, particularly important if some 
future global threat were to develop. 
(b) The United States could make 
investment to widen the Canal, add additional locks, etc. to 
make the Canal able to serve well into the 21st century. 
(2) Disadvantages 
(a) This could sour U.S. relations with 
Latin America. 
(b) U.S. control of the Canal after 2000 
would most likely be met with defiance by many sectors in 
Panama. 
(c) Demonstrations, similar to the Flag 
Riots, would possibly return, thus threatening the safety of 
Americans and smooth operation of the Canal. 
(d) The Canal could become an obvious 
target for major international terrorism.  It should be 
noted that the Hizballah—related bomb attack on 19 July 
1994 that killed 19 people (12 of whom were Jewish) was 
carried out on a commuter aircraft that originated from 
France Field, a former Canal Zone facility that reverted to 
Panama under the treaties.6 This type of activity could be 
sNew York Times, 21 July 1994, p. A6. 
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easily directed at Canal facilities should a renegotiated 
agreement renew the image of the Canal as a symbol of U.S. 
imperialism. 
bo From the Paaamaiaiajni point of view 
(1) Advantages 
(a) U.S. government jobs could be 
maintained in Panama. 
(b) Defense sites could possible be 
leased to the United States to generate more government 
revenue. 
(c) Canal modernization could be more 
aggressively pursued with U.S. involvement. 
(d) A high degree of good will between 
the United States and Panama could assist Panama in 
integrating into GATT and NAFTA and might guarantee Panama 
U.S. support in international bodies, such as the World 
Bank. 
(2) Disadvantages 
(a) A major renegotiation would 
represent for Panama a major and embarrassing reversal of a 
decades-old foreign policy. 
(b) It would be a failure of the 
Panamanian national spirit and an admission to the world of 
Panama's inferiority. 
(c) Any Panamanian leader who makes such 
a move will pay dearly politically.  In the recent 
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presidential election, only one candidate clearly stated the 
desire to renegotiate the treaties, Ruben Dario "Chinchorro" 
Carles.  He received only 16.2% of the vote. 
(d) A national referendum is required by 
the constitution for any change to the current treaties. 
3. Option 3: Partial Renegotiation 
This option represents the middle ground.  It could 
allow for the spirit of the Carter-Torrijos treaties to be 
implemented, but could allow for some continued U.S. 
involvement in the management of the Canal and limited 
maintenance of bases.  This option does not represent any 
great change in the foreign policies of the United States or 
Panama, but would allow for talks that could address 
concerns of both parties, for instance:   more Panamanian 
participation in the management of the Canal before 2000; 
some U.S. or international role in the management of the 
Canal after 2000;  or limited U.S. basing rights in Panama 
after the year 2000. 
a. From the U.S. point of view 
(1) Advantages 
(a) Continued U.S. involvement in the 
management of the Canal would allow the United States to 
monitor the material status of the Canal. 
(b) Panama could be prevented from going 
to a third source for capital (possibly Japan), thus 
maintaining U.S. influence. 
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(c) A limited military presence could 
give the U.S. a base for regional operations and protection 
of the Canal. 
(2) Disadvantages 
(a) It is likely that some would oppose 
U.S. involvement of any type;  this could endanger the 
Canal.7 
(b) From a financial point of view, 
continued U.S. involvement in the management of the Canal 
would likely require further U.S. investment in updating the 
Canal for use by larger vessels. 
bo From the Paaafuaiiian point of view 
(1) Advantages 
(a) Panama might be able to renegotiate 
some of the problem areas in the Panama Canal Act, 
particularly those aspects of the Act that limit increasing 
Panamanian involvement in management.  For example, in 
exchange for some future role as observer, the U.S. might be 
inclined to give the Panama Canal Administrator more leeway 
in dealing with the transition period. 
(b) A continuing U.S. military presence, 
at least on the side of the Canal opposite Panama City 
(Howard and /or Rodman) could preserve some of the jobs that 
would be lost should a total U.S. withdrawal occur.  There 
7This is an old argument that has been around since 1964. 
While I have restated it, I cannot identify any specific threat. 
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are currently 5,400 Panamanian employed on the U.S. bases in 
Panama.8 
(2) Disadvantages 
(a) Some Panamanians (a small but vocal 
minority) would view a change in the treaties as treason 
(remember the impeachment of Robles). 
(b) The opposition (specifically, the 
Arnulfistas) would use any renegotiation attempt against the 
PRD in the 1999 elections. 
(c) Part of the populist, Noriegista 
segment of the PRD would likely split off from President 
Perez Balladares and PRD moderates should they opt for any 
renegotiation with the United States. 
4. A Summary of the Hypothetical Options 
Each of the three options outlined above have 
advantages and disadvantages for the United States and 
Panama.  Both nations share a common interest in wanting to 
see the continued smooth operation of the Canal.  This 
common desire makes it equally advantageous to the United 
States and the government of Panama that actions not be 
taken that might alienate nationalistic, anti-U.S. segments 
of the population that could endanger the lives of U.S. 
citizens in Panama and threaten the smooth operation of the 
Canal. ' 
a. Option 1: Complete implementation with no 
8Shirley Christian, New York Times, 19 April 1992, p. 1-7 
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This is an acceptable alternative for both the 
United States and Panama«  It is extremely attractive in the 
short term for both parties.  The United States can use the 
Canal and gain savings from the base closures.  Panama 
restores its national sovereignty and gains the opportunity 
to develop reverted properties. 
The long term prospects for this option are more 
gloomy.  The Canal could fall into disrepair and there will 
be a power vacuum left as U.S. forces depart the region. 
Should the 21st century contain great power contention or 
conflict involving the United States, then the lack of U.S. 
involvement and/or presence in Panama will be a strategic 
deficit that could perhaps reguire (1) significant U.S. 
investment to assist a friendly Panama to restore the Canal 
to operational status;  (2) unilateral military action to 
guarantee the ability of the U.S. to use the Canal to the 
nation's strategic advantage;  or (3) increased warship and 
sealift construction to allow the U.S. military to support 
worldwide operations without using the Panama Canal. 
bo Option 2%   Complete renegotiation with major 
changes 
The immediate political price of this option is 
very high.  It represents a major reversal of both nations' 
current foreign policies.  This option would only be 
perceived as feasible if a major threat were bearing down on 
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the region, which obviously is not the case.  This option 
could allow for the status quo operations of the Canal and 
defense sites, but would set up both the Canal and 
Department of Defense facilities in Panama as targets in a 
new nationalistic struggle against U.S. imperialism. 
Implementation of this option would likely require a 
reversal to pre-1979 Canal Zone conditions (i.e. increased 
United States control and less Panamanian access).  While 
this is an option, it is not practicable. 
c. Option 3: Partial renegotiation 
This option represents some short-term political 
costs and good potential long-term advantages.  Should the 
United States proposed discussions, President Perez 
Balladares could accept partial renegotiation for 
"nationalistic" reasons, e.g. to preserve Panamanian jobs or 
to gain more Panamanian involvement in pre-2000 Canal 
management.  He could also suggest that partial 
renegotiation is part of the effort to strengthen ties with 
future NAFTA trading partners.  Perez Balladares, by giving 
sound reasoning and reassuring Panamanians that the issue 
will ultimately be decided by referendum, could avoid much 
of the political fallout that might accompany a total 
renegotiation proposal.  The long term advantages would be 
more efficient operation of the Canal (should there be some 
U.S. or international involvement) and an increase in Canal 
customer confidence (an outgrowth of a continued U.S. 
193 
, hi i sl t . hi t
l low er t anal
, t oul t t anal
epart ent ef s il t  
ti alist ru l i st . . peri l .
pl entati t oul ik i  
r l 1 anal dit .
nit t t tr l ani ess). hil
ti , t r ti l .
. pti arti l oti
hi t t r term lit l
st t nti l erm ant es. l
nit t t i s, r t r
all r l t rti l oti t
ti alist s, . . ani
i or ani n v ent 2 anal
anage ent. l est t rti l
oti t rt rt ren it
ra rt ers. r all ares,
ania s t
ill l im t erendu , l i uc
lit l t t i ht o  l
oti t osal. erm t oul
or t er t anal l
. . l n ent) anal
o er f t t . .
presence). 
Bo PREDICTIOMS OF PÄMM5MIÄM F0R1IGM POLICf BEHÄVI0H 
In conclusion, the three levels of analysis that were 
considered by chapters III, IV, and V--the international 
system, domestic politics, and leadership--will be brought 
together in an attempt to explain how Panamanian foreign 
policy is likely to develop as the year 2000 approaches. 
L Systemic Factors 
In post-Cold War Latin America, the old anti-U.S., 
anti-free market rhetoric is increasingly passe.  Throughout 
the region, former left-of-center populists have become the 
latest disciples of neo-liberal economics.  Examples include 
Argentina's Carlos Saul Menem, Brazil's Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, Chile's Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tangle, Mexico's Ernesto 
Zedillo, and Panama's Ernesto Perez Balladares. 
An inherent part of the new neo-liberal thought in 
Latin America is the concept of regional trading blocks. 
The current blocs in the Western Hemisphere are NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, CARICOM, and the Central American 
Common Market.  Since the December 1994 Summit of the 
Americas in Miami, there is regional consensus that a single 
Americas Free Trade Association (AFTA) should be in place by 
2005.  This organization will seemingly be built around 
NAFTA and may be joined by blocs (such as MERCOSUR) or by 
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resisted joining the Central American Common Market and the 
Panamanian government has made it clear that Panama desires 
a bilateral agreement with the United States in order to 
join NAFTA significantly ahead of neighboring states. 
The reality of the New World Order—dominated by 
regional trading blocs like the European Union--makes good 
relations among the American states highly desirable for all 
parties.  For Panama—a small service-oriented state which 
is so far not a member of the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) and which has resisted integration with the 
Central American Common Market—the New Order makes good 
bilateral relations with the United States a necessity.  In 
my estimate, the systemic determinants on Panamanian foreign 
policy are encouraging increased cooperation with the United 
States. 
2. Domestic Political Limitations 
The nature of the New Oligarchy's domestic politics is 
also a positive influence on President Perez Balladares. 
The traditional commercial ruling elite of Panama City have 
historically been predisposed to good relations with the 
United States.  However, anti-United States popular protest 
can turn the ruling elite against the United States out of 
the desire for self-preservation.  This was the case in the 
1920's, in 1948, and in 1964. 
President Perez Balladares, like no leader since 
Torrijos, is in an excellent position to manage the domestic 
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politics of Panama.  His credentials as a Torrijista and a 
businessman give him firm support from two of the major 
groups in Panamanian domestic politics.  He has also reached 
out to members of the former Panamanian Defense Forces and 
met with positive response.  Elected by the largest 
political party in Panama, Perez Balladares has enlarged his 
coalition since election.  It is likely that—like Menem in 
Argentina—Perez Balladares is transforming the political 
spectrum in Panama and gaining new support from segments 
that in the past were beholden to the Arnulfistas, MOLIRENA, 
or other parties to the right.  While aiming for neo-liberal 
goals that satisfy many in the commercial sector, Perez 
Balladares has utilized his mantel as a populist Torrijista 
to retain the support of the popular classes. 
President Perez Balladares's position within Panama's 
domestic political system is positive for the United States. 
Should the United States opt to seek a partial renegotiation 
of the Canal treaties with Panama and if Perez Balladares 
should view the proposal positively, then the likelihood of 
success in renegotiation and national referendum is high. 
Perez Balladares is the politician that can make it happen; 
as pointed out in chapter 4, Perez Balladares knows how to 
bailar la vara (dance the stick) better than any Panamanian 
politician since Omar Torrijos. 
3o Leaderships President Ernesto Perez Balladares, 
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Despite his previous role as a PRD party leader during 
the rule of Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega, President 
Perez Balladares seems to be disposed towards good relations 
with the United States.  If history is an indicator, then 
Perez Balladares —as a member of Panama's urban, upper 
class—is likely to continue showing a friendliness towards 
the United States. 
While Perez Balladares's U.S. education does not 
indicate any particular political disposition towards the 
United States, it at least ensures a degree of good 
communications between the Panamanian President and U.S. 
leadership. 
Having been elected, thus enjoying a "rational" source 
of legitimacy, Perez Balladares is unlikely to use the 
Panamanian masses against U.S. interests, as did past 
populist, charismatic leaders like Arnulfo Arias and Omar 
Torrijos.  This would seem to indicate that any 
renegotiation of U.S.-Panamanian treaty arrangements could 
possibly be conducted in a more tranquil climate than that 
in the 1970's.  Instead of facing government orchestrated 
protests, any protests against treaty discussions in the 
1990's will likely be organized by the opposition parties. 
4. Levels of Analysis; Is There One Best Approach for 
Panama? 
In considering the three levels of analysis surveyed in 
this thesis, they are all useful.  While studying the 
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international system is helpful in understanding the general 
atmosphere of the times and studying the leadership style of 
an individual can give some insight into how a leader might 
react, it is the domestic politics level of analysis that 
remains the most difficult to understand.  In Panama, the 
domestic politics level of analysis represents the principal 
threat to closer Panaraanian-U.S. relations.  Should any 
negotiations begin on the post-1999 Ü.S.-Panamanian 
relation, it is this area that U.S. analysts study most.  It 
should be remembered that domestic opposition leaders can 
paralyze the government in power if their interests are not 
met by any new agreement.  Two classic examples from history 
are the failure of the 1948 bases agreement and the forced 
shelving of the Johnson-Robles Treaty in 1967.  Negotiating 
an acceptable agreement with the government in power is 
simply not sufficient to guarantee success.  Rather, all 
sectors of Panamanian domestic politics must be included: 
the commercial elite, the political parties, the police, the 
masses (i.e. popular opinion), and labor.  Failure to 
satisfy any one of these could force the Panamanian 
government to abandon the process, to bailar la vara, and 
concentrate on survival. 
C= RECÖMMESFBÄTIOHS FOR U.S. POLICY-MAKERS 
1. What Pere^ Balladares Caamot Do 
President Perez Balladares, because he has to maintain 
his support base and his credentials as a nationalist, will 
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not approach the United States to request that U.S. bases 
remain in Panama.  If the United States decides for 
strategic reasons that bases in Panama should be maintained, 
then the U.S. must approach Perez Balladares with a proposal 
to initiate renegotiations. 
2. Facing Reality 
The reality that the Canal will be controlled by 
Panamanians as of 31 December 1999 should be accepted. 
Under the current legislation, the commission will continue 
as a U.S. government agency with appropriated funding until 
31 December 1999, when it will turned over to Panamanian 
control.  If the crippling bureaucracy of the Panamanian 
government is applied to the PCC, the Canal could be clogged 
with a mass of paper, stamps, signatures, and seals.  A 
meaningful effort must be made to ensure a smooth transition 
and not just a United States departure.9 
3. "Moderation in All Things..." 
On the issue of bases, there is a greater possibility 
of maintaining a U.S. presence if a medium-sized presence is 
sought.  This view is based on the comments of Fernando 
Eleta C, who pointed out the importance of employment for 
Panamanians in any agreement for maintaining bases in 
9Everardo Bösquez et al, "El Canal de Panama y su 
Administracion a Partir del Ano 2000" in Tareas 85 (Sept.-Dec. 
1993) (Panama: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, 1993), p. 27 
addresses changing Panama's constitution to deal with gaining 
control of the Canal. 
199 
t nit t t est t . .
ai a. nit t t i
t l aintai ,
. . ust r all r it  sal
oti t s.
. ci eali
l t anal ill tr l
ania s e ber l t .
nder r t i , missi ill t
 . . ent it r pri til
e ber 9, he ill r ani
ntr l. r ani
ent l , anal l o
it  ass er, a ps, t r s, l .  
eaningful rt ust a r  oot io
t t  u i t t art re. 9 
. oderati ll i s ..  " 
ses,  t ssibili
aint i  . . edi -si
ht. hi e ents
l t .,· i t t ort pl ent
ania s ent aint i
9Everar 6s t l, l anal am&  
drninistr i6  arti l na ar t c.
) P nam&: ent st i at eri os, 3), .
r i a's sti l it i
tr l anal.
Panama.10 Basing rights, with no or few actual forces in 
Panama, do not help Panama solve its large unemployment 
problem» 
4o Avoid Conflict with Business Interests 
There is a greater possibility of maintaining bases in 
Panama if bases are sought that avoid conflict with business 
interests.  Fernando Eleta C. pointed out that the two 
groups most likely to oppose any continued U.S. presence are 
(1) intellectuals and (2) businessmen.11 These businessmen 
are interested in acquiring reverted properties and the most 
coveted properties appear to be those on the Pacific, Panama 
City side of the Canal, i.e. Amador, Albrook, Clayton. 
There have been discussions of what to do with each of these 
bases.  However, there has been relatively little interest 
in the side opposite Panama City, i.e. Howard, Rodman, and 
Kobbe.  Discussions of what to do with reverted areas in 
Colon have also been rather muted. 
Another factor that must be considered is the effect on 
business interests of future plans to upgrade the Panama 
Canal.  According to Fernando Eleta C, the recommendations 
for Canal upgrades that resulted from the Panama-U.S.-Japan 
study of the Canal's future included new locks to be built 
about 2020.12 At the Canal's Pacific terminal, the new 
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locks would go where Rodman Naval Base is now located-- 
virtually destroying the base.  This plan might discourage 
Panamanian businessmen from developing Rodman and make the 
Panamanian government interested, but hard pressed, to find 
an interim use for the facility. 
D. CLOSURE 
The U.S.-Panamanian relationship has been a cornerstone 
and principal measure of the United States' relationship 
with Latin America as a whole.  It has been the field of 
play of great and sometimes controversial men like Philippe 
Bunau-Varilla, Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, John 
Hay, Manuel Amador, Franklin Roosevelt, Harmodio' Arias 
Madrid, Arnulfo Arias Madrid, Jose Remon Cantera, Dwight 
Eisenhower, Marco Robles, Lyndon Johnson, Omar Torrijos, and 
Jimmy Carter. 
The importance of this relationship to the United 
States was recognized by Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge, and 
Mahan.  As architects of the United States' "Large Policy," 
these "Expansionists of 1898" had a geopolitical view of the 
United States position in the world, dominance in the 
Caribbean, and significance as a two-ocean power.  While the 
American expansion into Panama, the Philippines, Hawaii, 
Guam, Cuba, etc. was considered carefully in the context of 
U.S. strategic interests, the withdrawal from this fading 
empire of overseas bases and possessions seems to be 
occurring in an ad hoc fashion. 
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This thesis has not made the case that the Panama Canal 
is vital for U.S. security.  This argument has been made 
many times, since it was articulated by Mahan.  For any 
reader seriously interested in U.S. security, sufficient 
information is available to prove that the Panama Canal is 
important to the United States, both militarily and 
commercially. 
This thesis is meant as a tool for policy makers who 
(1) already recognize the importance of the Panama Canal to 
U.S. security; and (2) are interested in what is possible 
between 1995 and 2000 in Panamanian foreign policy.  This 
thesis has used three levels of analysis--the international 
system, domestic politics, and leadership—to view the 
possibilities and limitations for Panamanian foreign policy 
under President Ernesto Perez Balladares. 
All of the levels of analysis seem to indicate the 
possibility of continued good relations with Panama during 
the 1990's.  This provides an opportunity for U.S. policy 
makers and strategic planners to deal with the Perez 
Balladares government in meeting the United States' 
legitimate security concerns. 
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